Urhobo Historical Society
Quo Vadis (Oil) Resource Control in the Niger Delta?
By Emmanuel Ojameruaye, Ph.D.
Introduction
As
we approach the October 4, 2009 deadline for all militants in the Niger
Delta
to surrender to the Federal Government (FG), the question facing the
apostles
of (oil) resource control by oil producing states and communities is: quo
vadis?, i.e. "Where do you go from here ?" or simply
"What next?". Will the October 4, 2009 mark the end of the resource
control struggle or will it mark a pause? If it is the latter, when
will it
resurrect again and in what form?
The Amnesty Deal
It is now an open secret that the Federal Government believes that
October 4,
2009 will mark the end of at least the military wing of the struggle.
In fact, the
Federal Government is already sounding triumphant and waving the
�Mission
Accomplished� banner. On September 29, 2009, the presidential review
meeting on
the implementation of the Amnesty program concluded that the October 4
deadline
for all repentant militants to surrender their arms remains unchanged.
The
meeting chaired by President Yar�Adua was attended by the
Vice-President, Chief
of Defense Staff, Inspector-General of Police, Governors of Cross
Rivers, Akwa
Ibom, and Bayelsa States, the Deputy Governors of Rivers and Delta
States,
Ministers of the Niger Delta Ministry and the Presidential Honorary
Adviser on
Niger Delta Matters.
The meeting completely ignored
the
conditions given by two leaders of the Movement for the Emancipation of
the
Niger Delta (MEND), Government Ekpemukpolo, aka Tompolo, and Ateke Tom
for
accepting the amnesty program. Tompolo had asked for an extension of
the
deadline by three months while Ateke had called for the withdrawal of
the Joint
Task Force (JTF) from the region. In fact, after the meeting the
Federal
Government categorically stated that it does not recognize MEND.
Briefing
State House Correspondents on the outcome of the meeting, the Defense
Minister
and Chairman of the Presidential Amnesty Committee, Major-General
Godwin Abbey
(rtd), warned MEND that it could not threaten the very existence of the
Federal
Republic of Nigeria. He noted that the government is prepared to defend
the
sovereignty of the country in all its ramifications. He said: �After
the 4th
of October the amnesty terminates, there will be no extension.
Government is
firm, is resolute and government will continue with subsequent aspect
of the
rehabilitation and reintegration of all those who have embraced
amnesty�MEND is
not recognized by the Federal Government as the spokesperson for the
militants
that is if they exist at all physically�MEND cannot choose for the
Nigeria
nation, if MEND decides to test the will of government and choose to
threaten
the very existence of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, government is
prepared
to defend the sovereignty of Nigeria in all its ramifications.�
On the next step by the Federal
Government (FG) after the deadline
of the amnesty offer, the minister said: �Government is going to
pay
attention to all the militants who have embraced amnesty; they are
going to be
put together in various camps that have been designated and in this
camps they
will be categorized and personal contacts will be established with each
of them
after thorough documentation and their choice of training and
settlement will
also be identified�.Government is willing to train them and to join
them in any
rehabilitation effort that will bring about their going into life as
normal
citizens without resorting to militancy.�
The meeting did not address the
issue of resource control which
has long been recognized as the root cause of the militancy. In fact,
despite
calls on the FG to address the resource control issue as part of a
holistic and
sustainable approach to addressing the Niger Delta crisis, it has
remained
silent on the issue before and since the declaration of the Amnesty
program. In
fact, a day before the above-mentioned meeting, MEND announced that
Nobel
laureate, Prof. Wole Soyinka, and Vice Admiral Mike Akhigbe (rtd) had
agreed to
join its four-man �Aaron team� of mediators with the FG. MEND
stated that
�Some eminent Nigerians have graciously accepted to dialogue on
behalf of
the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta, MEND, with the
Federal
Government of Nigeria whenever the government realizes the need to
adopt
serious, meaningful dialogue as a means to halting the violent
agitation in the
Niger Delta�. MEND further stated that the mediators �have
our
mandate to oversee a transparent and proper MEND disarmament process
that
conforms with international standards as the current disarmament
process is
flawed and lacks integrity�The MEND disarmament process will only come
after
the root causes of militancy and agitation in the Niger Delta have been
addressed by the Nigerian government�. MEND went further to accuse
the FG
of not showing �willingness to dialogue, preferring instead to make
wild
unrealistic threats, purchase more useless military hardware, and dole
out
bribes to traitors to our noble cause."1
Obviously, from
the statement
of Gen. Abbe after the presidential meeting, it is clear that the FG is
not
interested in negotiating with the MEND�s team. The FG appears
confident that
the Amnesty program has crippled MEND. The FG is also appears set for a
major
offensive against those militants who refuse to surrender by the
October 4
deadline. It has been reported that as soon as the FG announced the
Amnesty
program it began preparation for a new offensive in the creeks.
