INTRODUCTION
It is a great honor to me to be invited to address this gathering
of important sons, daughters and friends of Benin on the occasion
of the 5th Chief (Dr.) Jacob Uwadiae Egharevba (MBE)
memorial lecture.
Therefore, I would like to express my profound appreciation to the
Institute for Benin Studies, ably coordinated by Uyilawa
Usuanlele. The Institute’s
foresight and persistence in organizing this annual event rightly
honors a deserving son of Benin, whose priceless historical
scholarship in difficult circumstances has placed key aspects of our
history as a people on record for present and future generations.
In coming before you today, I am humbly following the path of more
eminently qualified individuals before me. Professor Unionmwan Edebiri set the tone when he spoke on "Benin
and the outer world." Professor Eghosa
Osagie reflected on "Benin in
contemporary Nigeria." Dr. Iro
Eweka reminded us that "We are, because
he was." Professor Peter P. Ekeh
then reached deep into the archives of our ancestry when he
presented " Ogiso Times and Eweka Times: A preliminary history of
the Edoid Complex of Cultures."
I am neither a professional political scientist nor historian. However, story telling is part of our culture and tradition. It is one of the ways ordinary folk have passed the story of our
people from one generation to another for centuries. When I was originally invited to deliver today’s lecture, I
tossed and turned for many months. What
singular event in my lifetime, I wondered, did the most, even at a
tender age, to shape my sense of whom I am? What was so singularly unique in its ramifications, as told to me
by my father, that I could sit in the moonlight and tell it again
and again to my children, and someday, God willing, to my
grandchildren and great grandchildren? That event was the MIDWEST REFERENDUM OF 1963, when I was four
years old.
The title of my essay today is the story of “Benin and the Midwest referendum”.
Why Benin? After all, two provinces (Benin and Delta), and many
divisions (including the Benin division) in what became the
“Mid-West” were involved in the “War” to
create the Midwest region in 1963.
There are two reasons. First, the
history of the Midwest referendum and events leading to it is
exceedingly vast and cannot in all honesty be addressed in a single
lecture without losing focus. Secondly,
I found a curious excerpt in the report of the Henry Willink
Commission:
“In general, it is our view that desire for the State is
strong in Benin City and Benin division, the heart of the old Benin
Kingdom, and that the idea has progressively less appeal as one
moves outwards from this centre.” [Colonial Office: Nigeria - Report of
the Commission appointed to enquire into the fears of Minorities
and the means of allaying them. July 30th, 1958. Chapter 4, page
31]
This prompted me to know more about why Benin came to be considered
by the Minorities Commission as the epicenter of the Midwest State
Movement and how she mobilized herself and others to join hands to
prosecute the “war for the Midwest”.
I shall conclude with two take-home messages:
a). Political parties come and go, but nationalities remain.
PREAMBLE
On March 29th, 1963 the Federal Ministry of Internal
Affairs of Nigeria was given the responsibility for the organization
of a referendum to decide whether a new Region should be created out
of the Western region in a sub-region called “the
Mid-West”, comprised of the Benin and Delta provinces.
Preliminary guidelines were contained in an official letter signed
by Mr. F.B.O. Williams on behalf of the Permanent Secretary,
Ministry of Internal Affairs. In
accordance with the Constitutional Referendum Regulations, 1963,
Mr. Gabriel Esezobor Edward Longe, Barrister-at-Law was
earlier appointed on January 21st as the Supervisor and
empowered to appoint other referendum officials. It was projected
that about 71 officials, all Nigerians of Midwest origin, drawn from
the Federal Public Service, Corporations in the Federal territory
and from other suitable institutions, working full time for about
three months, would be required. On the
day of the referendum, about 9,300 additional officials were
anticipated to be required for operations. The Command Center for the Referendum was designated as No. 2
King’s Square, Benin City. It was to that office that all
referendum officials reported on Saturday, April 6, 1963 to begin
their historic assignment.
The appointed Referendum and Assistant Referendum Officers for the
various districts of the Mid-West are listed in Appendix One
(1).
On the 24th of June 1963, by order of the Federation of
Nigeria Extraordinary Official Gazette No. 43, Volume 50, the
Supervisor of the Mid-West referendum issued Government Notice No.
1265.
It declared that voting at the Constitutional referendum for the
creation of the Mid-Western Region would proceed on Saturday, the
13th day of July 1963. The
referendum question was as follows:
“Do you agree that the Midwestern Region Act, 1962, shall
have effect so as to secure that Benin Province including Akoko
Edo District in the Afenmai Division and Delta Province including
Warri Division and Warri Urban Township area shall be included in
the proposed Mid-Western Region?”
Hours of voting at designated Polling Stations extended from seven
o’clock in the forenoon until six o’clock in the
evening. It is important to note that a
new Voters registration List was not compiled for the purposes of
the Mid-West referendum. Only those listed four years earlier in the Federal Electoral
Register of 1959 were entitled to vote. Those who wished to vote
“yes” were to place their ballot papers in the
“white box”. Those who wished to vote
“no” were to place their ballot papers in the
“black box”.
The results of the Referendum were as follows [GE Longe: Results of the Midwest
Referendum, 1963. July 18, 1963. From D.A. Omoigui archives.]
|
No. |
District |
Votes Scored by Eligible Voters |
|
|
|
|
Affirmative Answer “YES” |
Negative Answer
“NO” |
|
1 |
ABOH |
33,072 |
722 |
|
2 |
AFENMAI |
76,998 |
1,260 |
|
3 |
ASABA |
68,637 |
365 |
|
4 |
BENIN |
130,562 |
2,081 |
|
5 |
ISHAN |
73,088 |
563 |
|
6 |
URHOBO |
150,382 |
273 |
|
7 |
WARRI |
30,703 |
1,377 |
|
8 |
WESTERN IJAW |
15,635 |
577 |
|
|
Total |
579,077 |
7,218 |
The total number of eligible voters, being persons whose names
appeared in the Federal Electoral register of 1959 was 654,130. Of this number the percentage that voted in the affirmative was
89.07%, well in excess of the required 60% (or 392,478) for the
creation of the Mid-West region. The
region that was born on August 9, 1963 as a result of the July
13th plebiscite remains the only major administrative
unit of Nigeria created by due constitutional process.
EVENTS LEADING UP TO THE REFERENDUM
FROM 1897 – 1933
As is well known, Benin City, capital of the independent Benin
Kingdom and Empire, and traditional spiritual center of Edo speaking
people fell to British troops on February 19, 1897. From that day onwards we became part of the British colonial system
and whatever administrative structures its agents and latter day
surrogates created. The last independent Oba, Idugbowa Ovonramwen Ogbaisi, was deported
to Calabar on September 13th, 1897, where he died in
1914. [Jacob Egharevba: A Short History of Benin. Ibadan University
Press, 1968, p60]
In the meantime, Benin was administered as part of the Niger Coast
Protectorate, which later became the Protectorate of Southern
Nigeria in 1900. From 1906
“Southern Nigeria” was administered as three main
provinces, Western, Central and Eastern, along with the Lagos colony
with which it had been merged that year. The Eastern province was run from Calabar, the Central Province
from Warri, and the Western Province from Lagos. The Central Province was also known as the Niger province. It
consisted of the Aboh, Agbor, Asaba, Awka, Benin, Forcados, Idah,
Ifon, Ishan, Kwale, Okwoga, Onitsha, Sapele, Udi and Warri
districts. The protectorate of Northern
Nigeria, on the other hand, was initially organized into 13
provinces (run by Provincial residents) before Ilorin and Kabba were
merged into one. According to the
“Anthropological Report on the Edo speaking
peoples”
by Northcote Thomas in 1910, Edo-speaking peoples were mainly
located in the Central Province of “Southern Nigeria”
and the Ibie and Ukpilla districts of Kabba province of
“Northern Nigeria.”
The protectorates and colonies of Northern and Southern Nigeria
were later amalgamated on January 1st 1914 to create
“Nigeria”. [FD Lugard:
Report on the Amalgamation of Northern and Souther Nigeria, and
administration, 1912 – 1919. H.M. Stationery Office, 1920]. In
Benin, after a 17 year interregnum, Prince Aiguobasimwin, (also
known as Ovbiudu – the courageous one) eldest son of Oba
Ovonramwen, was crowned Oba Eweka II on July 24, 1914. Indeed, the splendor of that coronation ceremony is what initially
triggered the interest of the late Jacob Egharevba to write down the
history of his people. Dr. Ekhaguosa
Aisien has eloquently discussed the remarkable story of how Eweka II
regained the throne against incredible odds in his paper
“Edo Man of the Twentieth Century.”
[http://www.dawodu.net/aisien.htm] The Ibie and Ukpilla districts of Kabba province of “Northern
Nigeria” were merged with their kith and kin in the Benin
province of “Southern Nigeria” in 1918.
After 1897, the opening of core traditional Benin lands to
so-called “legal trade” in Oil Palm and Forestry by
British agents and surrogates created new opportunities and
encouraged mass migrations of southern Edoid peoples, among who were
the Urhobo. The period of the
interregnum also witnessed aggressive missionary activity,
establishment of schools, institution of a system of Warrant Chiefs
and the beginnings of what later became the western educated
elite. After 1914, the structure of the
colonial Benin Native Council provided a platform for competition
between elements of the new elite (like Iyase Agho Obaseki) who
controlled the District Council, and the Oba. The Oba was further weakened by not being allowed to collect taxes,
appoint chiefs without British consent or control land designated as
reserved for Government activity. Following the introduction of polls and direct taxation in 1920,
the new westernized elite in Benin became increasingly epitomized in
the years to come by social and later political groups known at
various times as the “Benin Tax-Payers Association” and
“Benin Community”. With the
restoration of the indigenous monarchy on one hand, and the
simultaneous nurturing of a colonial proxy elite on the other,
therefore, two tracks in the leadership of Benin were invoked and
waxing and waning tensions inevitably developed between them [Igbafe: Benin under British Administration].
In spite of British gerrymandering, primordial linguistic and
cultural bonds (and differences) that had evolved over centuries
could not be wished away overnight. The
appropriate administrative structure for Nigeria was, therefore,
always a source of controversy during the colonial era, as evidenced
by the number of constitutions that were promulgated in 1922
(Clifford), 1946 (Richards), 1951 (Macpherson), 1954, and finally
1960. Since
independence in 1960, our flirtation with numerous constitutions in
1963, 1979, 1989, 1995 and 1999 as well as states creation exercises
and calls for a “sovereign national conference”
continues to reflect this dilemma.
For example, early British administrators toyed with various
proposals for combining groups of provinces into regions and thus
nullifying the distinction between “Northern Nigeria”
and “Southern Nigeria”. In
1912, the Editor of the African Mail, Mr. E. D. Morel,
suggested that Nigeria be consolidated into the Northern, Central,
Western and Eastern provinces [ED Morel:
Nigeria, Its Peoples and Problems, London, 1912, p201-10,
2nd Edition]. Charles
L. Temple, one time Resident of Bauchi and later Lt. Governor of
Northern Nigeria, proposed seven provinces, namely, the Hausa
States, Benue Province, Chad Territory, Western, Central and Eastern
provinces along with the Lagos colony. The Governor-General, Sir
Frederick John Dealtry Lugard accepted neither of these proposals.
Thus after amalgamation, Northern and Southern Nigeria were left
intact under powerful Lt. Governors while the three previous large
provinces of Southern Nigeria, which had been run by Provincial
Commissioners, were broken down into smaller provinces and placed
under Provincial Residents. Northern
Nigeria comprised the Sokoto, Kano, Bornu, Bauchi, Zaria, Nupe,
Kontagora, Ilorin, Nassarawa, Munshi (Tiv), Muri and Yola
provinces. The old “Central
province” of Southern Nigeria was split into the Benin and
Warri provinces. The “Eastern
Province” was divided into the provinces of Calabar, Ogoja,
Onitsha and Owerri. The “Western
province” became the Abeokuta, Ondo and Oyo provinces, joined
thereafter by the new Ijebu province in 1916. Lagos remained The Colony. But
some provinces were more equal than others, in Lugard’s
eyes. Those that were “more
important” were classified as “First Class”
provinces. These were the Sokoto, Kano,
Bornu, Bauchi, Zaria, Oyo, Owerri and Abeokuta provinces. [FD
Lugard:
Report on the Amalgamation of Northern and Souther Nigeria, and
administration, 1912 – 1919. H.M. Stationery Office, 1920]. The headquarters of the Southern
Provinces was later moved from Lagos to Enugu in 1929.
Even in those early days, there were already stirrings of
nationalism. In October 1923, Humphrey
Omoregie Osagie, then only a 27-year-old clerk, delivered a
political lecture in Lagos under the auspices of Herbert Macaulay
and the Nigerian National Democratic Party. The young man from Benin would one day become a Titan in the
struggle for emancipation of his people. [A. J. Uwaifo: Omo-Osagie and Party Politics in Benin, Department
of History, University of Ibadan, May 1985]
Meanwhile, Oba Eweka II became increasingly concerned about the
long-term implications of various administrative proposals for new
regions that would ride roughshod over the unique history and
independence of most of the peoples of the Central Province, which
later became the Benin and Warri Provinces. Therefore, in 1926, he requested the British to bring all the Edoid
and Anioma (Western Ibo) areas together in one region that would
have a direct reporting relationship with the center. He argued that
the people of the Benin and Warri provinces were predominantly of
one linguistic, cultural, religious, chieftaincy and historical
stock and had functioned in the same cultural system before the
British came. [File BP 44,VOL 1, The Oba of Benin. National Archives,
Ibadan].
To the best of my knowledge, therefore, Oba Eweka II, in 1926, was
the first, following the dissolution of the old Central province, to
conceptualize the consolidation of what later became the Midwest
region of Nigeria in 1963. It was during
his reign that the first pan-Edo association called the Institute
for Home-Benin improvement emerged in 1932. Its mandate - according
to its own documents - was to represent the "Edo speaking people of
Nigeria viz: Benin City, Ishan, Kukuruku, Ora, Agbor, Igbanke, Sobe
etc." [Uyilawa Usuanlele: The Edo Nationality and the National Question
in Nigeria: A Historical perspective. In Osaghae and Onwudiwe
(Eds). The Management of the National Question in Nigeria. PEFS.
Ibadan 2001] In the
same year, Thomas Erukeme, Mukoro Mowoe, Omorowhovo Okoro and others
formed the Edoid Urhobo Brotherly Society in Warri.
Unfortunately, Oba Eweka II joined his ancestors on February 8,
1933 and did not live to see his dream come true. It was, therefore, on the shoulders of his son, Oba Akenzua II,
crowned on April 5, 1933, after overcoming opposition from his older
sister that the spiritual and royal leadership of the future Midwest
State Movement was to fall. [H Osadolo Edomwonyi: A Short
Biography of Oba Akenzua II. Bendel Newspapers Corporation,
1981.]
FROM 1934 - 1945
The Urhobo Brotherly Society evolved into the Urhobo Progressive
Union in 1934, and was later known as the Urhobo Progress Union
(UPU). This tightly knit organization
would prove to be a powerful ally in the fight for the Midwest. In 1935, the Institute for Home-Benin improvement lobbied for an
Edo speaking person to represent the Benin province in the
Legislative council. Up until then Benin
was represented by a Yoruba trader called Mr. I. T. Palmer who was
living in Sapele. This wish was
eventually granted when Gaius Obaseki became the first Edo speaking
representative on the Legislative council in the early forties (Usuanlele op. cit.). In 1937, the first conference
of traditional Obas and rulers in the Southern Provinces of Nigeria
took place in Oyo. At that meeting a
decision was taking to rotate the venue of the meetings to the
domains of various prominent rulers. Coincidentally, the Ibo State Union was also formed that
year.
Then in 1939, what Oba Eweka II had feared came to pass. The ten Southern Provinces (along with the Cameroon trusteeship
province) were consolidated around the Igbo and Yoruba nationalities
into two groups now called the “Eastern provinces” based
at Enugu, and the “Western Provinces” based at Ibadan.
In this new set-up, the Benin and Warri provinces of the independent
old “Central Province” were now part of the so-called
“Western group” with the River Niger as a natural
boundary. The “Anioma” or
“Western Ibo” subgroup of the Benin province, led by
Asaba indigenes, requested to be merged with the Aboh division of
the Warri province in a new Western Ibo province, but were overruled
by the British because of the advent of the Second World War. [JIG Onyia:
My role in Nationalism. 1986 JID Printers Ltd. Asaba]. Oba Akenzua II took note of the Asaba-led agitation. However, in
the years preceding it, he was distracted by internal problems in
Benin like the Forest reserve dispute of 1934, the abolition of
District Heads in 1935, Uzebu uprising and Benin water rate
agitation of 1936 – 1940 [Igbafe, op. cit.] . It was not long, however, before the Richards Constitution of 1947
crystallized both groups of provinces into the Eastern and Western
“regions” of Southern Nigeria, each with its own
Regional Assembly. The old
“Northern Nigeria” remained as one large region.
Professor P.A. Igbafe has discussed much of the dynamics of
colonial rule and its impact on traditional Benin in his outstanding
book “Benin under British Administration”. The late Jacob Egharevba
also discussed tensions between Oba Akenzua, a few of his prominent
chiefs (like Iyase Okoro-Otun) and the emerging Benin educated and
commercial elite in his seminal book
“A Short History of Benin.” Such tensions were driven by different
agendas but manifested opportunistically from time to time. Nevertheless, these tensions - which undermined the Oba’s
stature and even threatened his throne - were temporarily resolved
after negotiated concessions following appeals from British
officials and Traditional Rulers in other jurisdictions, like
Warri.
During this era too, Oba Akenzua II, motivated by visions of a
united pan-Edoid nation, agreed to the British proposal for transfer
of large tracts of land from the Benin province to the Warri
province for “administrative convenience. Affected tenants, who agreed to continue to pay royalty in return,
populated such lands, many of which had opened up after 1897,
including places like Jesse, Ogharefe and other lands across the
Ethiope River - which are now in the Delta State portion of the
former Midwest.
In August 1942, the conference of traditional Obas and rulers in
what was now the Western Provinces of Nigeria took place in Benin
City. It is said that at
that meeting, there was an attempt to speak Yoruba as the Lingua
Franca, thus causing some irritation among delegates from the Benin
and Warri provinces. Nevertheless, the
Second World War was in progress and all efforts were focused on its
successful prosecution, so sleeping dogs were allowed to lie. The war was interrupted only by reports that the Institute for
Home-Benin Improvement had transformed into the Edo National Union
in 1943 and that Nnamdi Azikiwe proposed
eight (8) protectorates in his “Political Blueprint for
Nigeria” [RL Sklar: Nigerian Political Parties. Princeton, 1963]. At about this time tribal unions like the Bauchi Improvement
Association, Ibibio State Union, and the Pan-Ibo Federal Union
became known. The pro-independence
National Council for Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC) was
formed by Herbert Macaulay in 1944. It attracted many young educated elite from the Benin and Warri
provinces initially. Among them were men
like Mr. Anthony Enahoro, TJ Akagbosu, Chief Gaius Obaseki, Arthur
Prest, O.N. Rewane, Begho and Edukugho. [EA Enahoro: Fugitive Offender, London: Cassell, 1966]
AFTER WORLD WAR II
In 1945, two significant events occurred in Benin. Chief Humphrey Omo-Osagie, already mentioned earlier in this essay,
retired from the public service and quietly returned to Benin. He was an ex-student of King’s College Lagos where he was a
Schoolmate of Oba Akenzua. 1945 was also
the year that Oba Akenzua re-established the Aruosa Church as the
Edo National Church of God. He later
wrote its catechism and published two volumes of liturgical books as
well as a rule-book based on its constitution.
In the same year, Michael Adekunle Ajasin and Jeremiah Obafemi
Awolowo conceptualized founding the “non-political”
exclusively Yoruba vanguard cultural group called the
Egbe Omo Oduduwa (Society of
Descendants of Oduduwa) in London. It
would later be formalized in 1947 and then metamorphose into the
Action Group political party in 1950/51. [Sklar, op cit]
After the war, the momentum for independence began to gather
strongly, led by Macaulay until his untimely death in 1946 when
Nnamdi Azikiwe took over the leadership of the NCNC. By this time Obafemi Awolowo had begun staking positions publicly
and was quoted in 1947 as saying, “Opportunity must be
afforded to each group to evolve its own peculiar political
institutions.” [Awolowo: Awo – The autobiography of Chief Obafemi Awolowo.
Cambridge University Press, 1960]
Indeed, one of the controversial issues of that era was the extent
to which Edo based parties and groups should ally themselves with
parties and groups outside the Edoid region. Oba Akenzua II was
opposed to external alliances because he saw them as a threat to Edo
National aspirations. In 1947, for example, there was a
conference of delegates from the Benin and Warri provinces at the
old Conference Hall in Benin City, where fears of domination in the
West were articulated.
On the other hand, some Edo speaking politicians like Anthony
Enahoro and Gaius Obaseki, for example, became disillusioned with
Nnamdi Azikiwe and the NCNC allegedly for Ibo leanings after
Macaulay’s death. [Enahoro, op. cit.] The Pan-Ibo Union had been
one of the founding organizations of the NCNC. However, Azikiwe later assumed its Presidency in 1948. The West African Pilot later quoted him in 1949 as saying “It
would appear that the God of Africa has created the Ibo nation to
lead the children of Africa from the bondage of
ages….”
Meanwhile deep discomfort in Benin with the provincial
administrative changes of 1939 was heightened by proposals in the
new Richards Constitution of 1946 for the formal creation of the
Eastern, Western and Northern Regions in Nigeria. The new constitution created a separate House of Assembly and House
of Chiefs in the Northern region. Initially, the Eastern and Western
regions were allotted a unicameral House of Assembly each, to which
were later added a House of Chiefs for each of the Regions. But back in Benin, Oba Akenzua II found himself once again in
dispute with elements of the “new elite” even as he kept
an eye on events at the national level.
Following the death of Iyase Okoro-Otun in 1943, efforts by the Oba
in November 1947 to abolish the title of Iyase (“Prime
Minister”) on account of his experience during the water rate
agitation were strongly opposed. Opposition was mobilised by the new “Benin Community
Tax-Payers Association” primarily formed to pressure the Oba
to confer the title of Iyase on a literate individual. Thus he reconsidered his position, even though supported by a group
of chiefs and prominent citizens including Omo-Osagie, Egbe
Omorogbe, Ogieva Emokpae, J. O. Edomwonyi, D.E. Uwaifo, C.Y. Legemah
etc. These chiefs and other men later
created the Edo Young People’s party [Edomwonyi, op. cit.] . After
an unsuccessful attempt to confer the title on Idehen, then the
Esogban of Benin, Oba Akenzua eventually conferred it in April 1948
on Hon. Gaius Obaseki, son of the late Iyase Agho Obaseki, some say
under pressure from British authorities. In the next few years to follow the Oba was subjected to
humiliations such as a decrease in his salary and ban from
conferring titles without permission [CN Ekwuyasi: Benin Situation as it is
today. Daily Times, April 26 1950, p8].
As the Iyase, Gaius Obaseki was executive Chairman of the
newly re-organized Benin Divisional Council while Oba Akenzua II was
the President. Obaseki was also the
concurrent Chairman of the Benin City Council and its powerful
Administrative Committee. In addition he
was elected the Oluwo or Leader of the influential Reformed
Ogboni Fraternity (ROF), a fact that would assume great significance
in the politics of Benin. The ROF was a
religious order said to be have been in existence since the late
19th century but formally founded in 1914 by African
Christian clergy led by Anglican Archdeacon Ogunbiyi. It was later introduced into Benin society from Yoruba land, (but
is different from the much older traditional Ogboni society of
Yoruba Obaship). The ROF describes
itself as the equivalent in the United States of “the
Freemasons, Odd Fellows Fraternity, The Rosicrucians, etc.
[Morton, Williams. The Yoruba Ogboni Cult in Oyo. AFRICA Vol. xxx 1960, p 362-374].
At the Benin provincial level, there were two conferences that
year, both marked in part by growing rivalries between two prominent
sons of Benin – Chiefs Gaius Obaseki and Humphrey
Omo-Osagie. It was also in May 1948 that
Bode Thomas, an emissary of Obafemi Awolowo paid a visit to the
Benin and Warri provinces to canvass support for a new political
party with a “Yoruba orientation”. The result of Bode Thomas’s visit was to split the hitherto
united nationalist front of young Midwest based politicians into
pro-NCNC and anti-NCNC factions. At
about this time, midwesterners barely took note of a new northern
organization called the Jamiyya Mutanen Arewa, which was founded in
May 1948. It would later evolve into the Northern Peoples Congress
(NPC), a political party that was destined to play a critical role
in the creation of the Midwest region after independence.
Anyway, having accepted the Iyase situation, on October
16th, 1948, Oba Akenzua II addressed the inauguration of
what was known as the
“Reformed Benin Community”, formed by Chief Humphrey Omo-Osagie in Benin:
He said, inter alia:
“The aims and ideals of this new political body seem very
laudable and there is no doubt that it will help develop usefully
like its counterparts, the Egbe Omo Oduduwa of the Yorubas, the
Federal Union of the Ibos and so on….
In the scheme of things, all Benins should strive for a state or
principality of Benin in the new Nigeria in the making. The Hausas, the Yorubas, the Ibos, and so on are on the move and
the fact that this or that non-Benin political party has awarded
scholarships to Binis for higher studies should not deprive us of
our identity, custom, tradition, language and culture, or lull us
into a false sense of security. …..
I believe Nigeria expects each of her states to do or mind its own
business, though all states have one common business to perform,
that is work together in order to achieve in a short time
independence for a United States of Nigeria.....
Therefore, the Richards Constitution in 1950 must aim at creating
more regions with full autonomy than there are at present, each with
its own Governor. At least there must be a fourth region to be known
as the Central or South West provinces……
I sincerely hope that the day will come when there will be a larger
body to be known as the Federal Union of the Central or South West
Provinces in which the Edo, Urhobo, Itsekiri, Ishan, Ora,
Ivbiosakon, Sobe and so on will be principal members of the
union…." [SOURCE: National Archives of Nigeria, Ibadan; File BP2647. Reformed Benin
Community. ]
Akenzua further advised the Reformed Benin Community to unite all
the Edos, critically study the Richards Constitution, which was due
for review, and make the creation of the new region the main focus
of the organization. At about this time, the only other voice that
was loudly heard in the wilderness of States agitation was that of
Barrister Udo Udoma who was the first to conceptualize the
Calabar-Ogoja-Rivers (COR) State.
Meanwhile, the new Iyase of Benin, Gaius Obaseki, was waxing
stronger, exploiting his unique concentration of powers. Jacob Egharevba wrote: “As
a result of various differences, ill-feeling grew up between the Oba
and the Iyase.” Professor
Igbafe was more direct:
“Like Cardinal Wolsey of Tudor England, Gaius Obaseki
concentrated power in his own hands with ruthless efficiency and
uncompromising vindictiveness against known
opponents……..The Ogboni began to indulge in excesses.
Gaius embarked on a vigorous membership drive. Those who held out were persecuted.
The result of this over-concentration of power in the hands of a
single individual and the excessive exercise of that power
vis-à-vis the Oba’s loss of prestige, stipend and
power, produced an inevitable but opposite and equal reaction. There was bitterness against the Ogboni, which now began to
dominate the councils and to infiltrate all walks of life in Benin.
Progressive young men found the Ogboni influence a social menace and
unacceptable to their way of thinking. Possibly the Iyase’s
position in the council and in the Ogboni gave excessive political
importance to this cult. Having
struggled to place a literate young Iyase in a position of power in
order to deflate the Oba’s palace autocracy, the people found
that the Ogboni cult was now too powerful and sinister for their
comfort.” [Igbafe: op. cit.]
At the Warri and Benin provincial conferences of 1949, all
Edo-speaking people (including Urhobo) supported calls for a Midwest
State [Files BP/2328, BP/2678/1, BP/742; WP/569/1 National Archives,
Ibadan]. During this period opinion among
leaders from Asaba division was predominantly in support of
consolidation with the Eastern region or creation of a western Igbo
province within the Western region. Asaba, western Ijaw, and an
Itsekiri faction all opposed creation of the Midwest. When Benin and
Warri delegates in favor of creation of the Midwest region attempted
to raise the issue at the Western regional conference on
Constitutional reform that year, they were prevented from doing
so. Therefore, with Oba Akenzua in the
lead, they walked out. Meanwhile
both Obafemi Awolowo and Nnamdi Azikiwe at this stage were
expressing preference for a Three-States based Nigeria, a position
they elucidated at the All-Nigeria Constitutional Conference in
Ibadan in January 1950, preparatory to the take-off of the
MacPherson Constitution.
Back in Benin, the fear and resentment of the Ogboni was amplified
the suspicion that it was some sort of mechanism for the Yoruba
infiltration and control of Benin society [Abiodun Aloba: It is a choice between
Ogboni and Benin. Daily Times, October 1st, 1951, p8]. This later became the template
for a popular uprising. Many who had
tormented Oba Akenzua in the difficult days of the 1930s and early
forties became royalist. The “Reformed Benin Community”
noted above, later evolved, first to “Otu-Adolo” and
then to “Otu-Edo” on March 15th, 1950,
specifically, according to J. Osadolo Edomwonyi, to “counter
the excesses of the ill-motivated activities of the so-called
Taxpayers Association cum Ogboni.” [Edomwonyi, op. cit] After a
crack-down by Obaseki against local demonstrations, a delegation of
leaders led by E. O. Imafidon was sent to Lagos to invite Humphrey
Omo-Osagie back to Benin from a meeting in Lagos, to lead the
Otu-Edo. The new party was dedicated to
the “development of Benin and the unification of all
Edo-speaking peoples of Nigeria.” In its constitution it also said it would promote “a sense of
nationalism among the people of Benin” and combat threats to
“the structures of our laws and custom” and
“national unity.” [Orobosa Oronsaye: Cultural Organisation and Political Development
– The case of the Otu-Edo. University of Ibadan, Department of History, June 1977.]
It was in this context that the Otu-Edo party was formed in a
crisis atmosphere, to support the Oba in his fight against the
taxpayers association under Iyase Gaius Obaseki at the local level
while mobilizing support for the Midwest State Movement at the
provincial level. [Otu-Edo Union, File No. 1170/1 National Archives, Ibadan] Although, there were some
initial problems with key NCNC leaders like Ernest Ikoli, Mbonu
Ojike and Nnamdi Azikiwe, some of whom were suspected of being
members of the ROF in Lagos, Otu-Edo later entered into an alliance
with the NCNC at the national level. Meanwhile, at the local level in Benin, according to Professor
Igbafe:
“……..the Ogboni allied with the Action Group
founded by Chief Obafemi Awolowo out of the Egbe Omo Oduduwa in
Yorubaland…”
How did all this play out?
After Otu-Edo was created, another political party, called the
Benin Action Group was created in Benin in March 1951, in response
to the activities of Bode Thomas mentioned earlier. They were both opposed to Ogbonism in Benin politics, as
crystallized, in their opinion, by the Benin Community Taxpayers
Association. Indeed both parties overlapped and shared
membership.
In the weeks preceding the formal launching of the united
“Action Group” at Owo from April 28 – 30, 1951,
Anthony Enahoro had organized a meeting of Benin and Warri leaders
of thought in Sapele, ostensibly to discuss Midwestern
solidarity. People like Gaius
Obaseki, Arthur Prest, Festus Edah (Okotie-Eboh), Okorodudu, S. O.