According
to the reports, Israeli and Russian instructors have been "providing
specialized training to Nigerian Navy and Air Force sailors and pilots
on how
to operate the ships and helicopters over the past few months, and some
of
these instructors may help operate them during the offensive."
It
is instructive to note that ever since the Amnesty debate started, the
FG has
not clearly stated how it plans to address the �root causes�of the
violence in
the region other than repeating the usual refrain : �we
will develop the region.� It appears that the FG and MEND have
different views on the �root causes� of the crisis. To the FG, it
appears that
once the �repentant� militants can be settled by cash payments,
training and
rehabilitation all will be well. To MEND, the root cause is the refusal
of the
FG to acquiesce to the demand for resource control. However, MEND
leaders have
not been using the term �resource control� lately and it is becoming
doubtful
if most of the militants and some of their leaders know what resource
control
is all about or have a coherent goal for their struggle. Now that the
militancy
now appears to be in its �last throes�, at least for some time, what
will
happen to �resource control� struggle?
Let
me observe that the term �resource control� seems to have fallen into
disuse in
recent times. The FG as well as political leaders from the Niger Delta
region
and even the militants hardly use the expression these days. To the FG,
it has
almost become an anathema because it is synonymous with rebellion. Many
political leaders from the Niger Delta seem to have also decided to
keep away
from the expression after claims by some governors from the region that
their
�travails� (and �punishment�) under President Obasanjo was due to their
leadership of the resource control struggle. Since most
politicians are
more interested in �personal preservation and interest� they seem to
have
decided to stay away from being associated the struggle.
Evolution
of the Resource Control Struggle
To
predict the future of the resource control struggle, it is important to
first
define the concept and do some �backcasting�. Although the struggle for
resource control in the Niger Delta can be traced to colonial times,
the term
was not used then. In fact, the term was first used by the
�South-South�
governors in 2002 during �offshore/onshore dichotomy� case between the
FG and the
littoral states at the Supreme Court. It was during the heat of
the
offshore/onshore court case, that the SS governors met in Benin City
and
defined their struggle as ultimately one of �resource control� which,
they
defined as:
"The practice of true
federalism
and natural law in which the federating units express their rights
to
primarily control the natural resources within their borders and
make
agreed contribution towards maintenance of common services of sovereign
nation
state to which they belong. In the case of Nigeria, the federating
units are
the 36 states and the Sovereign nation is the Federal Republic of
Nigeria�.
The Governors were simply
recanting statements contained in
previous Bills of Right, Declarations and Charters of Demand by some
ethnic
nationalities in the region such as the Ogoni Bill of Rights, The
Kaiama
Declaration, etc. For instance,
the
�Ogoni Bill of Rights� presented to the federal military government and
peoples
of Nigeria in November 1990 included the following: �i)
That oil was struck and produced in
commercial quantities on our land in 1958 at K. Dere (Bomu oilfield);
ii)
That in over 30 years of oil mining, the Ogoni nationality have
provided the
Nigerian nation with a total revenue estimated at over 40 billion Naira
(N40
billion) or 30 billion dollars; iii) That in return for the above
contribution, the Ogoni people have received NOTHING; iv) That the
Ogoni people
wish to manage their own affairs; v) That the Ogoni people be granted�The
right to the control and use of a fair proportion of OGONI economic
resources
for Ogoni development; �The right to protect the OGONI environment
and
ecology from further degradation.
The
Ogoni Bill of Rights brought some of Ogoni leaders into direct
confrontation
with the federal military government which led to a �military
occupation� of
Ogoni territory. Following internal feud within the ranks of Ogoni
leadership
which lead to the brutal murder of some Ogoni leaders, nine activists
of the
Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP) including its leader,
Mr. Ken
Saro-Wiwa, were hanged by the Abacha military regime on November 10,
1995
despite pleas for clemency by several world leaders and oil company
executives.
On
the other hand, the 1998 "Kaiama Declaration" by the Ijaw Youth
Council (IYC) states inter alia that: �all land and natural
resources
within the Ijaw territory as belonging to the Ijaw communities� because
they
are the basis of our survival� peoples and communities right to
ownership
and control of our lives and resources".
In
essence, resource control, natural resource control within the Nigerian
context
is the desire of a state government and/or local government and/or
local
community to control any natural resource found within its defined
boundaries.
The degree of �control� is negotiable with the federal government.
Resource
control is different from derivation which is simply �a form of
compensation
and/or reparation for an expropriated interest�.a recognition of
a prior
beneficial right that was subsequently expropriated� (Akpo
Mudiaga-Odge).
In other words, under derivation, the federal government retains
control of
natural resources but compensates the state and local governments where
such
resources are exploited in accordance with an agreed formula. On the
other
hand, under resource control, the state and local governments are not
recompensed for anything; they collect the revenues (in terms of rents,
royalties, taxes and other payments) and pay agreed taxes (or
contributions) to
the central or federal government for its common protection and
administration
of the federation. The Nigerian constitution from colonial times to
date
provided for the principle of derivation and not resource control.
However, some
form of resource control has been in practice in mining of marble in
Igbeti
Community in the old Western Region (now Oyo State)2
Given the political economy of Nigeria and the practical difficulties
of
implementing resource control of natural resources by regional or state
governments, the country had settled for the principle of derivation
since
colonial times. This does not mean that it is the ideal system for a
true
federation and that other options cannot be adopted with the passage of
time.
For instance, it is possible to adopt �joint ownership� or control of
natural
resources by both the federal government and the mineral producing
state and
local governments and communities through the allocation of shares or
equity
holding in mineral producing ventures to the latter group similar to
the Igbeti
Marble Formula. This way, state and local government as well
communities can
participate in the management, control and �dividends� of the mineral
activities
within their territories.
To
be sure, the issue of revenue sharing or allocation (and hence degree
of cross-subsidization)
has been a thorny one since the foundation of Nigeria. According to the
2006 UNDP
Human Development Report for the Niger Delta, �At the root of the
amalgamation of the Southern and Northern Protectorates by Lord Luggard
in 1914
was the issue of cross-subsidization � the richer South would subsidize
development endeavors in the poorer North. The level of
cross-subsidization was
not specified�in 1946�the Phillipson Fiscal Commission �proposed the
derivation
principle as a basis for fiscal federalism. The idea was that revenue
should be
shared, among other things, in proportion to the contribution each
region made
to the common purse or central government. Derivation became the only
criterion
used to allocate revenues among the regions in the 1948-1949 and
1951-1952
fiscal years. In the period shortly after independence in 1960, the
disparity
in allocation largely reflected the degrees of enterprise and levels of
production in the regions. This means that, by merely looking at the
levels of
allocations, one could easily discern the regions with high levels of
economic
activities in areas such as cash crop production�earnings from exports
and
excise duties, etc. The incentives embedded in the revenue allocation
inevitably encouraged competition among the regions, with each striving
to
contribute more in order to get more from the centrally allocated
revenues.
Between 1946 and 1960, the derivation principle was maintained at 50%.
After
independence, it continued at the same level until 1967, when the
Nigerian
civil war started�After the civil war led to the political and fiscal
centralization of the federal system, the military administration of
General
Gowon promulgated the Petroleum Decree No. 51 in 1969. This put the
ownership
and control of all petroleum resources in, under or upon any land in
Nigeria
under the control of the Federal Government. It means that individuals,
communities, local governments and even states with land containing
minerals
were denied their rights to the minerals�. Consequently, derivation
plummeted progressively from 50% in 1967 to 20% (minus offshore
proceeds) in 1975-79,
then to 0% in 1979 -1981, 1.5% in 1982-1992, 3% in 1992-1999 and the
13%
(minimum) under the 1999 Constitution that the military regime handed
over to
the new civilian administration of President Obasanjo. However,
President
Obasanjo initially refused to apply the 13% derivation he inherited to
offshore
proceeds thereby effectively reducing it to less than 8%. Do we
need to
look any further for the underlying cause of the twelve-day (Niger
Delta
Republic) revolt led by Major Isaac Adaka Boro in 1966 and the clamor
for
increased derivation since the early 1980s which has boiled over into
clamor
for resource control and unrest in the Niger Delta region?