Ighodaro etc. were present. At the
meeting, most participants expressed sentiments against the creation
of a separate midwestern region. However, two dissenters, Chike Ekwuyasi and E. O. Imafidon who were
present, rushed back to Benin to alert Omo-Osagie who then called a
rally of his own and initiated counter-measures [Oronsaye, op. cit.; Uwaifo, op. cit].
On April 28, delegates from Benin and Warri provinces attended the
main Action Group conference at Owo, at which merger of the
Midwestern and Western components was accomplished. Gauis Obaseki emerged as the Vice President for Benin Province,
S.O. Ighodaro, as Treasurer, Anthony Enahoro as Assistant Secretary,
while Arthur Prest and W. E. Mowarin emerged as Vice Presidents from
the Warri province. However, Benin
Action Group delegates, like D.N. Oronsaye, C. N. Ekwuyasi, S. O.
Ighodaro, and others, who were not members of the Reformed Ogboni
Fraternity, opposed Gaius Obaseki’s election at Owo. When they returned, the Benin Action Group dissociated themselves
from Chief Awolowo’s Action group and later allied themselves
with H Omo-Osagie’s Otu-Edo party in what was known as
Otu-Edo/Benin Action Group Grand Alliance. Iyase Obaseki, now Vice President for the Awolowo Action group,
moved immediately, some say ruthlessly, to consolidate his hold on
Benin division [Oronsaye. Op. cit.].
The stage was set, therefore, for a bitterly fought council
election, which took place in December 1951. The period preceding it was associated with waves of violence,
including arson and murder, in an uprising against the Awolowo
Action Group/Benin Taxpayers Association/Ogboni known locally as
“Airen Egbe Ason”, meaning “people do not
recognize each other at night”.
Beginning in July, but with its
high point on September 6th, it was allegedly triggered
by actions of two members of the “Ogboni Action group”,
namely Iyare and Obazee, at Evbowe in Isi district. [File 1818/6/B
National Archives, Ibadan] Farmers who opposed the Ogboni
were allegedly mobilized and concentrated at Eguaholor from where
they proceeded to burn down the houses of leaders of the Ogboni in
villages all over Isi district. The epidemic breakdown of law and order
necessitated massive mobilization of Policemen to many parts of
rural Benin province [File B.D. 1818/7. Benin Situation Report.
National Archives, Ibadan]. Many were
detained, subsequently charged to court, fined and even jailed.
GCM Onyiuke, Charles Idigbe, and Mr. S.
O. Ighodaro, then the Secretary of the Benin Action group, comprised
the legal team hired by Otu-Edo to defend its members.
Nevertheless, after the mayhem, with the Ogboni infrastructure
broken in the rural areas, Otu-Edo, under Humphrey Omo-Osagie, with
the Oba as its patron, came to power in Benin in 1952 - while at the
regional level, the Awolowo Action Group dominated the legislature
in Ibadan. The Macpherson
Constitution replaced the Richards Constitution in 1952. It created
a central legislature that was called the House of Representatives
and initially led to false hopes that a quick mechanism for States
Creation would be established. Meanwhile, Oba Akenzua had to preside over the residual bitterness
that accompanied the recruitment drive for ROF, followed by the
uprising of 1951 in Benin division. It
tore families and communities apart. However, with no justification intended for the violence, had Chief
Humphrey Omo-Osagie not come to power that year to align the
“new elite” with the “traditional
leadership”, the subsequent unified role of Benin as the
heartland of the agitation for the creation of the Midwest may never
have seen the light.
When the Western House of Assembly opened in January 1952, 21 out
of 24 Midwesterners were allied with the NCNC while three –
S.O. Ighodaro, Arthur Prest, and Anthony Enahoro - were allied with
the Action Group. One immediate
source of irritation was the government’s official pamphlet,
which insensitively described the Parliamentary Mace with four
ceremonial swords as representing the authority of Yoruba
Chiefs. To aggravate matters, when the
unicameral Western House of Assembly was formally declared open by
then Lt. Governor Sir Hugo Marshall, the Alake of Abeokuta, rose to
speak immediately after Sir Marshall and said:
“On my right sits the Oni of Ife; On my left, the Leader of
our Government, Obafemi Awolowo. The Voice of the West is
complete.” [Hansard of Western House of Assembly: January 7, 1952]
In other words, as the delegates from Benin and Delta saw it, the
“voice of the West” did not include those of the people
of Benin and Delta provinces. To
compound matters, Benin and Delta delegates later complained too
about derogatory epithets that had allegedly been hurled at them,
such as “KoboKobo”, used to refer to persons (or
barbarians) whose diction cannot be understood. [File BP/2328/1 National Archives, Ibadan]
>From this point on, the Oba of Benin, Akenzua II, supported by
the Benin and Warri (Delta) legislative delegation, began openly
touring Benin and other Divisions of Benin province as well as the
Delta province to campaign for the Midwest (Central) region. According to Professor Michael Crowder:
“In the Western region, as a reaction against the allegedly
Yoruba-dominated Action group, the Mid-West State movement was
started, supported largely by non-Yoruba-speaking peoples and in
particular the people of the old Benin Empire.” [M Crowder: The Story of Nigeria. 3rd Edition, 1972.
Faber]
Indeed, at the very next Benin Provincial Conference at Ogwashi-Uku
in June 1952, attended by pro-Midwesterners like JO Odigie of Ishan,
Chike Ekwuyasi of Benin and Dennis Osadebay of Asaba, separatist
sentiments were strongly expressed, resulting in the creation of the
“Central State Congress”. [File BP/2328/1 National Archives, Ibadan] One of the criticisms of the Western region government was the
alleged decision to spend 225,000 pounds in Awolowo’s home
province of Ijebu with a population of 383,000, as compared with
169,000 pounds in the Benin province with a population of
624,000. Subsequently, a subgroup known
as the Committee of the Midwest Organization emerged under R.O.
Odita.
Before the end of 1952 another significant event occurred. It was the decision of the Action Group government based in Ibadan
to restore the title of the ‘Olu of Itsekiri’ to
‘Olu of Warri’ as it had been known in previous
centuries. Non-Itsekiris in Warri
Province reacted violently, concerned that there was an implication
of suzerainty over the whole province. Thus a compromise was reached. In
exchange for acceptance of the designation of the Olu as ‘Olu
of Warri’, the province was renamed ‘Delta
province’. [personal papers, Alfred O. Rewane] In spite of this compromise, the
experience soured the relationship between many Urhobo leaders of
thought and the Action group leadership, which they felt, had been
beholden to a powerful Itsekiri lobby. It served to drive Urhobos, already so inclined, further into the
warm embrace of the Midwest Separatist Movement.
Back in Benin, another one of the many clashes between H.
Omo-Osagie and Gaius Obaseki was playing out. In 1953, Otu-Edo got Iyase Obaseki deposed as Chairman of the
Executive Committee of the Benin Divisional Council allegedly for
not attending meetings. His Orderly and Police escorts were
withdrawn and monthly salaries stopped [Oronsaye, Op. Cit.]. However, the Oba did not cooperate in
the attempt to strip him of his title as Iyase, allegedly for not
performing the rites of the office. Thus
Obaseki retained his title as Iyase – although he never really
performed the formal traditional ceremonies of acceptance of the
title in the first place. Nevertheless,
colonial authorities removed the Resident in Benin province, Mr. H.
Butcher for his role in during and after the controversial Iyase
affair of 1948.
In July/August 1953, Councilor J. Osadolo Edomwonyi moved a motion
in the Benin Divisional Council praying the Constitutional
Conference in London to include on its agenda, the creation of a
separate region for the Benin and Delta provinces [Edomwonyi, Op. Cit.]. However, overshadowed by a bitter
fight between Obafemi Awolowo of the Western region and Nnamdi
Azikiwe of the Eastern region over excision of Lagos on one hand and
Southern Cameroons on the other, creation of new States was
overruled at the London Constitutional conference [Report of the Conference on the Nigerian Constitution, held in
London, July-August, 1953 Cmnd. 8934, (London: H.M.S.O., 1953,
p4)]. When he returned from London, Chief
Omo-Osagie briefed Oba Akenzua II, who then made arrangements to
host a conference of traditional and political leaders of the Benin
and Delta provinces on September 18, 1953 in Benin City. Anthony Enahoro, S. O. Ighodaro, Arthur Prest and the Olu of Warri
boycotted this well attended meeting. In
his address, Oba Akenzua II said, among other things that
Midwesterners were seeking freedom, “not only from the white
man, but also from foreign african nations…” He went on to state that,
“Benin-Delta was a sovereign nation before the occupation of
the country by the British.” Akenzua also said, “The divide and rule policy of the British
Government had done much harm to the national solidarity of
Benin-Delta Province in the past but as God now wants things to be
what they were before the advent of the British Government, that is,
the Yoruba State for the Yorubas and Benin-Delta State for the
“BENDELITES”, that is, the inhabitants of the
Benin-Delta Province, steps should now be taken without further
delay or fear to move the British Government to repair the damage
they have done by restoring the national status of Benin-Delta
Province before they transfer power back to the Nigerians from whom
they have taken it.”
Mr. JIG Onyia of Asaba then moved a motion, which said
inter-alia:
“Be it resolved, and it is hereby resolved that:
1. We (the peoples of Benin-Delta
Province) in a conference holding at Benin City this 18th
day of September, in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred
and fifty three, demand as of right an immediate creation of a
separate State for the peoples of Benin-Delta
Province…….” [Edomwonyi, Op. Cit.]
Spurred on by stronger and stronger perceptions of discrimination
in the West, exemplified by matters such as the state ment of Alake
of Egbaland in 1952, Adegoke Adelabu’s emergence over Osadebay
as NCNC leader of Opposition in the West, threats of Western
regional control of Midwestern forests, etc. H Omo-Osagie urged the
assembly to create a “party which will serve as the Vanguard
in the battle for the Midwest.” The envisioned party was to be
independent of parties based in other regions. After overruling an alternative concept put forward by JIG Onyia of
Asaba, that the organization so created should be a
“movement” rather than a “political party”,
the Benin Delta Political Party (BDPP) was created. It was to
function under the patronage of a President General (Oba Akenzua II)
and six Vice Presidents (Ogirrua of Irrua, Emeni of Obiaruku, Ovie
of Ughelli, Momodu of Agbede, Ovie of Effurun and Ogenieni of
Uzairue). Members of the Executive
Committee were D.E. Odiase, T.O. Elaiho, G. Brass Ometan, J. W. Amu,
J. D. Ifode, J. Igben, Martins Adebayo, John Uzo, H. O. Uwaifo and
Barrister Gabriel Edward Longe. Chief Oweh later replaced JD
Ifode. Other BDPP stalwarts included
Onogie Enosegbe II of Ewohimi, E. A. Lamai of Fugar and Martins
Adebayo of Akoko-Edo. [File Ben Prof 2/BP/3022, National Archives, Ibadan]
Oba Akenzua II subsequently notified the Western House of Chiefs of
this development, quipping, “I think that the Benin Delta
State can succeed very well without being tied to the apron strings
of the Yoruba State.” He also said
“The fact is the Benin/Delta People’s Party will not
allow the Benin/Delta State to be annexed to the Yoruba State
whether the North and the East are broken into small States or
not.” [Western House of Chiefs Debates, Oct. 20, 1953]
Then he proceeded to lead a series of
tours all over the Midwest to campaign for the Midwestern
region. Such tours were undertaken in
December 1953, February and May 1954. The BDPP hinged its success on the prestige of various traditional
rulers, inspite of undercurrents of tension with some western Ibo,
specifically Asaba leaders like F. Utomi and G Onyia, who issued
public statements after the Western Igboid Conference of December
1953, that Asaba people should not attend BDPP meetings. In his memoirs, Dennis Osadebay says “they feared that the
creation of the region would mean the resuscitation of the old Benin
Kingdom and it’s alleged oppressive rule and domination of
minorities.” [DC Osadebay: Building a Nation: An Autobiography. MacMillan, 1978.]
In 1954, Obafemi Awolowo became Premier of the Western region under
the 1954 Constitution that created the Federation of Nigeria. At the
same time Chief Festus Okotie-Eboh of Warri, representing the NCNC,
became the Regional Minister of Labour and Welfare. Dennis Osadebay emerged as NCNC Opposition leader in the West,
while V.I. Amadasun became NCNC Chief Whip. Meanwhile the BDPP relied increasingly on the local NCNC
operational infrastructure, even while foreswearing any party links
in public. As time went on, therefore, pressure grew from within the
BDPP to formally ally the party with the NCNC – which the Oba
was opposed to. Meanwhile there were
unconfirmed rumors at the end of 1954 that the Oba had reached a
secret deal with Chief Awolowo. [Michael Vickers, Ethnicity and Sub-Nationalism in Nigeria, p93] Concerned
about these rumours, Chief Omo-Osagie decided to ignore the General
Secretary of Otu-Edo, Mr. J. Osadolo Edomwonyi, who had close links
to the Palace, and unilaterally nominate Mr. Eric Imafidon to
contest the All-Nigerian Parliamentary elections. Both Omo-Osagie and Imafidon defeated Edomwonyi’s “Oba
of Benin BDPP faction” candidates. [Uwaifo, Op. Cit.; Oronsaye, Op.
Cit.]
The Action Group had in the meantime conceptualized a plan to seize
political control of Benin by co-opting the Oba and destroying Chief
H Omo-Osagie.
According to testimony from Dr. Obas. J. Ebohon,
“My father was the personal driver of Chief Omo-Osagie
through out his political career and what both himself and B2 went
through before, during, and after the creation of Mid-West is
unimaginable and sometimes better than some of 007 epic films. My father once told me that the journeys to and from the Western
House of Assembly in Ibadan was the type of journeys one makes to
and from the battle field. Firstly, they never exceeded four people
and they travelled by Bedford Lorry instead of a car to which his
status demanded. The reason for this was security as his life was
threatened openly by those enraged by his demands for Mid-West
State. He said on approaching Ore, they would disembark and B2 would
come out of the comfortable second row and climb into the back of
the Bedford lorry and be covered with trampoline and that is where
he would remain through the numerous roadblocks put out to hunt him
down and, that is how he would remain until they arrive Ibadan.
Sometimes, for the need to confuse his detractors, he would be
hidden in lorries carrying plantain to Ibadan and guess where he
would be sitting - buried among the plantain and that is how he
remains until the outskirts of Ibadan and be transferred into the
Bedford lorry again. On numerous occasions they escaped death with
the skin of his teeth. My father indicated that when they are
travelling, it usually was like preparing for a funeral at B2's
house and those of his entourage and the worst is expected and, when
they return unharmed, it was jubilation.” (Source: OJ Ebohon. Edo-Nation Egroup, July 5, 2002. RE: [Edo-Nation] The
Last Edo Political Titan: Chief Humphrey Omo-Osagie)
Under these circumstances, on March 8th, 1955, Obafemi
Awolowo invited Oba Akenzua II for a meeting in Ibadan. According to the minutes of the meeting, Chief Awolowo told Oba
Akenzua II to disengage himself from politics before it becomes a
disadvantage. Awolowo told him that he
had planned to preserve the position of traditional rulers as an
"important part of the social and spiritual life of the people"
outside the political arena. In
response, Oba Akenzua II politely but firmly drew a distinction
between politics and his activities with the Midwest State movement.
He went further to query why the Ooni of Ife and the
Alake of Abeokuta were open supporters and contributors to
the Action Group but were not being similarly advised. Awolowo reacted by promising to give other Obas similar advice, but
also told Oba Akenzua II to go back to Benin and seriously reflect
over his comments. [National Archives, Ibadan; File B.P.215 Correspondence with the
Oba of Benin.]