As
a result of the struggle for resource control by the governors and
political
leaders of the Niger Delta, the FG under President Obasanjo decided to
abolish
the offshore/onshore oil dichotomy in 2004 thus paving the way for the
allocation of the 13% of oil revenue to the oil-producing states in
accordance
with the 1999 constitution. Not satisfied, the leaders carried the
struggle to
National Political Reform Conference (NPRC) convened by President
Obasanjo in
early 2005. However, because of the limited mandate of the NPRC, the
Niger
Delta delegates apparently decided to focus on increasing the
percentage
derivation instead of pressing for resource control. As a starting
point, the
Niger Delta delegates to the NPRC demanded for 60% derivation but they
eventually
settled for �25% now and 50% within 5
years�, i.e. a return to the 1963 position within five years.
However, the
majority delegates from other part of the country, particularly from
the North,
insisted on 17% derivation which was eventually adopted by the NPRC. At
the end
of its deliberations in July 2005, the NPRC made the following
recommendations
amongst others:
i) "an expert
commission should be appointed by the Federal Government to study all
the
ramifications of the industry including revenue allocation with a view
to
reporting within a period of not more than six months, how the
mineral
resources concerned can best be controlled and managed to the benefit
of the
people of both the states where the resources are located and of
the
country as a whole�.
ii) "A clear
affirmation of the inherent right of the people of the oil
producing areas
of the country not to remain mere spectators but to be actively
involved in the
management and control of the resources in their place by having
assured
places in the Federal Government mechanisms for the management of the
oil and
gas exploration and marketing.
iii) increase in the
level of derivation from the present 13% to 17%, in the interim pending
the
report of the expert commission. Delegates from the South-South and
other
oil producing states insisted on 50% as the irreducible minimum.
Having
regard to national unity, peace and stability, they agreed to
accept, in the
interim, 25% derivation with a gradual increase to attain the 50% over
a period
of five years.
Following
the NPRC, there was a lull in restiveness the region as the militants
and
proponents of resource control waited for President Obasanjo to
implement the
above recommendations. However, when it became clear that the President
was not
in a hurry to implement the recommendations, the militants resumed the
struggle. This time around the �struggle� became more violent because
of: (a)
the arrest and detention of Alhaji Mujahid Dokubo-Asari, the �Supreme
Leader�
of the NDPVF and Chairman of the Niger Delta People�s Salvation Front
(NDPSF)
in October 2005 on charges of treason; and (b) the impeachment of the
Governor
of Bayelsa State, Chief D. S. P Alamieyeseigha, in early December 2005.
He was
detained in London in November on charges of money laundering but he
jumped
bail and escaped to Nigeria and was subsequently expelled from the PDP
and
impeached by the State Assembly, an action that was believed to have
been
orchestrated by President Obasanjo, as payback for championing
�resource
control� and supporting the militants.
The
rank and profile of the militants increased significantly as a result
of the
two factors mentioned above. They demanded for the release of both
Alhaji
Dokubo-Asari and Chief Alamieyeseigha but President Obasanjo refused to
yield
to their demands. In addition, he also refused to implement the
recommendations
of NPRC on the Niger Delta. Thus, the oil-producing areas continued to
receive
13% of oil revenue as against the 17% recommended by the NPRC till he
left
office in May 2007 and up till today.
In
an attempt to reduce tension in the region, President Obasanjo
inaugurated the
Council on the Socioeconomic Development of Coastal States of the Niger
Delta
on April 18, 2006 with himself as the Chairman. In his address to the
Council,
he outlined a 9-point agenda for the region, including the creation
20,000 new
jobs in the Armed Forces, Police, NNPC and Teaching for indigenes of
the region
within three months, commitment of N230 billion for the construction of
the
long-abandoned East�West (Warri-Mbiama- Port Harcourt-Eket-Oron) road,
commencement of the dredging of the river Niger, upgrading of the
Petroleum
Training Institute (PTI), Effurun in Delta State to a degree-awarding
institution, establishment a federal polytechnic in Bayelsa State by
September,
rural electrification for 396 communities, water supply for over 600
communities, and the appointment of an officer in the office of the
Secretary
to the Government of the Federation to coordinate the various
intervention
programs by all the tiers government as well as those of oil companies
and
development partners. The Council turned out to be another ruse as most
of the
promises were not delivered before he left office. However, he
established a
new Federal University of Petroleum Resources in Effurun on the eve of
his
departure from office and appointed Prof. Alabi from his home state
(Ogun) as
Vice Chancellor, Mrs. Onwuka from the South East as the Registrar, and
the Emir
of Gwandu from the North as the Chancellor, and Engr. Makoju, also from
the
South West, to head the Governing Council. The President did not deem
it fit to
appoint a Niger Deltan as one of the principal officers of the new
university
located in Delta state.