This meeting between Oba Akenzua and Chief Awolowo was to presage a
complex series of intrigues that would unfold in the next few
months. Just as Chief H Omo-Osagie was
to leave for Lagos in March 1955 to take up a new position as
Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Finance, he was involved
in a factional split with a sub-faction of the Edomwonyi group led
by A.G. Bazuaye within the Otu-Edo [Otu-Edo Secretariat: Confusion in the Otu Edo. March 4, 1955]. This was coming to a head just as the mandate of the Benin
Native Authority Council was expiring. The Action Group Government in Ibadan refused to renew the mandate
of the council, preferring instead to appoint a provisional
caretaker council. This caretaker
committee was under the chairmanship of the Oba, but consisted of a
mixture of the pro-Action Group Bazuaye faction of Otu-Edo and
elements of Iyase Gaius Obaseki’s pro-Action Group Benin Tax
Payers Association, pending new elections. The new provisional council included well-known Action Groupers
like S.Y. Eke and V.O.E. Osula [Benin Native Authority Files 730/4 (April 2, 1955) and 730/5
(May5, 1955)]. It increased the salary of the Oba
in a move that appeared to signal a rapprochement between Oba
Akenzua and Iyase Gauis Obaseki. It was
hoped that the Oba would cooperate with an alliance of the Bazuaye
and Obaseki groups to oust Omo-Osagie from power. But the Oba wanted some kind of public indication that the Action
Group would stop being ambivalent or even hostile toward the
creation of the Midwest.
Therefore, on June 14th, 1955, a legislator, MS Sowole,
moved a motion, seconded by JG Ako, a minister of state, which was
carried in the Western House of Assembly titled “Creation of a
Separate State for Benin and Delta Provinces.” Chief Awolowo’s curious reaction to this development on the
floor of the House was to announce that “the Government adopts
no official attitude whatsoever” towards the Sowole motion [Western House of Assembly Debates, 14 June, 1955].
According to Professor Michael Crowder, at this stage, the Action
Group:
“…..gave its blessing to
this movement, partly because it was beginning to find the Mid-West
an electoral and economic liability and partly because it
realized that if it were to champion the creation of new states in
the Eastern and Northern Regions it could hardly object to the
creation of one in the Western region itself.”
The problem, though, was that the Action group was never trusted by
core Midwest Protagonists, who saw opportunism and duplicity in its
behavior. Dennis Osadebay, for example, was of the opinion that the
Sowole motion was little more than a vote catching gimmick to secure
victory at the 1955 and 1956 general elections [Osadebay, Op. Cit.]. In time to come his suspicions
would be confirmed when, after independence, Chief Awolowo openly
said that the Sowole motion was not binding on the Western
region.
It was in this situation that local government elections took place
in Benin in September 1955. Once again,
Chief Omo-Osagie and the Otu-Edo were victorious [Oronsaye, Op. Cit.]. A few weeks later, on October
25th, 1955 Oba Akenzua was appointed Minister without
portfolio in Awolowo’s government at Ibadan – an
announcement that practically destroyed the BDPP. The Oba explained that henceforth he would use his membership of
the Action group Government of the Western region to push for the
creation of the Midwest. In response,
members of Otu-Edo in Benin staged a mock funeral of the Oba right
in front of his Palace.
Meanwhile, according to Michael Vickers, in December 1955, western
Ibo leaders, not unmindful of developments in Benin, but also
confident in their trained manpower advantage over others, decided
that a future Midwest would best serve their interests, rather than
either the West or East. Thus they began
renegotiating the terms of renewed cooperation with the now moribund
BDPP. [Vickers:
Ethnicity and Sub-Nationalism in Nigeria. Worldview Publishing,
2000. p121] Thus, inspite of his stature as
the earliest and most consistently committed advocate of the Midwest
cause, H. Omo-Osagie would later concede the leadership of the
Midwest State Movement to Dennis Osadebay, also known as the
“Gentleman Leader of the Opposition” in exchange for
support.
In January 1956, the Oba removed
himself as a Patron of Otu-Edo, and stopped making public demands
for the creation of the Midwest, hoping to achieve it, nonetheless,
by some kind of internal understanding with Chief Awolowo’s
government. The Oba’s high
stakes moves throughout 1955 caused a lot of mistrust within Otu-Edo
as well as pro-Midwest sympathizers in other parties. But Oba Akenzua remained convinced that his presence in the
government was the tactical thing to do in the circumstances. He would give Chief Awolowo time to fulfill his promise. In February, he hosted the Queen at the Benin Airport and made a
point of emphasizing the uniqueness of the grand Benin-Delta
reception. Tragically, Iyase Gaius
Obaseki died in April and was mourned throughout the region as a man
of great stature. [Egharevba, Op. Cit.]
Another development in the Western Regional Assembly that created
consternation in the Benin and Delta provinces was the attempt in
1956 to enforce Yoruba as a language medium in all schools
throughout ALL the provinces. The
British Lt. Governor, Sir John Rankine, vetoed compulsory
implementation in the Benin and Delta provinces, explaining that it
was a time–bomb. It is not clear
what role Oba Akenzua II played in
securing this veto. [personal communication, D. A. Omoigui]
On May 5, 1956, the Midwest State Movement (MSM) was inaugurated
from the ashes of the BDPP. Its patron
was the Obi of Agbor. Members of the Executive Committee were Dennis
Osadebay (Leader), Chief H. Omo-Osagie (Deputy Leader), J. E. Otobo
(Secretary), G.E. Odiase, O. Oweh, F. Oputa-Otutu and M.A.
Kubeinje. Its legal advisers were A.
Atake, M. Edewor, W. Egbe, GE Longe, and JM Udochi. [JA Brand. The Midwest State Movement in Nigerian Politics.
Political Studies, Vol. XIII, 3 (1965), p351] In preparation for the September 1956 London Constitutional
Conference, the MSM embarked on fund raising drives and political
tours through the Delta and Benin provinces [Vickers, Op. Cit.]. It also began developing
detailed arguments to justify the creation of a new region. Such arguments included the proposed region’s distinct way of
life, various examples of discrimination including allocation of
funds to various line items in the budget. The proposed region’s economic viability was also studied,
taking note of its agricultural base, Rubber, Timber, Palm oil,
brown coal, water resources, ports and its capacity to create
secondary industries from the African Timber and Plywood Factory in
Sapele. The conference was, however,
later deferred until 1957.
Meanwhile on May 26, during Western parliamentary regional
elections in Benin, Otu-Edo secured victory once again. Notably, G.I. Oviasu of Otu-Edo/NCNC defeated S.O. Ighodaro of the
Action Group and the Oba’s second son, Felix Akenzua, lost to
VI Amadasun. One irritant during this
election was the complaint that many students from the Benin and
Delta provinces at the University College Ibadan were so mistrusted
by Action group operatives on campus that their names were
surreptitiously removed from voters’ registration lists in
Ibadan.
LONDON CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE OF 1957
During the 1957 London Constitutional Conference, the MSM declared
that it would be willing to accept a plebiscite in the Benin-Delta
area. However, efforts by the MSM to
insist that the creation of states be discussed before
self-government were outflanked as the NCNC and AG resisted any
effort to create new states in their own regions [Report by the Nigeria Constitutional Conference held in London,
May and June 1957. Cmnd. 207. London: HMSO, 1957]. The AG, for example, accused
the NCNC of stalling about the proposed COR State because of the
possibility of discovery of Oil, even as it was busy proposing
regions elsewhere. The NPC was also
uninterested in the creation of new regions in the North. All three parties did not want any delays in independence merely on
account of creation of new states for minorities.
Eventually, Chief Awolowo, while opposing all State requests except
those of the Midwest, COR and Middle Belt, which he said should be
created simultaneously, got his rivals in the NCNC and
Northern Peoples Congress (NPC) to accept certain fundamental
principles which would guide creation of new regions and which would
be enshrined in the proposed new constitution. These requirements included a two-thirds majority consent of the
legislature of the concerned state from which the new state was to
be created, as well as the federal parliament; that ethnic groups
should not be split; that ethnic groups that chose not to separate
could stay with the original state; and that both the proposed new
state and the residual state from which it was created should meet
tests of viability.
For the Midwest in particular, Anthony Enahoro proposed an idea
patterned after the Ministry of Welsh Affairs that had been created
in 1951 in the United Kingdom by the Conservative government. This concept meant that rather than a new Midwest region, the
Midwest would be managed under a “Ministry of Midwest
Affairs” concurrently under his supervision as the Western
region Minister for Home Affairs. Chief Awolowo accepted this
concept.
By the time the conference came to an end, delegates from the three
major ethnic groups had agreed that in addition to tough legislative
requirements at federal and regional levels, a plebiscite should be
conducted in the area of any proposed new state to determine if 60%
of registered voters in the area wanted a new state [Joint Proposals by the NPC, NCNC and Action Group
Delegations: The creation of New
States. Statement submitted to the Nigerian Constitutional
Conference, London, June 1957.]. As a consolation prize, a Commission
of Inquiry was recommended to ascertain the facts about the fears of
minorities and consider what safeguards should be included in the
new constitution, with the proviso that creation of states only be
considered as a last resort. The Rt. Hon. Alan Lennox-Boyd,
Secretary of State for the Colonies, appointed this commission in
September 1957. It later came to be known as the Willink
Commission. Its members were Henry
Willink, Gordon Hadow, Phillip Mason and J.B. Shearer. It arrived in Nigeria on November 23rd, 1957 and held
public sittings and private meetings from December 8th to
23rd at Benin and Warri. Following an extensive schedule of visits all over the country, it
left for the UK on April 12th, 1958 and eventually
submitted its report on July 30th, 1958. [Cmnd. 505. London: HMSO, 1958]
Before settling down to prepare for the Willink Commission visit,
reaction to the outcome of the London Conference among members of
the MSM was extremely negative. Chief
Omo-Osagie, for example, said,
“The people of the Midwest would willingly submit to the use
of nuclear weapons, devastating bombs or machine guns to annihilate
them, rather than remain in a self governing West.” [West African Pilot. July 14, 1957]
TESTIMONY AT THE WILLINK COMMISSION
It has been said that the Midwest State Movement flew the two
expatriate counsels that led the testimony of the pro-Midwest
witnesses at the Willink Commission, into the country. In point of fact Chief Omo-Osagie paid for their round trip fares
and expenses out of his own pocket. Money was not forthcoming from the NCNC. The more senior of the
pair was George G. Baker.
Three major sets of opinion were canvassed. The Midwest State movement was only interested in the creation of
the Midwest (meaning Benin and Warri provinces en bloc) – to
which it wanted the Edo-speaking Sobe and Ijagba areas of Ondo
province appended. The Action Group, represented by its
lawyer, Fani Kayode, conceded that the Midwest might, as a last
resort, be allowed to go (after all the legislative hurdles) but
that Warri division and Akoko-Edo should join Ondo province, while
the western Ibo should join the Eastern region and the western Ijaw
should join eastern Ijaw. He even went
further to suggest that Ishan division should be excluded from the
“residual Midwest” for no other reason than because
Ishan had a significant number of Action Group supporters. The government of the Western region, represented by Rotimi
Williams, differed slightly from Fani-Kayode, by accepting that
Afemai and Ishan divisions could join the proposed “residual
Midwest”, implying the Benin and Urhobo divisions, if they
wished. [Willink Commission report.
Cmnd. 505. London: HMSO, 1958]
The position of the MSM was based on fear of colonization by the
Yoruba. Detailed testimony was heard
from a broad range of witnesses, including Chiefs Ezomo, Oliha, Ineh
and Osula. Other witnesses included the
Chairmen of the Iyekovia, Uhunmwode and Benin City councils, namely
Messrs Adonrin, Atohengbe and Ogbebor. Edo women made a submission through Madam Eweka. Complaints included lack of rubber markets and processing
facilities, excessive local taxation, including “head
taxes” which would then be remitted to Ibadan, poor
infrastructure, and discrimination in the award of scholarships and
opportunities for Edo women traders at Ibadan. More recently, Mr. Isaac Asemota recalled that, “While Benin-
City stayed in the dark with no electricity, running water, good
roads, separate and unequal schools and grossly inadequate health
clinics, there in Ibadan, Edo tax monies were being squandered in
the construction of Cocoa House, Mapo Hall and Commercial
Broadcasting Service Radio Station whose frequency we couldn’t
even pick up in Benin-City. The best we could hope for was
Redifussion radio which had a very low frequency and could not be
heard more than two miles away from the broadcasting booth. “
(Isaac Asemota: “The last Edo Political Titan: Chief Humphrey Omo-Osagie” unpublished manuscript, Edo-Nation
Egroup, July 2, 2002.)
The most powerful and emotional testimony from Benin came from
Chief H Omo-Osagie. He lamented the
insidious cultural role of Ifa divination and Ogboni
activities in inserting Yoruba values and ways into Benin
society. He explained that
Ifa divination required knowledge of Yoruba, while the Yoruba
derived Ogboni society, was, according to him, “more dangerous
than freemasonry.” In fact he
openly stated that after independence, laws would likely be passed,
making membership of the ROF compulsory. He went on to criticize the Western region Chiefs Law No. 20 of
1957 which was being used with effect to intimidate traditional
rulers and influence the selection of chiefs and Dukes inside the
Midwest. The Chief also went into
additional detail about perceptions of Yoruba domination of the
Police, government boards, the public service, and the use of
scholarships as a tool for punishing separatist divisions. The Benin division, for example, had not, under the period of
review, received any scholarships, while the Ijebu province (home to
Chief Awolowo) had secured 17 such awards.
Another complaint was that Rubber was
being developed in the Ijebu province when investment in the
promised Ikpoba Rubber processing factory for already established
rubber plantations of the Midwest was being help up. A similar shenanigan affected the Koko port. He went on to use examples of the decision by the Action Group
government to dissolve the Benin Divisional Council in 1955 as an
example of arbitrary misuse of power. In
conclusion, Chief Omo-Osagie opposed the new
“Welsh-type” arrangement implemented by the Action Group
through the establishment of the “Ministry of Midwest
Affairs” and the Midwest Advisory Council, and demanded either
the creation of a Midwest region or a return to a unitary government
at the center with provinces at the periphery.
Supporting testimony from the Ishan division, where the Action
Group had deposed the Onogies of Idoa and Ubiaja was also heard from
G. Ebea, A. Ibhazo, Prince Shaka Momodu, and His Royal Highness,
Enosegbe II, Enogie of Ewohimi. Similarly, the Commission heard from the Oba of Agbede who bluntly
stated that the Oba of Benin, and not any of the Yoruba Obas, was
his Oba. On their part, Messrs Utomi,
Onyia and Odiakosa provided the views of the Asaba division.
Interestingly, while scholarship
complaints were commonplace in the Benin division, the Asaba
division was doing very well with scholarships under the guidance of
its representative, Dennis Osadebay, who was then the Chairman of
the Regional Scholarships Board. In Warri, there was a split among the
Itsekiri. While Chiefs Arthur Prest and
Festus Okotie-Eboh were in support, at this stage, of creation of a
Midwest region, O.N. Rewane and the Olu of Warri were against
it.
In response to testimony of pro-Midwest witnesses, a shadowy
organization called the “Anti-Midwest State Movement”
was put forward by the Action Group. It
asserted that Edos had more to fear from Igbo than Yoruba
domination, and that creation of a Midwest region would expose Edos
to Igbo domination.
Among its observations, the commission noted that actual
expenditure on road development in the Midwest area up to March 31,
1957, was only 15% of the estimates, compared with 50% in the Yoruba
West. It also made the following
observation:
“What is feared is a permanent Action Group majority in the
Western House of Assembly. The Action
Group drawing its inspiration from a Yoruba society, the Egbe Omo
Oduduwa expressing itself….through the Ogboni Fraternity,
controlling Boards, Corporations and Commissions, eventually even
the Magistracy and Judiciary, aiming at the obliteration of all that
is not Yoruba. That is what is meant by Yoruba domination.”