The
Faltering of the Resource Control Struggle
By
the time President Obasanjo left office in amy 2007 he had almost
neutralized
the �political wing� of the resource control struggle through
intimidation of
the governors, legislators and other politicians aspiring to �elective�
and
appointed political offices, especially under the ruling PDP party.
After the
travails of some governors, many politicians from the area decided to
either
avoid using the term �resource control� or soft-pedal on the issue of
resource
control for fear of being �EFCC�ed�. Ironically, as the political
leaders made
a tactical withdrawal from the struggle, the �military wing� grew
stronger and
attracted a larger number of unemployed youths, some of whom were used
to rig
the 2007 elections by the politicians. At the same time, the militants
started
making money through illegal oil bunkering (stealing of crude oil),
hostage taking,
harassment of oil companies and forced protection payments from oil
companies.
With the money coming in from these sources, the leaders of the
militants were
able to procure more arms and recruit more
militants.
As soon
as
President Yar�Adua was sworn into office in May 2009 he correctly
identified
the resolution of Niger Delta crisis as one of his cardinal objectives.
However, rather than move quickly to implement the recommendations of
previous
commissions on the Niger Delta, he opted to hold his own form of Niger
Delta
Summit under the leadership of Prof. Ibrahim Gambari. The people of the
Niger
Delta saw the move as a deceptive tactic to resolving the resource
control
issue, and unanimously rejected the idea of the Summit under the
chairmanship
of a Northerner. President Yar�Adua thus retreated and after some
prevarications established the 44-member Niger Delta Technical
Committee (NDTC)
in September 2008 under the chairmanship of Dr. Ledum Mittee, the
leader of
MOSOP, with members drawn from all the Niger Delta states. The
Committee was
charged to: a) collate, review and distill the various reports,
suggestions
and recommendations on the Niger Delta from the Willinks Commission
Report
(1958) to the present and give a summary of recommendations necessary
for
government action; b) appraise the summary recommendations and present
a
detailed short, medium and long term suggestions to the challenges in
the Niger
Delta; and c) make and present to government any other recommendations
that
will help the Federal Government achieve sustainable development,
peace, human
development and environmental security in the Niger Delta region�.
The NDTC
completed
its assignment in November 2008 and submitted its report to the Federal
Government in December 2008. The report contained far-reaching
recommendations aimed
at the �sustainable development, peace,
human development and environmental security� if they are all
implemented
as a �package�, i.e. holistically. The Committee noted that �the
very
first action by the government towards implementing these
recommendations is
even more important than any other subsequent
intervention�Consequently, the
recommendations are set out as two inter-related parts; the first part
being
those actions that set the right tone for the implementation of all
subsisting
and further actions. The tone-setting agenda appears �in the form of a
Compact
with the Niger Delta� The short-term Compact will deliver on a visible,
measurable outputs which produce material gains within an 18 months
period�guided by a principle in which the Federal Government�.report
publicly
on progress in implementation every three months�. Among
other things
the Compact aims to deliver the following within an 18 month period: a)
Immediately
increase allocation accruing from oil and gas revenues to the Niger
Delta to
25% (i.e. additional 12%)�b)Within 6 months, complete initial steps
that will
support a disarming process for youth involved in militancy. This
process would
have to begin with some confidence building measures on all sides.
These
measures include cease fire on both sides, pull back of forces, open
trail of
Henry Okah. Also credible conditions for amnesty, setting up a
Decommissioning,
Disarmament and Rehabilitation (DDR) Commission and a negotiated
undertaking by
militant groups to stop all kidnappings, hostage taking and attacks on
oil
installations; c) Establish by the middle of 2009, a direct Youth
Employment
Scheme (YES) in conjunction with states and local governments
that will
employ at least 2,000 youths in community works in each local
government of the
9 states of the Niger Delta; and d) Complete the East-West road
dualization
from Calabar to Lagos by June 2010�
Even
before the
NDTC completed its work, the Federal Government went ahead to announce
the
establishment of the Ministry of the Niger Delta which was not part of
the
Compact. Critics regarded the establishment of the Ministry as a
cosmetic and
sinister move because that was not the issue at stake. It was argued
that the
creation of the Ministry would increase the bureaucratic red tape in
resolving
the Niger Delta crisis, weaken (and crowd out) the NDDC and the
authority of
the state governments. In view of the short deadline given to the NDTC
to
complete its work and the sense of urgency in resolving the Niger Delta
crisis,
it was expected the Federal Government would present the NDTC report to
the
National Assembly and then issue a White Paper on it and commence the
implementation
of the recommendations immediately. In fact, it appeared that after the
establishment of the Ministry of the Niger Delta, President Yar�Adua
went to
sleep and kept the NDTC report on his shelf to gather dust. By April,
2009 it
had become clear that the Federal Government was not interested in
implementing
the recommendations of the NDTC. Meanwhile, the agitation in the Niger
Delta
continued unabated as the FG used its Joint Military Task Force (JTF)
to
intensify its fight against the militants. At the same time, there was
growing
comingling of militancy with criminality as some militants intensified
kidnappings, hostage taking, attack on oil installations, etc. Even
many Niger
Deltans became worried by the growing insecurity in the region caused
by the
activities in the militants. There were growing signals that the FG was
leaning
more towards a �military solution� to the crisis. All that the
government
needed was a �trigger�. Whilst waiting for the trigger, the FG
decided to
set up an 18-member Presidential Panel on Amnesty and Disarmament of
Militants
in the Niger Delta (PPADM) on May 5, 2009 under the chairmanship of the
Minister of Interior, Major-General Godwin O. Abbe (rtd), with the
following
terms of reference: a) To prepare a step-by-step framework for
amnesty and
complete Disarmament, Demobilization and Re-integration (DDR) in Niger
Delta
with appropriate time-lines; b) To ensure that those with criminal
records do
not take advantage of the amnesty; and c) To work out the cost to
Government of
disarmament, demobilization and re-integration of the militants.
It
should be noted that the NDTC called for the establishment of a DDR
Commission
within 6 months, but the FG decided to set a �Panel� on �Amnesty and
Disarmament� about six months after it received the NDTC
report.
Even at that, the Panel did not start work until after the �trigger�
came on
May 13, 2009 when the JTF launched a full-scale invasion on the Ijaw
Gbaramatu
Kingdom in Delta State to dislodge �Tompolo�and his fellow MEND
militants who
had allegedly killed some members of the JTF. As the JTF continued its
offensive against the militants, the FG began working on the terms of
�amnesty�
for the militants under a sense of �mission accomplished�. The
Presidential
Panel completed its work at about the third week of June and submitted
its
63-page report to the FG recommending a N50billion amnesty package for
�repentant militants�. President Yar�Adua made the Amnesty Proclamation
on June
25, 2009. However, two days before the proclamation, security agents
arrested
the leader of the Niger Delta Volunteer
Force, Asari
Dokubo on his return from a medical trip to Germany but he was
quickly
released on orders of the President to demonstrate his
�magnanimity�. A day before the
proclamation of the Amnesty,
MEND accused the Head of the Presidential Panel on Amnesty for
Militants
in the Niger Delta, General Godwin Abbe (rtd), of trying to bribe them
in order
to get their cooperation in sharing the N50 billion budgeted for the
amnesty
exercise. MEND spokesman, Jomo Gbomo, was quoted as saying �It
is a
shame that the interior minister and his cohorts are offering bribes
and
incentives to militants in a desperate attempt to get our cooperation
in
sharing the N50 billion budgeted for the amnesty exercise�.While it is
true
that some of us will succumb to the temptation of money as Judas did,
there are
a majority that will remain steadfast in integrity, honor and a
commitment to
the people who cannot fight for their rights.�
Later,
the FG
released Henry Okah, one of the militant leaders who had been in
federal custody
for over a year, to travel abroad for medical attention. At the same
time, the
FG announced that each militant who came forward to surrender at the
will be
aid N20,000 monthly plus N1,500 daily for meal, making a total of
N65,000
monthly. The �monetary bait� was aimed at incentivizing the militants
to give
up their arms and surrender to the JTF. To further shore up
confidence
for the amnesty plan, President Yar�Adua made a one-day visit to
Yenegoa, the
capital of Bayesla state. Amidst apprehension and counter-accusations,
the
amnesty came into effect on August 6 and militants were given 60-days
up till
October 4, 2009 within which to surrender their arms to the FG and be
registered for post-amnesty rehabilitation. After initial hesitation,
many of
leaders of the militants, starting with �General� Boyloaf�, began
accepting the
amnesty due mainly to monetary incentives and pressure from some
political
leaders from the region. The leaders of the militants encouraged and
their
�boys� to come forward to submit their arms and ammunitions. Despite
several
hiccups, over 6,000 out of the expected 10,000 militants have
surrendered to
the FG as of September 29. However some MEND leaders such as Dokubo
Asari and Jomo
Gbomo are yet to fully embrace the amnesty. It is doubtful if the MEND
leaders
who have not fully embraced the Amnesty can be as effective after
October 4 as
they were before the Amnesty. For one thing, the Amnesty seems to have
torn the
militancy asunder by putting a knife in the fragile bond that held the
militants together. In fact, it appears that for the militants �things
have
fallen apart and the center can no longer hold�.