But in its recommendations, the Willink Commission advised that
short of a new state, the “Midwest area” for which the
Ministry of Midwest Affairs of the Western region was being
established be reduced to a “Council for Edo Affairs”
with responsibility for development, welfare and culture
preservation, covering the Edo-speaking divisions of Benin, Urhobo,
Afenmai and Ishan. In addition to a
similarly proposed “Calabar Council” in Eastern Nigeria,
the commission felt that “these two are the areas in which it
seems to us, there is the strongest and most united local sentiment
and the most clearly distinguishable culture.” (see Willink
Report, Chapter 14, Section 4, Item 36, page 97.)
In reaction, the MSM rejected the Willink report, insisted on
creation of the Midwest region, but left open the possibility of a
“Provincial Commissioner for Benin and Delta provinces”
at the federal level – an option the Action Group rejected
outright.
1958 – 1960
While the Constitutional Conference and Willink Commission were
finalizing their activities, the Western region passed what was
known as “amendment No. 4” to the local government law
of 1957, which gave it new powers by which it could manipulate the
control of local councils. The
combination of the local government and chieftaincy laws, control of
customary courts and heavy handed use of tax assessments was then
exploited in an aggressive drive by the Action Group to take control
of the Benin and Delta provinces [Sklar - Benin: A Study in the Mechanics of Chieftaincy Control.
P238-42, In: Sklar, Nigerian Political Parties.].
During the Lancaster House conference in London which took place in
September and October 1958, the concept of a minority area inclusive
of Benin and Delta provinces, except Warri division and Akoko-Edo
district was discussed and vaguely agreed to, pending further
consultation, without plans for a Special Ijaw Area Board. [Report by the Resumed Nigeria Constitutional Conference Held in
London, September and October 1958, Cmnd. 569, London: HMSO,
1958]
In the meantime, the rising political profile of key Midwesterners
who would come to play critical roles in the creation of the Midwest
was unmistakable. A national
government was formed based on the 1957 constitution, in preparation
for independence. In this government
Chief Festus Okotie-Eboh of Warri emerged as the Minister for Labor
and Welfare (NCNC), a position which gave him direct access to
northern leaders with whom he consolidated strong personal
relationships which would be used by the Midwest movement with
devastating effect after independence. The Action Group was represented by Chief SL Akintola
(Communications and Aviation) and Mr. Ayo Rosiji (Health). Other Midwesterners like H. Omo-Osagie, James Otobo, V. I.
Amadasun, Oputa-Otutu, Shaka Momodu, FH Utomi and others also became
more prominent in party and legislative affairs at regional and
national levels. It was in May 1958 that initial talks
to enter into a post-independence government coalition were held
between the NCNC and the NPC [Enahoro, Fugitive Offender, Op. Cit.].
Back in Benin, the battle to undermine Chief Omo-Osagie’s
power base was continuing – on all fronts.
Local government elections took place in
Benin on May 17th, 1958 [Oronsaye, Op. Cit.]. The manipulation of post-election council nominations made it
possible for the Action group to dominate the council although the
party did not win the elections. On
November 25th, Action group stalwart S. Y. Eke, moved a
motion to ban Owegbe “juju” (also known as Isigidi,
Aimuekpensulele or Iselogha) from the Benin division. The motion was carried and confirmed on March 19th, 1959
by an order of the Western region Governor-in-Council – with
the support of Oba Akenzua II [West Regional Gazette, No. 14 of 19 March, 1959]. The Oba,
who was then a Minister in the government, had commented in a letter
on January 23rd, 1959, that Owegbe was an imported juju
and that its existence in Benin was a threat to peace. Chief Omo-Osagie demanded a
formal judicial inquiry, saying the ban was politically motivated,
and explained that that there was no “juju” or
“cult” as such, but that there was indeed an
“Owegbe society” which was the “youth wing”
of the Otu-Edo party. The existence of
youth wings was by no means a new phenomenon in Nigeria. The Zikist National Vanguard and Awo National Brigade were
examples, according to the Chief, who also directed attention to the
violations of fundamental human rights and freedom of association
which the ban implied [Debates of the Western House of Assembly, May 27, 1959; col.
863].
When however, Chief Omo-Osagie asserted that the Oba would testify
that there was no such thing as “Owegbe juju” known in
the Benin division, the Oba, in a letter dated July 22nd,
1959 stated that there was such a “juju” which, in his
opinion at that time, as a Minister in the Action group government,
was dangerous. In what seemed to reflect the underlying political
fear, the Oba said the danger was not with claims of powers to kill
or save but in the ability of intelligent citizens based in Benin,
having convinced less sophisticated rural based folk to take oaths,
could then by order, cause disturbances anytime they wished –
a veiled reference to the disturbances of 1951. Using this cover, the western region government moved to emasculate
the Owegbe society, which was actually originally created to provide
sanctuary for those who wanted a way to fortify themselves from
Ogboni recruitment drives. To illustrate
the political nature of this development, the Oba reversed himself
when he wrote a letter in 1962 (having since left the Action group)
to the government saying he no longer had any concerns about Owegbe
(see below).
At the same time, the national wing of the NCNC was seeking to wean
itself from its dependence on the Otu-Edo. It accused Otu-Edo of restricting choices for candidates in
elections to Benin indigenes, to the detriment of resident Igbos who
wanted to contest in Benin and represent the party at the
center. This complaint was curious,
considering that Chike Ekwuyasi, an Ibo speaking Midwesterner from
Ogwashi-Uku was actually elected on Otu-Edo platform to represent
Benin back in 1951 – and no Benin indigene had ever been
elected from any Igbo district. Nevertheless, the party established the Orizu and Onyia Commissions
of inquiry to probe Otu-Edo – resulting in a recommendation by
J.I.G. Onyia of Asaba to dissolve Otu-Edo and replace it with
straight party membership of the NCNC, also known as “NCNC
simplicita.” The report also
pointed out that Omo-Osagie had not held elections for the position
of President-General of Otu-Edo since
1950. This aspect of the report was
attractive to Omo-Osagie’s critics within Otu-Edo – like
GI Oviasu, DEY Aghahowa etc, who then formed a faction called
“NCNC pure.” Nevertheless,
Omo-Osagie, leery of non-Edo based political parties, insisted that
Otu-Edo would not be swallowed by any national party but would
remain independent. [Oronsaye, Op. cit.]
Other noteworthy developments in 1959 include the decision of the
NCNC to establish a Midwest secretariat in Benin and the emergence
of the States creation issue in the campaigns for federal elections
in December 1959. In that election, the
Action Group – which said it would also support the creation
of the Midwest, but only if it occurred simultaneously with states creation in
other regions
- won three out of fifteen seats in the Midwest, two of which were
in Ishan (A. Enahoro and P.D. Oboh) and one in Afenmai (M.
Obi). The other twelve federal
legislators from the Midwest were all members of the NCNC, including
A. Opia, U.O. Ayeni, E. A. Mordi, J.B. Eboigbodi, Jereton Mariere,
J.K. Deomonadia, O. Oweh, Festus Okotie-Eboh, and N. A.
Ezenbodor. In the Benin division, H.O.
Osagie, D.N. Oronsaye and D.E.Y. Aghahowa secured the federal seats.
(Daily Times, December 14, 1959, pp5-6). These legislators would all play
crucial roles in the fight for the Midwest after independence. For example, Jereton Mariere, a distinguished member of the Urhobo
Progress Union, and businessman who had managed the late Mukoro
Mowoe’s business at Agbor, would later emerge the first
Governor of the Midwestern region. [personal communication, Professor PP Ekeh]
1960
As was the case in previous years, 1960 was full of action, for and
against the creation of the Midwest, including false and real hopes
and intrigue. [Isuman JU. Facts about the Midwest State. Amalgamated Press,
Lagos, 1960]
On July 7th, the Oni of Ife, Oba Adesoji Aderemi, became
the Governor of the Western region while the Alake of Abeokuta
became the President of the House of Chiefs.
Chief Omo-Osagie wasted no time in
making a public statement about the development. Oba Akenzua II, who had been generally
snubbed and cut off from many day to day decisions in the Ministry
of Midwest Affairs except his approval was important to some
Machiavellian scheme or the other, finally had enough. Independence was approaching and the Midwest region had still not
been created. The
post-independence federal government was going to be formed by the
NCNC and the NPC. The vast majority of
the federal legislators from the Midwest belonged to the NCNC. Therefore, the Oba decided to abandon the Action group, resigning
his position as a Minister without portfolio. By so doing, he realigned the
traditional establishment with the “new elite” for the
final push to secure the Midwest.
But shortly after he did so, the Action Group won 15 out of 30
seats from the Midwest in the Western House elections of August 8,
1960, even barely beating an Otu-Edo candidate in Benin as well
Prince Shaka Momodu in Irrua, in what was regarded as an upset,
perhaps influenced by manipulation of the 1959 voter’s
register. This outcome emboldened
Awolowo and Akintola to publicly declare that they would not support
the creation of the Midwest until after the 1964 federal
elections when they would be in power at the center – although
they kept up pressure for creation of the Calabar-Ogoja-Rivers and
Middle Belt States in other regions. Meanwhile, Barrister SO Ighodaro had taken over the Ministry of
Midwest Affairs from Anthony Enahoro, when the latter elected to go
federal, having lost out to SLA Akintola who returned to the West to
succeed Awolowo as the Premier.
The 1960 constitution specified that for a referendum to take place
seeking to establish support for a new region, two-thirds majority
must approve it in the Federal House of Representatives and Senate,
followed by majority approval in two-thirds of regions. Recognizing the key role which the governing party in the federal
government in Lagos would have in initiating any legislative move
toward the creation of the Midwest, Festus Okotie-Eboh and his
mentor, Humphrey Omo-Osagie, were busy lobbying northern
leaders. Eventually Festus
Okotie-Eboh almost single handedly got Alhaji Muhammadu Ribadu and
Alhaji Ahmadu Bello of the NPC to agree in principle to make an
exception for the Midwest based on its unique history, knowing they
were generally opposed to States creation. Without this crucial achievement on the part of Chief Okotie-Eboh,
the creation of the Midwest would have been dead in the water. It was in recognition of this strategic feat that Festus
Okotie-Eboh was given a chieftaincy title in Benin,
the Elaba of Uselu. Chief Humphrey Omo-Osagie, the indefatigable fighter with whom Oba
Akenzua II had had his ups and downs but whose firm resolve and
loyalty to his people had stood the test of time, was conferred with
the title of Iyase of Benin. [Egharevba, Op. Cit.]
(The Action Group Western region government, however, refused to
confirm both titles until 1962 when there was an emergency
administration in office at Ibadan).
Nevertheless, the Akintola government in Ibadan moved quickly to
consolidate its gains. It appointed many
Midwesterners to ministerial positions, created a Midwest minority
area and advisory council, and reorganized its administrative
structure to create six new regional conferences, as if in tacit
recognition of the six regions it was canvassing for the
country. Chief Anthony Enahoro
became the Chairman of the Midwest regional executive – which
did not include Akoko-Edo district and Warri division. Dalton Ogieva Asemota, a well known
independent, distinguished retiree from the United African Company
(UAC), personal friend of Oba Akenzua II and first Chairman of the
Midwest Advisory Council, became appointed by the Western region as
the first post-independence Senator from Benin Province in Lagos,
while Senator M.G. Ejaife, a household name in Urhoboland, was
appointed to represent the Delta.
Dennis Osadebay, leader of the Midwest State movement, left Ibadan
for Lagos to take up his new position as Senate President, to
replace Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe who had become the Governor-General. Chief Festus Okotie-Eboh became the Federal Minister of Finance and
leader of the parliamentary party. The straight shooting Michael
Okpara replaced Nnamdi Azikiwe as Premier of the Eastern region and
leader of the NCNC. Alhaji Tafawa Balewa
of the NPC became the Prime Minister. Alhaji Ahmadu Bello held fort in the Northern region.
The ducks were lining up in a row.
1961-62
The years 1961 and 1962 moved with dizzying speed.
At the Midwest regional conference of
the AG, Chief Awolowo kept up his oft repeated statement that he
would work for the simultaneous creation of the Midwest, COR
and Middle Belt States. In the Midwest, however, his comments
were regarded with skepticism, all the more so considering what was
regarded as his preference for a balkanized version of the
Midwest. In any case, in March 1961, the
NCNC – urged by Chief Okotie-Eboh - formally opposed the
exclusion of Akoko-Edo and Warri from the Midwest minority
area. When Chief Awolowo was confronted
with the commitment the Western regional House of Assembly had made
to creation the entire Midwest back in 1955 by approving the
Sowole motion, he replied that he was no longer bound by that motion
because the country was under colonial rule at the time [Federal Parliamentary debates, April 4, 1961]. The comment merely served to
confirm suspicions that he did not support the creation of the
Midwest – under any circumstances – even though he
challenged Balewa to create the Midwest before the end of May
1962.
Meanwhile, back in the Midwest, the NCNC and Action Group were
locking horns in increasingly aggressive confrontation between party
thugs regarding the alleged misuse by the AG of customary courts and
tax assessments to harass political opponents, particularly in Ishan
division, where the pro-Midwestern Prince Shaka Momodu was active,
but just as much elsewhere [West African Pilot, August 30, 1961]. In the near crisis atmosphere
that this created in the Midwest, Michael Okpara and the NCNC wanted
the Balewa government to declare a state of emergency in the West,
but Balewa resisted the temptation, seeing as it had other problems
on its hands such as the controversy over the Anglo-Nigerian defence
pact and the Congo controversy. Balewa
also wanted to reach out to the Action Group during this period.
On April 4th, 1961, what is now known in history as the
first Midwest motion was moved and carried by voice
acclamation in the federal House of Representatives [Federal Parliamentary Debates, 4 April, 1961, col. 802]. It was a private
member’s motion, which would run into legal trouble later
because no formal count had been taken, as constitutionally
required, of those in favor or against, and many complained that
they had left the council chamber before the voice vote was
taken. The
April 1961 Midwest motion in the federal legislature was followed by
initial approval in June 1961 in the Eastern region and in September
1961 in the Northern region. During this
period newspaper articles written by AG loyalists appeared in which
various ethnic groups of the proposed Midwest were warned of
“Benin domination.” In the
smear campaign, designed to derail Midwest unity, rumors were spread
about how certain posts were going to be dominated by
“Benin.”
In early 1962, Dr. Okpara’s plans for a contrived state of
emergency in the Midwest petered out, reportedly because it had been
leaked by a reporter. In February, faced
with what seemed to be a constitutional certainty, the AG met with
the NCNC in Lagos, in order to get an agreement on the proposed
Midwest Constitution Act which would respect its views on what
should constitute the Midwest. By this
time it was obvious that the first Midwest motion was inadequate
because no vote count was taken. Therefore, on March 22nd, 1962, Alhaji Tafawa Balewa
introduced the second Midwest motion.
Late on March 23rd, 1962, Senator Dalton Asemota of the
Benin province received an important visitor in his apartment at the
federal legislator’s Legco Flats in Victoria Island, Lagos.
His visitor was none other than
Chief Anthony Enahoro, Vice President of the Action Group and leader
of the Midwest Regional Executive. Enahoro stayed on in Senator Asemota’s flat until the early
hours of the morning lobbying him to adopt the party position of the
AG to vote against the second Midwest motion. The Senator, who was not a party man, was nonetheless reminded that
he owed his position to the goodwill of the Action Group government
in Ibadan. Early on the 24th,
late Senator Asemota’s wife, late Mrs. Onaiwu Asemota (nee
Obinwa family of Onitsha) rushed to my parent’s house to
report the conversation Enahoro had with Senator Asemota. On this basis, the Senator’s
brother in Benin, late Pa Elekhuoba Asemota was contacted emergently
by phone with a report of what had transpired. My parents rushed to the Senator’s flat to ask him whether he
had decided to oppose the motion. The
late Senator, to his eternal credit, smiled and told my parents,
“Do not worry, my children, even if it costs me this position,
I shall not act against the interests of my people.”
(personal communication, GO Omoigui)
After overcoming an attempt by Action group legislators, therefore,
to amend the motion by deleting Akoko-Edo, Warri and western Ijaw
from the definition of “Midwest” and then obfuscate
issues by adding the creation of 11 new states as a pre condition,
the Federal House of Representatives and Senate approved the second
Midwest motion by 214-49 on March 24, 1962. The final count-down had begun.