From all
indications, it will be difficult for militants to regroup and
constitute a
threat to the FG in the immediate future. Since the FG did not make a
commitment to resolving the resource control issue after the amnesty,
one can
safely say the �military wing� of the resource control struggle seems
to have
lost the battle, but perhaps not the war. The political wing lost the
battle
much earlier. Since the past two years, most political leaders hardly
use the
word �resource control�. At best, they talk of addressing the �root
causes� of
the crisis by calling on the FG to develop the region through
infrastructural
development and job creation. Neither President Yar�Adua nor the
Chairman of
the Amnesty Implementation nor the Niger Delta Ministry nor any of the
governors has mentioned resource control or the implementation of the
NDTC
report since the declaration of the Amnesty. Now that both the
political and
militant wings of the resource control struggle seem to have
back-pedalled on the resource control
issue, quo
vadis?
The
Future of
the Resource Control Struggle
It is
difficult to
predict the future course of the resource control struggle. There are
various
possibilities. The FG can put a permanent end to the struggle by taking
certain
actions far beyond the proposed post-amnesty rehabilitation of the
repentant
militants.
Firstly,
if the
Amnesty succeeds and a development-enabling environment is created in
the
region over the next six months, the FG may decide to implement all the
recommendations of the NDTC which will address a significant part of
the �root
causes� of the crisis, and the ultimate goal of the resource control
issue.
Will this happen?
Secondly,
the FG
may decide to implement some of the recommendations of the NDTC plus
other
recommendations that will fully address the resource control issue.
These
include: i) incrementally increasing derivation to 50%; or ii) adopting
an
incremental-differential derivation formula; or iii) adopting the
�Igbeti
marble formula� by allocating share (equities) in oil
companies/ventures to oil
producing states, local governments and communities; iv) combining
increased
derivation (to, say, 25%) with equity holding by oil producing
areas in
oil ventures (to, say 25%); and v) establishing a petroleum
heritage and
dividend fund for oil producing states, etc.3
On the
other hand,
the FG may assume that the resource control struggle is dead and then
decide to
ignore the NDTC recommendations, implement the Amnesty program for some
time
(i.e. resettle the repentant militants) and continue business as usual,
i.e.
retain the 13% derivation, and withdraw the JTF after sometime. It is
unlikely
if this scenario will result in sustainable peace and development in
the
region. For one thing, the projected 10,000 �repentant militants�
constitute
only about 0.2% of the youths in the region and less than 1% of the
number of
unemployed youths in the region who constitute ready recruits for a
future
�military wing� of the resource struggle.
Alternatively,
the
FG may decide to ignore the NDTC recommendations, implement the Amnesty
program
for some time, continue business as usual and treat the region as a
conquered
territory, i.e. expand and retain the JTF sine die. This course
of
action will not be sustainable under a democratic setting. Under this
scenario,
the �political wing� of the resource control struggle will wake up from
its
current slumber, liberate itself from the ruling PDP and align with
other
parties in the country that are willing to address the resource control
issue.
If they fail to find allies, they may take the gauntlet and align with
a new
group of more disciplined militants. The outcome of this can be
anybody�s
guess.