Six days later on March 30th, 1962 the Midwest
referendum Bill was passed. It was
followed on April 17th and 18th by the Midwest
Parliamentary Bill which specified the addition of Akoko-Edo, Warri
and Western Ijaw areas to the proposed Midwest. No sooner did this vote take place than Barrister S. O. Ighodaro,
Attorney General of the Western region, went to court to challenge
the validity of the Midwest Parliamentary Bill and the Eastern
region’s approval of the federal Midwest Bill. Separately, the Olu of Warri and Chief Reece Edukugho filed court
proceedings to contest the inclusion of Warri in the Midwest.
Meanwhile, on April 4th the Eastern region passed the
second Midwest motion, followed on April 5th, by the
Northern region. On April
13th, a counter-motion was passed by the Western House of
Assembly, opposing the federal Midwest motion [Daily Times, April 14, 1962].
In May 1962, an important development occurred within the Western
region and Action Group which would open the way for the Midwest to
bolt out of the West. A crisis erupted
between Chiefs Obafemi Awolowo (Party Leader and Leader of the
Federal Opposition in Lagos) and Samuel Akintola (Premier of the
West). This crisis had many causes [Sanya Onabamiro, Glimpses into Nigerian History. MacMillan
Nigeria, 1983. p149]. For one,
the positions of party leader (Awolowo) and head of government in
the western region (Akintola) were held by two different persons,
one from the non-Oyo group of rain forest Yorubas (Awolowo from
Ijebu) and the other from the Oyo group of savannah Yorubas
(Akintola from Ogbomosho). Secondly,
Akintola felt that Awolowo ought not to have allowed any competition
with him as “deputy leader” for the position of Premier
when Awolowo left Ibadan to go to Lagos as Federal Leader of
Opposition at the end of 1959. Thirdly,
control over spending of the Cocoa Marketing Board investment funds
built up during the Second World War caused friction between
them. Fourthly, they disagreed over
whether to accept an invitation by Prime Minister Balewa for the
Action Group to join the federal government. In this proposal, Balewa intended for Awolowo to be deputy-Prime
Minister and Minister for Finance – which would have displaced
Okotie-Eboh from that position. To all
of this was added the undercurrent of a serious conflict between
their wives.
On April 19, 1962, one day after S. O. Ighodaro went to court on
behalf of the Akintola government to challenge the Midwest motion,
Chief SL Akintola was expelled from the Action Group by Chief
Obafemi Awolowo after an unsuccessful attempt at
reconciliation. The Governor of the
West, Sir Adesoji Aderemi was advised by a majority of Action Group
legislators at Ibadan to dismiss Akintola as Premier and replace him
with Alhaji D. S. Adegbenro – an act that was challenged all
the way up to the Privy Council in London. On May 26, 1962 an attempt by the Western House to meet and ratify
Akintola’s dismissal ended in confusion, leading to Police
intervention. Armed with his wet handkerchief as an
antidote to teargas, V.E. Amadasun was one of the first to rush to
Lagos from Ibadan to inform the Midwest community in the federal
government of the development, which led to the eventual declaration
of a State of Emergency in the West on May 29 [Federation of Nigeria Official Gazette, supplement to No. 38,
Vol. 49, May 29, 1962]. Although the Privy Council
eventually approved the Governor’s action, its
“approval” had been overtaken by events in Nigeria
because of a constitutional amendment by the Federal House of
Representatives. Meanwhile, under
the “emergency administration” of the West led by
Senator MA Majekodunmi, a fresh slate of predominantly pro-Midwest
Midwesterners became ministers, including Mark Uzorka, T. E. Salubi,
Webber Egbe, A. Y. Eke etc, with Oba Akenzua II and the Olu of Warri
as “advisers.” It was the
emergency administration in the West which gave the Western
region’s approval for the Midwest referendum to proceed.
In May, there was an All-party Midwest conference in Benin at which
Senator Dalton Asemota of Benin was made Chairman of the Midwest
United Front Committee (UFC). The
conference – which was boycotted by most members of the Action
Group - was a confidence building measure designed to iron out party
differences and differences between ideological and ethnic interest
groups. The conference resulted in the
creation of many committees to plan for the future Midwest. In addition to the UFC, these committees were the constitutional
and legal, finance and general purposes, civil service,
delimitation, and minority protection committees.
In June, the Majekodunmi regime filed a motion to withdraw the
court cases that were pending against the Midwest motion. Both motions were eventually dismissed in July by the Supreme
Court.
On September 9th, there was another all-party
round-table at the Oba’s Palace in Benin which most members of
the Action Group, except Ja Isuman and JE Odiete boycotted. At this meeting, a 75 man Midwest Planning Committee including all
Midwest legislators at regional and federal levels was created. It too was chaired by Senator Dalton Asemota, assisted by EB
Edun-Fregene, JAE Oki, Dr. Christopher Okojie, Chief Festus
Okotie-Eboh, Dennis Osadebay and Humphrey Omo-Osagie. Various sub-committee chairmen were Olisa Chukwura for the
constitutional and legal, Chief A. Y. Eke for the finance and
general purposes, J.I.G. Onyia for the civil service, Chief Obasuyi
for delimitation, Ja Isuman for the Plebiscite, and Chief Odiete for
minority protection. About one
week later a new political party called the Midwest Peoples Congress
(MPC) was formed. It was allied to the
Northern Peoples Congress and led by Apostle Edokpolo. [Vickers, Op. Cit.]
A week later on September 22, Chief Awolowo and many others were
arrested for an apparent plot to overthrow the government of Prime
Minister Balewa. Chief Anthony Enahoro
initially escaped into exile in Ireland but was extradited back to
Nigeria in May 1963 to stand trial.
With the Promised Land in sight, there was need for all resources
to be mobilized for known and unknown threats during the
referendum. Therefore, Oba Akenzua II
wrote an interesting letter to the Permanent Secretary of the
Ministry of Midwest Affairs on October 2nd, 1962, in which he
said:
Dear Permanent Secretary,
Your MWP144/358 of 26/9/62. I do not
now see any justification for the continued ban on
“Owegbe”. I, therefore,
support the suggestion that the ban on “Owegbe” should
be lifted. I recommend that the ban on
“Owegbe” in the Benin Division and elsewhere should be
lifted.”
Yours sincerely,
(sgd) Oba of Benin
(see Exhibit 63/5 p143, Owegbe Commission of Inquiry, 1966)
1963
With unity and security on the home front, all hands were now on
deck for the final push. Balewa
had decided that he would not conduct the referendum until there was
a formal government back in office at Ibadan. By order of the federal government, the
Akintola government was reinstated on January 1st, 1963
as Premier, this time with support from a new coalition consisting
of the NCNC and his new party called the United People’s Party
(UPP). This action caused an additional
misunderstanding within the old Action Group just as it was reeling
from the report of the Coker Commission of Inquiry into management
of Cocoa Marketing Board investments and newspaper coverage of the
ongoing trial of Chief Awolowo and others for treasonable felony [Enahoro, Op. Cit.].
On January 21, Mr. Gabriel E. Longe, from Owan district of the
Afenmai Division was appointed the Supervisor of the Midwest
referendum. He had been the legal
adviser to the Benin Delta Peoples Party back in the fifties. No civil servants from the Western region were to be selected (to
avoid a conflict of interest or fear of victimization) and no
non-Midwesterners were to be given any significant roles in the
exercise. Chief Festus Okotie-Eboh was
the link man to the Prime Minister to make sure there were no
mistakes at federal level.
A few days later on January 24th, the Midwest Planning
Committee met again to get updates on developments and plan for the
referendum. Two days later, on January
26th, KSY Momoh, who had taken over from Chief Anthony
Enahoro as Chairman of the Midwest Regional Committee of the Action
Group publicly announced that the Action group would oppose the
creation of the Midwest, but, unknown to him, the horse had left the
barn. On February 23rd,
Midwestern dissenters from the Action group and elements of the
Midwest State Movement and NCNC entered a secret pact to make sure
the Midwest referendum was hitch free. Faced with a choice between the party and their region, and urged
on by appeals from Senator Dalton Asemota, many opted for their
region. Under such pressure Action
Group hardliners and anti-Midwest region politicians like KSY Momoh,
C. Akere and Olatunji Oye, who were all former Ministers under
Akintola before the split in the AG, decided to attend the next
meeting of the Midwest Planning Committee (MPC) on March
9th. [Vickers, Op. Cit.]
Thereafter, Oba Akenzua II resumed his tours of the Midwest to
garner support for the “Yes” vote. He was quoted as saying,
“Whoever does not drop his or her ballot paper into the WHITE
ballot box will be condemned by future generations. Even those who die before the plebiscite takes place will be
condemned in the other world, if they die with the bad intention of
voting against or persuading people to vote against the creation of
a Midwest region.” [Speech by Oba Akenzua at Agbor, March 12, 1963]
On April 23rd, Mr. James Otobo, a pro-Midwest politician
who had decamped from the NCNC to the AG before independence and had
since crossed over to the UPP requested for a postponement of the
referendum pending clarification of certain issues.
Therefore, another meeting of the
Midwest Planning Committee was called on May 20th,
followed by yet another meeting on May 30th at which
final agreement was reached on the creation of new divisions for the
Akoko-Edo and Isoko people, as well as the composition of the
interim Midwest administration.
In the meantime, on May 2nd, tragedy struck. Senator Dalton Ogieva Asemota, Chairman of the Midwest Planning
Committee died suddenly.
THE DEATH OF SENATOR DALTON ASEMOTA
At the end of April 1963, Senator Asemota came to Lagos to attend a
scheduled meeting of the Senate. The
Senate adjourned on April 29th, and so he made plans to
return to Benin on May 2nd.
On May 1st, however, he
woke up early and telephoned his older brother Pa Elekhuoba Asemota
to tell him that he would be returning to Benin the next day. Then he went to the General Hospital in Lagos to see Dr. Laja in
follow-up to a Chest X-ray he had earlier ordered. Dr. Laja gave him a prescription, some of which the Hospital
pharmacy did not have, so he was asked to find them at a private
pharmacy. >From the hospital he went
shopping but returned home at about 3 pm to take his medications on
an empty stomach. After this he left for
the Commercial Medicine Store on Nnamdi Azikiwe Street owned by his
friend, Senator Wusu from Badagry. On arrival he handed the prescription
to his friend who in turn gave it to his assistants to get the
medications. Meanwhile Senator Asemota
was resting on the counter along with his wife, Onaiwu, waiting on
the prescription. Then suddenly, and
without warning he slumped.
He was then rushed to the General Hospital Casualty
department. His wife then came to my
family house on MacDonald Avenue in Ikoyi, Lagos, where we were
neighbours to Chief Anthony Enahoro on our back side and Dr. Rilwan,
a well known Lagos physician, on the other. Dr. Rilwan, my parents, and Mrs Onaiwu Asemota rushed back to the
hospital to find out what was happening, only to be directed to the
mortuary where the Senator’s lifeless body was lying. It was my father that had the unenviable responsibility to break
the devastating news to Chiefs Omo-Osagie and Okotie-Eboh. Chief Omo-Osagie notified Pa Elekhuoba Asemota in Benin.
Meanwhile, my father went to Dr. Laja’s house to get
permission for release and embalmment. While on their way to the hospital the Doctor said the Senator had
had an enlarged Heart on Chest X-ray. When Senator Asemota asked him how his Chest X-Ray looked, he told
him: “It is okay, Papa.” to
which the Senator responded by smiling.
Senator Dalton Asemota, the consensus builder, did not live to see
the Midwest he worked so hard to make possible. Descended from
Chief Osemwota, the Eson, and a descendant of the Ezomo Nehenua
family of Benin, and Madam Iyeye Ero, the later Senator
was buried in the Asemota family compound after a sermon led by
Reverend Akinluyi at the St. Matthew’s Cathedral in Benin City
[personal communication, Mr. DA Omoigui]. He was replaced as Chairman of the
Midwest Planning Committee by Chief Morgan Agbontaen.
ACTIVITIES AT THE OBA'S PALACE AND AT WARD LEVEL IN PREPARATION
FOR THE REFERENDUM
Once it became apparent that the referendum was indeed going to be
held, a tactical forward HQ was established at the Oba's Palace,
Benin City. Representatives of the
Midwest State Movement met there regularly for briefing. At one of the early meetings Oba Akenzua II warned all concerned
that it was a rare event indeed for a government to lose a
referendum in its area of jurisdiction. He reminded them that in 1962 General DeGaulle had conducted a
successful referendum for a new constitution in France.
The government of reference in the Midwest, Oba Akenzua II was
referring to, was that of the Western region, which, inspite of
public pretensions Oba Akenzua said, was opposed to the
creation of the new region. He told
those gathered that no stone must be left unturned to ensure victory
in this last lap of what he said was a war of liberation. Midwest patriots like the late Israel Amadi-Emina, Senior
Divisional Adviser for the Benin and Delta provinces to the Western
region Government were in regular attendance,
at a risk to their civil service careers
in the western region, explaining the inside mechanics of Action
group rigging methods. It was from him and others in the
system that all the administrative traps in the 1959 voters’
register were learnt, including fake names that had been planted
there at the time of the voters’ registration in 1959.
Without knowing the number and
identity of the fake names, he explained, it would be impossible to
get 60% of those registered after accounting for
“No” votes. It was not the
intention of those who wrote such difficult clauses into the
constitution that any new region would ever be created.
Quite apart from open campaigning for voters to vote "YES", as well
as tours to various parts of the Midwest, detailed operational plans
were made to ensure victory on polling day. Fleets of Armels buses, for example, were leased by Chief Humphrey
Omo-Osagie and sent around the Benin province in operational
support. The Otu-Edo party machine went
into high gear. Prince Shaka Momodu and
his “militia” were on alert. The Owegbe society was completely mobilized. The Urhobo Progress Union used every avenue known to man, including
churches, to mobilize voters. Turn-out
at ward level all over the state was planned to be close to 100% to
make up for unknown ghost voters.
About two weeks prior to the official referendum, to minimize
uncertainty, at every potential polling station in every ward vote
forecasts were generated by Midwest enthusiasts, based on a
pre-referendum poll. Records were
meticulously collected from hut to hut and house to house and
recorded with entries for "Total Electors", "Total entitled to vote
(based on the 1959 federal register)", "Number of people dead (since
the 1959 federal elections)", "Number of people that have left the
area (since the 1959 federal elections)", "Number of people likely
to vote 'Yes'", and "Number of people likely to vote 'No'." On this basis detailed plans were made to target potential "No"
votes to convince them otherwise, through education, direct
lobbying, and traditional sanctions. Many of such "No" votes had been confused by conflicting campaigns
to vote against the creation of the Midwest by some interests. Anti-Midwest campaigners told villagers that putting their votes in
the “white box”, was a vote for return to the rule of
“white men”. Pro-Midwest
campaigners told villagers that a vote in the “black
box” was a vote for “Evil”.
But more mundane methods were also used to campaign. For example, in one case, the retired Head of a Household asked his
visitor what the whole referendum controversy was about. What, he wondered, was he to gain from going to the polling station
at his age? The Midwest protagonist he
spoke to explained it very simply in this way: If the referendum were to approve the creation of the Midwest, he
would no longer have to travel all the way to Ibadan to collect his
pension. All he would have to do was to
go to Benin City nearby. The old man
thought about what he had just heard and said: "In that case my son, everybody in this house will go there and
vote 'Yes'.”
In yet another case, this time in Benin City itself, a local ward
leader of the Action Group was approached by some colleagues in the
Action Group to notify him that party policy was to oppose the
creation of the Midwest. The gentleman
concerned calmly told his visitors that it would be sacrilege for
him to go against the wishes of Oba Akenzua II.
From June 5th until June 14th, and again from
June 20th until the 25th, massive campaign
tours were undertaken by the MSM, led by Dennis Osadebay.
On July 1st, Michael
Okpara, Premier of the Eastern region, came on tour to encourage the
people of the Midwest to vote “Yes”. Also in attendance during the referendum were many other NCNC
national leaders who were made interim divisional team leaders. They included GC Mbanugo, TOS Benson, RA Fani Kayode (who had since
decamped from the AG), RA Akinyemi, KO Mbadiwe, Akinfosile, as well
as Okotie Eboh and Omo Osagie. On or
about July 10th, with all the signs pointing to a
successful referendum, even Chief Obafemi Awolowo, leader of the
Action Group, faced with dissension within the ranks of the Midwest
Action Group, sent a note from prison to his supporters urging them
to vote “Yes.” (Vickers, Op. Cit.)
THE BAUCHI MEETING: OKOTIE-EBOH AND
BALEWA’S SECOND THOUGHTS
On the surface, all had seemed set to go for the referendum, once
all the legislative bills had been passed and the supervisor
appointed. Behind the scenes, however,
Chief SL Akintola had been warning some of friends in the NPC that
they were setting a precedent by supporting the creation of the
Midwest region which would someday come back to haunt the North.
It seemed clear to Akintola that
if the Midwest referendum was allowed to go forward, the Midwest
would, indeed, opt out of the West. Once
the Midwest was so created, a precedent would have been set for the
creation of other regions, a prospect that was not attractive to the
northern leadership. On this
basis, Prime Minister Tafawa Balewa began to have second
thoughts.
In the last week of May 1963, the
supervisor of the referendum, GE Longe was summoned for what he
thought was another of his routine briefings for the Prime
Minister. At this meeting, which
took place in Bauchi, rather than Lagos, he witnessed a private show
down between Okotie-Eboh and Balewa. Okotie-Eboh insisted that he had received Sardauna’s
commitment, things had gone too far and that Balewa could not back
out. After a hot exchange, Balewa
conceded to Okotie-Eboh and gave the final go ahead for the
referendum [personal communication, Kenneth Longe, Benin City]
THE REFERENDUM DIARY
The Midwest was divided into eight districts for the purpose of the
official referendum. They were Aboh,
Afemai, Asaba, Benin, Ishan, Urhobo, Warri and Western Ijaw. Counting Stations for each of these districts were located at the
Recreation Hall, Kwale; Town Hall,
Auchi; Council Hall, Asaba; Conference Hall (Urhokpota), Benin City;
Town Hall, Irrua; Council Hall, Ughelli; K.G.V. Memorial Hall,
Warri; and the Court Hall, Bomadi, respectively.
The diary below was developed from interviews with and the personal
records of Mr. D. A. Omoigui, Assistant District Referendum Officer
for Benin NE (I) in what is now known as Uhumwode local government
area.
April 6th, 1963
Upon arrival on April 6th, 1963, at the headquarters of
the Referendum at Kings Square, Benin City, the Supervisor welcomed
all referendum officers. The Secretary
to the Supervisor (Mr. G. B. A. Egbe) then provided each officer
with copies of the Constitutional Referendum Act, 1962 and
Constitutional Referendum Regulations, 1963 along with Circular No.
1 which contained “General Instructions. ”
The eight major Districts identified for the Referendum were placed
under District Referendum Officers (DRO). Each district was divided into Constituencies. Assistant District Referendum Officers (ADRO) were operationally
responsible for the conduct of the exercise in each constituency
which was further subdivided into wards and finally, 1,841 polling
stations. The ADRO was responsible for
providing the name and address of each polling station as well as
the staff. At each polling station,
there was a Presiding Officer, two Polling Officers, one Orderly and
one female searcher in reserve. For each
polling station the ADRO reconciled the 1959 Federal Electoral
register for that station and provided it to the Presiding Officer
for use in verifying the legitimacy of individual voters on polling
day. The ADRO was also responsible for
instructing Polling Officers in their duties, providing all
equipment to be used and ensuring that all ballot boxes were
delivered to the District Referendum Officer at the counting
center. The DRO on the other hand
was responsible for coordination in addition to conducting the count
at the counting center. Only he had the
legal authority to open each ballot box, but he was allowed to
delegate that responsibility to the ADRO if necessary. At the end of the Referendum every officer was expected to submit a
report on his work.
Public information leaflets with directions on “How to
Vote” were printed at the Nigerian National Press, Ltd on Malu
road, Apapa, in Lagos. Voters were
instructed on eight basic steps:
1.
Find out where your Polling Station is (same as it was in 1959)
2.
Find out when Polling day is. (To be announced by the Prime
Minister)
3.
Go to the Polling Station.
4.
Go to the table where the Polling Officers are sitting. (Show your
card or provide your name, address and registration number, subject
to challenge by any of the polling agents representing various
political parties)
5.
Have your left forefinger marked with special ink.
6.
Take your officially stamped ballot paper. (Your registration card
will also be stamped)
7.
Go to the screened compartment and place your ballot in either the
white box for YES or the Black Box for NO.
8.
Leave the Polling Station.
Thursday April 18th, 1963
The Supervisor welcomed all referendum officers back to Benin
City. Based on advance reports, claims
for reimbursement according to standard civil service rules were
received from officers and requested financial advances made to
enable them discharge their duties. Some
had trekked for many miles through bush paths infested with wild
animals just to identify polling station locations. Others had the problem of dealing with a low proportion of
all-season motorable roads and made requests for back-up
LandRovers. Then there was the
little detail of paying for supervising presiding officers who
either had cars or motor-cycles, rather than those who would need
transportation arrangements. This was
necessitated by concerns about communication, particularly during
rains.
Having secured the names of all polling stations and names of
officers (recruited locally) expected to man them, as well as
reconciled voters’ lists, the officers were now ordered to
begin an intensive lecture tour for all polling officers. Booklets containing detailed, standardized instructions were
distributed to ADROs who were expected in turn to give them to
Presiding and Polling Officers. Such
pamphlets included “Instructions
to Polling Officers”, “Instructions to Referendum Officers” and guidelines
developed for “Law and Order”.
The DROs on the other hand were charged with preparing the ballot
boxes and polling compartments. Boxes
were brought from Lagos, then cleaned. Their clips, nobs, nutches and locks were tested for efficacy. Each
Referendum Officer was given two delicate specially designed
security keys and then trained how to use them.
Between April 18th and 20th, Mr. Egbe
organized additional short lectures on various aspects of their
duties. Clarification was
provided, for example, for use of two voters' lists in sub-divided
wards. Further instructions were issued
by the Supervisor regarding the importance of ensuring that the
exact number of voters in the register for each polling station was
precise and could be defended in court. They were then ordered to return to their districts and
constituencies until the next scheduled meeting on Monday May
13th, 1963.
In the Uhumwode District Council area, the ADRO, Mr. D. A. Omoigui,
conducted lectures to polling officials at 10 am and 4 pm
respectively, at the Council Hall, Ehor and the Eyaen Court Hall on
Tuesday 23rd and Friday 26th of April.
May 13th, 1963
The meeting of DROs and ADROs originally scheduled for May 13th had
to be put off until May 20th because the Supervisor had been invited to a meeting of
representatives of political parties of the Midwest at Prime
Minister Tafawa Balewa’s house in Lagos on the same day. At that meeting, party representatives from the NCNC, AG, MPC and
UPP requested assurances that they could discuss any concerns about
arrangements for the referendum with the Supervisor, including
compliance with the referendum regulations. They also wanted
clarification about the powers of their polling agents and their
ability to raise objections about specific Referendum Officers and
polling officials with alleged party sympathies which might be
detrimental to their cause. The
Prime Minister directed the Supervisor to keep all parties informed
of his activities.
May 20th, 1963
On May 20, 1963, his referendum officers submitted the ratified
figures based on an audit of voters projected for each polling
station to the Supervisor. Residual
problems with the inspection and testing of ballot boxes were
reported for Benin City, Ubiaja, Warri and Ughelli and arrangements
made to address them. The list of
locations where new polling booths were to be constructed and the
associated costs were obtained. There
were discussions about line item costs of contracting private
typists and hiring of outboard engines in riverain areas. Officers were warned against any non-neutral activities, which
might bring the referendum into disrepute. They were alerted that
the Supervisor could change lists of polling officers recommended if
there were complaints of favoritism. Having been directed to continue lectures to Polling Officers, work
to get all ballot boxes ready, make arrangements for construction of
polling booths and compartments, and packaging of equipment for each
polling station, they were asked to return on Monday June 10th
for further instructions. It was
expected that the referendum might take place at the end of
June.
June 10th, 1963
At this meeting it was made clear that the referendum would not
take place in June as earlier hoped. Discussion focused on estimates for construction of screens and
booths. The Supervisor expressed concern
that in the past, such items were discarded after elections. He expressed the hope that the use of anti-termite frames would
enhance reusability and save money. He
also directed the officers to ensure that all materials and
equipment supplied for the referendum was returned in good
condition. They were expected to plan
this ahead and rehearse their plans, in order to identify transport
and security requirements.
Instructions for the counting of votes were then issued. The
procedure was rigidly spelled out to the Referendum Officers as
follows:
1.
All boxes, envelopes and articles delivered by the Presiding
Officers were to be checked.
2.
The Returning Officer would then be given the statement of invalid
papers.
3.
An accounting was then to be made of unused ballot papers, unused
tendered ballot papers, spoilt ballot papers and canceled papers.
4.
At this point the returning officers would be provided pencils,
clips and forms for “Record of Votes.” (Form C1)
5.
The seal on each Ballot box was then to be broken, the box unlocked
and its contents emptied on the counting table, after which the
returning officer begins counting the ballots, face upwards in
bundles of 100 each, removing any further invalid papers.
6.
If ballots were unmarked with official markings or issued in a
different polling station they were to be rejected, and the word
“rejected” written boldly on them. If any rejection was contested by a party counting agent the phrase
“Rejection objected to” was to be inscribed under the
word “Rejected.”
7.
At this point the returning officer would complete the
‘Record of Votes’, sign and hand it over to the ADRO
along with unsealed envelopes containing rejected and counted papers
from the WHITE and BLACK boxes.
8.
Then the ADRO would tally the total number of votes in each box,
total number of valid votes, and the number of rejected papers.
9.
After each of two boxes from every polling station had been counted
and tallied, the numbers for the constituency were to be totalled
and reconciled with the numbers of ballot papers and boxes
originally provided to each polling station and the constituency as
well as the Voters’ register.
10.
At this point the statement would be signed and dated by the
ADRO
11.
Form C2, containing all figures, was then to be declared publicly
for that constituency and a copy sent to the DRO.
Before parting ways to their specific zones of responsibility, they
were reminded to continue training polling officers, preparing
ballot boxes and building up parcels of equipment for each polling
station. It was anticipated that they
would meet again on Monday July 1st.
On June 12th, 1963, however, the Prime Minister
announced on radio that the long awaited Midwest referendum would
take place on Saturday, July 13th, 1963. Therefore, all Referendum Officers were summoned back to Benin
City.
June 13th, 1963
At this meeting detailed instructions were issued regarding the
impending referendum. The Supervisor, Mr. GE Longe, did not attend
because he had to go to Lagos for an assignment. As a result, he made arrangements to make field trips to various
locations between June and July 13th.
His address at the meeting was read out in his behalf. To ensure authenticity, he decided to restrict the power to appoint
polling agents to the Midwest Regional Secretaries of the four
recognized parties, namely the UPP, AG, NCNC and MPC. He did so to avoid town or district secretaries sending all sorts
of unverifiable names. Of the four
polling agents approved in each polling station, two were for
political parties in favor of the creation and two for parties
against the creation of the Mid-West. A similar formula was used for the Counting agents.
However, Referendum Officers were only authorized by law to guide
political parties in this process, if so requested by the parties
involved, but not actually solicit them to make appointments.
For Law and Order, the Police was provided with the list of all
polling stations and their locations, as well as collecting points
for ballot boxes at the end of polling.
The ADRO (HQ), Mr. Edgal, was to distribute supplies of public
leaflets and posters to referendum officers. Officers were expected
to release these every week, assisted by the Western region Ministry
of Information and the Federal Territory Ministry of
Information.
Once again it was emphasized that DROs rehearse how to open Ballot
boxes during the count. Polling Screens
were supplied directly to those polling stations located on
motorable roads. For those which could
be so reached or which were located on bush paths that were not
large enough to allow porters carry the sticks on which the cloth
screen would be mounted, presiding officers were paid up to 10
shillings to make local arrangements in the bush for sticks. Presiding Officers in remote unmotorable areas were also charged
with the construction of polling booths for a fee not to exceed 4
pounds. For stations in villages on
motorable roads (or accessible by an outboard launch or canoe), two
polling screens were to be used as a booth while sheds could be
constructed in front of the booth to reduce heat. Presiding Officers were paid up to 15 shillings for each shed so
constructed.
On the basis of these guidelines Mr. Longe asked the Officers to
estimate the numbers of booths, bush sticks, and sheds they would
need in the more remote areas of the Midwest.
Because polling screens at that time were made out of anti-termite
timber and highly durable cloth, they cost the Government over 3,000
pounds. Therefore, detailed arrangements were made for their storage
in the event of future use after the referendum.
Officers were then told to put final touches to their list of names
of presiding, polling and returning officers. These lists would then be used to prepare vouchers for their
remuneration. Formal certificates of
appointment would also be issued. Each
returning officer was paid 7/6d.
June 24th, 1963
Mr. Longe addressed the DROs. A
checklist of requirements was itemized and reviewed. They were asked to collect the certificates for polling and
presiding officers, as well as the certificates to be attached to
each copy of the voters’ lists given to each presiding
officer. Arrangements were
completed with Messrs Edgal and Odikpo for the transportation of
polling screen frames, as well as collection of ballot boxes,
publicity materials, materials and equipment for the counting
centers. Addresses of collecting
centers were confirmed and transport arrangements reviewed for
collection of Ballot boxes and polling equipment at the end of the
poll. Names of counting clerks and other
polling officials were confirmed.
Finally, DROs were told to return on July 1st along with
their ADROs.
July 1st, 1963
At this crucial meeting, a number of last minute details were
clarified and rehearsed. The list of
equipment for each Counting Center was rehashed. Lists of packeted articles for use at each polling station and
items to be handed over to ADROs by presiding officers at the close
of polling were reviewed. In addition to
handing over count results, along with all envelopes, articles,
ballot boxes and keys used at polling and counting stations, ADROs
were charged to write post-mortem reports on the referendum in their
various constituencies, explaining any particular difficulties
encountered and making suggestions for future improvement.
Mr. Longe issued a general approval of all the counting clerks,
orderlies and female searchers that had been nominated. In larger towns ballot papers were to be distributed on the morning
of the poll. In scattered but motorable
areas, ballot papers were to be distributed the evening before at
identified central locations to presiding officers. For very remote
areas, including villages located deep inside the Delta, referendum
officers were advised to make arrangements to collect their ballot
papers from the Referendum HQ a few days prior, subject to
arrangements for security. Ballot paper
stamps were issued to referendum officers during the meeting but
were not to be distributed until the ballot papers were being given
to presiding officers. Officers were
reminded once again to notify presiding officers that unstamped
ballot papers would be rejected during the count.
The critical importance of the Ballot paper account was again
stressed, with emphasis on the need for appropriate signatures
appended by polling agents, presiding and referendum officers. Another very important document Mr. Longe was concerned about was
the certified extract of the Voters' list. Each extract was to be certified and officially marked. Mr. Longe
emphasized again and again the need for referendum officers to think
pro-actively and ensure that all elements of the referendum could be
defended in court. As of this time
political parties had not made their choices of polling agents known
but it was obvious that polling agents would in fact be appointed by
the time the referendum was conducted.
Officers were directed to cross-check the adequacy of lighting at
their counting centers. Counting
was expected to begin once ballot papers arrived from individual
constituencies. Once results were
collated and signed, they were to be telephoned to phone number 326,
the official phone number for the Referendum Secretary (Mr. Egbe) in Benin. Simultaneously, a
special courier was to be physically sent with the original signed
and certified Form C2 to the Secretary in Benin. (A copy of Form C2 was to be retained by the ADRO and DRO on
site).
Posters were to be put up at each polling station at least seven
(7) days prior to the referendum. Extra
posters were made available to replace those destroyed by rain or
removed by unscrupulous characters opposed to the referendum.
Final lists of polling officials were accepted. Payment for services was to be made as approved at the various
counting centers after close of polling.
For law and order, the Police expressed the opinion that it would
be unnecessary for referendum officials to be escorted by the Police
while moving around on polling day. However, the Police promised to send out periodic patrols. Therefore, Mr. Longe suggested that ADROs identify a central
location to their subordinates at which they could be reliably
reached. Whatever movements were to be
undertaken by the ADROs was to be prioritized, focusing in
particular on ensuring that all ballot boxes arrive safely at the
counting center. This
unwillingness of the Police to provide bodyguards for referendum
officials prompted some referendum officers to hire their own
private bodyguards. The DROs in
particular were directed to move about their districts in a
supervisory role but were advised to use their counting centers as
their offices in order that they could be reached if necessary,
either by their ADROs, the Police, or the Supervisor.
For transport, one lorry was allocated to every district except
riverain Western Ijaw which was supplied with motor launches. The
Lorries were to be used to distribute polling equipment and
materials and recollect them at the end of polling. (Polling Screens were to be stored at central locations at a cost
of rental not to exceed 15 pounds yearly). Alternative special arrangements were made for the collection of
ballot boxes. Each counting center was
alloted several back-up vehicles and arrangements made to ensure
that no more than one collection trip was made by any one
vehicle. At about 4pm vehicles were to
be deployed to the farthest polling stations from the counting
centers. At 7pm these vehicles would
then begin a preplanned, secure one-way trip back to the counting
station, stopping to pick up ballot boxes at predesignated polling
stations.
Lastly, officers were requested to return on July 19th, following
the referendum, for final debrief and audit prior to departure back
to their regular jobs on Monday July 22nd 1963.
POLLING DAY, July 13th, 1963
In most constituencies – except in the Benin and Asaba
divisions - polling went off without major problems.
In Benin City, Mr. C. Akere, a known
Action Grouper, reportedly kept coming in and out of the
Headquarters of the referendum on Ring Road with complaints,
particularly about the unexpected massive turn-out of voters. On each occasion, Mr. Longe would ask
him to bring evidence of malpractice but he had none to show.
According to Mr. D. A. Omoigui, ADRO for Benin NorthEast (I) there
were few Police patrols in his constituency. The Police stayed put at Ehor without transport, cutting off
polling officials in the Eyaen area from any kind of formal security
protection. Many were beaten up or
rough-handled by Action Group thugs who even tried to prevent voters
from voting. For example, Mr. H.R.A.
Iruegbae, then Presiding Officer at the Ugha Native Authority School
Idumwumgha was beaten and his plastic bag seized. When the ADRO went
to get Police at Ehor, he found them at Adobadan. The procession then returned to Idumwungha where for unexplained
reasons the Police Officer in Charge, Mr. Izevbizua-Iyamu, refused
to arrest the thugs or clear them out of the polling station. This type of Police behavior was not universal. At Ehor, for example, another Police officer, one Mr. Omonudo,
carried out his security assignments with despatch and seriousness
when reports were made to him. At Orio, a privately hired bodyguard
called “Dogo” from Auchi physically threw
obstructionists out of the polling station when the Police did not
show up.
During counting at the Conference Hall in Benin, a special
representative of Chief Akintola who had been sent to
“monitor” the counting, was chased out of the Hall by
members of the Owegbe society, when it transpired that his name was
not on the official list of agents representing the various
political parties.
July 18th, 1963
After interim results from 22 out of 30 polling constituencies had
already shown on July 16th that over 60% voted
“Yes”, final results were released by Mr. Gabriel
Esezobor Longe on Thursday July 18th, 1963. Almost 90% of voters had opted to leave the western region. Shortly, thereafter, there was an attempt by the legal adviser to
the Action Group, Barrister SO Ighodaro, to file a motion contesting
the referendum. However, this was later
withdrawn.
WHY WAS THERE OPPOSITION FROM SOME KEY MIDWESTERNERS IN THE
ACTION GROUP TO THE CREATION OF THE REGION?
Those from Benin who opposed the creation of the Midwest are best
placed to explain their actions, party loyalty aside.
Some were definitely influenced by fear
that they would find themselves in the opposition in a new Midwest,
and would be denied government patronage.
In an interview in the United States,
Chief Anthony Enahoro made reference to the fact that at a certain
stage, Chief Samuel Akintola was using the Midwest issue for
internal power play within the Action group. It is not clear whether, this, therefore, was his reason for acting
the way he did, as a rival and opponent of Chief Akintola within the
party. In any case this would not
explain his position on the matter back in the fifties.
According to testimony by Phillip Obazee, who was in a position to
know what transpired in Action group circles within his own ward in
Benin,
“What may explain the "why" question as I know it from my
ward-level
intelligence gathering at that time are as follows: (1) Trust - many
people
in the Benin and Delta Provinces were very leery of the NCNC agenda;
(2)
Keep them in Check - the Igbos, like the Japanese in the U.S.A in
the 1980',
were buying major real estate holdings, owned most of the businesses
along
Forestry and Mission Roads, and were gaining very strong grips on
the
political and economic machinery of Benin Province; (3) B2 (Chief
Omo-Osagie) agenda and the politics of cult intimidation - some
people were
of the opinion then that Chief Omo-Osagie and the politics of cult
that his
followers were known for would perhaps soon hold the Palace and the
people
of Benin Province a hostage; (4) NPC opportunism
and Lagos Street
factor - it was not clear to many why the North would have interest
in the
creation of Mid-West with its attendant new-breed of "money
wadding"
opportunists (Was the North vying to be
noticed because of the Lagos
Street Factor?); (5) Free Education -
many people were afraid that free
elementary education practiced in Benin and Delta Provinces could
not be
sustained under Mid-West Region; and (6) 1897 factor - the vestiges
of the
defeat of the Binis in 1897 cannot be ruled out in the metaphysical
calculus
of asking the Binis to go against the political order of the day,
and the
Binis would for a long time continue to be laggards in embracing
new
political dispensations, particularly where those new dispensations
are
masterminded by leaders of checkered history.” [personal communication, Edo-Nation Egroup, December
8th, 2002]
Separately, in Warri, for example, there were
minority-within-minority fears among certain Itsekiri leaders.
AFTER THE REFERENDUM
THE DEATH OF CHIEF GABRIEL ESEZOBOR LONGE
AUGUST 9, 1963
After the Midwest had been successfully created and was fully
functioning, there was an attempt in 1964-65 by KSY Momoh, an Action
Group operative, to get a court
injunction to declare the region illegal, based on criticisms of the
delimitation exercise that accompanied the creation of the
region. The suit was thrown out by then
Chief Judge Chike Idigbe (personal communication, Mr. KO Longe).
CONCLUSION
What began as a request to colonial authorities in 1926 from Oba
Eweka II, took on a sense of political urgency in 1948, and was
finally attained during the reign of his son, Akenzua II, on August
9, 1963. On August 9, 1964, at the first
anniversary celebration of the Midwestern region, the first
Governor, Chief S J Mariere, said, among other things,
“I do not think that it is an exaggeration to say that if, in
any sense, one single person could be said to be responsible for a
turning point, Oba Akenzua II must be classified as one such
person…..when, later this evening, I invite all present to
drink with me the toast of the Federal republic and the toast of
Midwestern Nigeria, I am sure that, in some special way, we will be
drinking the toast of Oba Akenzua II, Uku Akpolokpolo, Omo
n’Oba n’Edo. Along with toast, we will also be drinking
the toast of other potentates of Midwestern Nigeria who, in diverse
ways and fashions, in several nooks and corners, in places low and
high, in circumstances difficult and easy, have contributed their
quota and mite towards our successful deliverance into the promised
land, whose first anniversary today we
celebrate………In quite a different vein we must also
remember those great men and women who toiled and sweated on the
journey to this land of our fathers but died in harness when already
the land was in sight. Today, I am sure,
that the spirit of late Senator Dalton Ogieva Asemota and the soul
of Chief Gabriel Esezobor Longe will specially rejoice in their
abode in the great beyond…..” [Ayeni, P (Ed): Midwestern Nigeria First Anniversary 1964.
Ministry of Information, Benin City]
In addition to Senator Dalton Ogieva Asemota and Chief Gabriel
Esezobor Longe, many of the great figures mentioned in this essay
have since died, some violently. Chief
Festus Okotie-Eboh, the great enabler, was assassinated during the
January 15, 1966 coup. The story I have
related traces the origins of a determined nationalist agitation,
confident in its historical heritage, pure in its strategic
formulation, complex in its operational implementation, but
persistent nonetheless, complete with the kind of ups and downs,
promises and betrayals that characterize all sustained human
endeavors. But, as I noted at the
beginning, two lessons stand out from the saga:
b). Organized and united across traditional and contemporary forms of
leadership, nothing can stand in the way of the peoples of the
Midwest.
Let us ask ourselves why, to this day, in Benin City and other
towns of the Midwest, later called Bendel, and now Edo and Delta
States by military fiat, many of our heroes have never been honored
or memorialized. Why are there no
statues, buildings, airports or prominent streets named after many
of these great men and women who achieved the impossible? Why have they not been recommended for post-humous awards?
It is my recommendation, therefore, that the Edo and Delta Houses
of Assembly should create a special award titled “Hero of the
Midwest” to be conferred on the visionaries, strategists,
operational and tactical leaders, key allies and referendum officers
whose efforts ensured our “successful deliverance into the
promised land.” Furthermore, the
history of the creation of the Midwest should be taught in schools
and a designated area should be established in Benin to be named the
“Midwest Memorial”. The
memorial should contain a small museum, have statues of the most
prominent fighters and plaques dedicated to all those that made it
possible.
On my part, as a son of Benin, in the Midwestern region of Nigeria,
on behalf of my generation and future generations, I say to all of
you alive or dead, who made it possible, “Thank
you.”
APENDIX ONE
List of Referendum Officers and Assistant Referendum Officers and
their respective Areas
|
HEADQUARTERS |
|
|
Supervisor |
Mr. Edward Longe |
|
Assistant District Referendum Officer |
Mr. Edgal |
|
Secretary |
Mr. G. B. A. Egbe |
|
Referendum Officer |
District |
Assistant Referendum Officer |
Division |
|
F Obuku |
ABOH |
Pius Aghenu |
Ukwuani Aboh East |
|
|
|
Paul Aninta |
Ndosimile Aboh West |
|
PGO Nwanjei |
ASABA |
HU Ogbo |
Asaba North East |
|
|
|
NN Onyebujo |
Asaba North West |
|
|
|
AI Buzugbe |
Asaba South East |
|
|
|
POK Okanigbe |
Asaba South West |
|
RME Aitalegbe |
AFENMAI |
DE Ayeni |
Ivbiosakon Afenmai NW (II) |
|
|
|
MM Momodu |
Agenebode Afenmai SE |
|
|
|
ME Ajakaye |
Auchi Afenmai NE |
|
|
|
EL Jamgbade |
Igarra (Akoko Oke) Afenmai NW I |
|
O Oronsaye |
BENIN |
FU Amayo |
Benin Central West |
|
|
|
E. Fadaka |
Benin Central East |
|
|
|
DA Omoigui |
Benin NE (I) Uhumwode |
|
|
|
I Igiehon |
Benin West (I) |
|
|
|
GO Aiwerioba |
Benin SE Iyekorhionmwon |
|
|
|
CGA Okoh |
Benin NE (II) Akugbe |
|
|
|
MO Igbinokpogie |
Benin West (II) |
|
AA Ordia |
ISHAN |
JO Omosun |
Ishan South East |
|
|
|
MO Elebesunu |
Ishan West Central |
|
|
|
MA Borha |
Ishan North East |
|
|
|
FA Ijewere |
Ishan North West |
|
SW Anaughe |
URHOBO |
JR Abohwo |
Central Urhobo East |
|
|
|
M Ayisire |
Central Urhobo West |
|
|
|
JO Ogedegbe |
Isoko North (Urhobo West I) |
|
|
|
JA Agwae |
Isoko South (Urhobo West II) |
|
|
|
PWA Ogigirigi |
Urhobo East (I) |
|
|
|
PA Ewetuya |
Urhobo East (II) |
|
FO Moore |
WARRI |
OO Pessu |
Benin River |
|
|
|
Princewill Egworitse |
Warri Area |
|
BD Daubri |
WESTERN IJAW |
Martin Abidde |
West Ijaw (I) |
|
|
|
WJ Abere |
West Ijaw (II) |
APPENDIX 2
(August 19, 1963 – February 8, 1964)
|
Administrator |
Dennis Osadebay (NCNC) |
|
Deputy Administrator, Local Government |
Chief H Omo-Osagie (NCNC) |
|
Deputy Administrator, Chieftaincy |
Chief SJ Mariere (NCNC) |
|
Deputy Administrator, Finance and Economic development |
James Otobo (UPP) |
|
Commissioner, Health |
Reverend Edeki (UPP) |
|
Commissioner, Works and Transport |
Dr. Christopher Okojie (NCNC) |
|
Commissioner, Justice |
Mr. Webber Egbe (NCNC) |
|
Commissioner, Education |
Chief Oputa-Otutu (NCNC) |
|
Commissioner, Information |
Mr. FH Utomi (NCNC) |
|
Commissioner, Lands & Housing |
Mr. N. Ezonbodor
(NCNC) |
|
Commissioner, Internal Affairs |
Mr. BIG Ewah (UPP) |
|
Commissioner, Trade & Industry |
Apostle John Edokpolor (MPC) |
|
Commissioner, Agriculture and Natural resources |
Mr. KSY Momoh (AG) |
|
Commissioner, Labour and Social Welfare |
Mr. JD Ojobolo (UPP) |
|
Commissioner, without portfolio |
Mr. Albert Okojie (MPC) |
|
Commissioner, without portfolio |
Mr. JO Oye (AG) |
|
Commissioner, Establishments & Training |
Mr. PK Tabiowo (sworn in on August 27, 1963) (NCNC)
|
APPENDIX 3
THE FIRST MIDWEST CABINET, 1964
|
Premier |
Dr. the Hon. Chief Dennis Osadebay |
|
Minister, Local Government
& Chieftaincy |
Chief H Omo-Osagie |
|
Minister, Economic Development |
Chief O. Oweh |
|
Minister, Finance |
Chief O.I. Dafe |
|
Minister, Health |
Mr. John Igbrude |
|
Minister, Works and Transport |
Dr. Christopher Okojie |
|
Minister, Justice |
Mr. Webber G. Egbe |
|
Minister, Education |
Chief FH Utomi |
|
Minister, Establishments |
Mr. John Umolu |
|
Minister, Information |
Reverend Imevbore Edeki |
|
Minister, Lands & Housing |
Mr. ES Ukonga |
|
Minister, Internal Affairs |
Prince Shaka Momodu |
|
Minister, Trade & Industry |
Mr. JA Orhorho |
|
Minister, Agriculture and Natural resources |
Mr. VI Amadasun |
|
Minister, Labour and Social Welfare |
Mr. EO Imafidon |
|
Minister of State (Finance) |
Mr. GI Oviasu |
|
Minister of State (Agriculture & Natural Resources) |
Chief FU Osuhor |
|
Minister of State (Local Government & Chieftaincy) |
Hon. LST Fufeyin |
|
Minister of State (Premier’s Office) |
His Highness, Enosegbe II, Onogie of Ewohimi |
|
Minister of State (Premier’s Office) |
His Highness, Gbenoba II, Obi of Agbor |