Lessons
and Recommendations
What
then are some of the lessons of the resource control struggle to date?
Firstly,
a situation where the exploitation of a natural resource (hydrocarbon)
with
significant negative externalities (such as pollution, environmental
degradation and loss of farmlands) takes place in a certain region of
the
country and the federal government appropriates over 85% of the revenue
coming
from that resource is a recipe for instability and insecurity, and a
time-bomb
at worst.
Secondly,
natural justice and common sense dictate that at least 50% (but
preferably
100%) of rents and royalties paid by ventures that exploit a natural
resources
should be made to the people (state, local government, community and
individuals) from where the natural resource is exploited. The FG could
have a
share but not necessarily the loin share.
Thirdly,
the people on whose land a natural resource is exploited should not be
expected
to be mere spectators in the business. They have an inalienable right
to
participate in the management, ownership, control and dividends of the
ventures
that exploit the natural resource.
Fourthly,
the resource control struggle can be suppressed for some time, but not
all of
the time. So long as the natural resources of the federation are
distributed unevenly
and the benefits of the natural resource are not distributed to reflect
their
geographical locations the ghost of resource control will continue to
haunt the
federation. A high degree of cross-subsidization of one section of the
federation by another section is unsustainable in a federation. The FG
should
as a minimum return progressively to the pre-1967 revenue allocation
system.
Alternatively, as a minimum, it should adopt a system that ensures a
sense of
partial ownership and control of the exploitation of the natural
resource by
the state and local government areas where such a resource is found.
Fifthly,
the political leaders of the region where a natural resource is
exploited
should not be na�ve to think that a leader from the rest of the country
will be
so altruistic to grant resource control without a persistent struggle.
The
struggle must however be peaceful and unrelenting. If the political
leaders
abandon a peaceful struggle they create room for militants to take over
the
struggle. The �militant wing� is however susceptible to infiltration by
criminal elements and opportunists whose activities could lead to
alienation
and support of some of the very people they are purportedly fighting
for.
Thus, the militant wing must be disciplined and must be willing to work
cooperatively the political leaders of the region and the nation to
achieve the
goals of resource control.
Conclusion
In
conclusion, unless the �root causes� of the Niger Delta crisis are
addressed by
the FG, including the resource control issue, whatever peace the
ongoing
Amnesty program will bring may be ephemeral. As I concluded in
chapter 16
(The Long Road to Resource Control in the Niger Delta) of my book, The
Political economy of Oil and other Topical Issues in Nigeria,
�Following his
triumphant release in 1990 from more than a quarter-century of
imprisonment,
Mandela published his autobiography in 1994 which he aptly titled Long
Walk
to Freedom where he �tells the extraordinary story of his life -
an epic
of struggle, setback, renewed hope, and ultimate triumph�� Although
the
resource control struggle by the ethnic minorities in the Niger Delta
is
different (from Mandela�s struggle) in many respects, the few parallels
are
nonetheless poignant.
Emmanuel
Ojameruaye, PhD.
Phoenix, USA.
October
2, 2009
_________________
1 In a strange
twist, as I was about posting this article on the internet on October
2, the
Guardian of the same day reported that Tom Aleke was flown to Abuja the
previous day to meet with President Yar�Adua where he promised to
surrender.
2
The "Igbeti Marble formula" was first introduced in old Western
Region. It stipulated that "the proceeds of all resources in a
location should be shared to recognize the right of indigenous
communities, the
local, government, the operating firms, the state government and the
federal
government. This formula enables the local community to go into
partnership
with the technological firms producing wealth in the environment and by
participatory decision making in the process entails those concerned
share the
pride of progress together. The " Oyo State benefit plan" of 1990
also ensures that the people of the state derive maximum
benefit from
the exploitation of natural resource of the state by allocating of 10%
equity
participation to the state government."
(see A. A. Ikein, Socio-economic and environmental
challenges in
the Niger Delta.).
3 Details of these options for addressing the
resource control issue are contained in my submission to the NDTC in
September
2008 as well as in my presentation on �Preconditions for Sustainable
Peace and
Development in the Niger Delta region� at the Launching of the Niger
Delta
Congress in New York on July 12, 2009. Some details can also be found
in my
book, The Political Economy of Oil and other Topical Issues in Nigeria�
(Xlibris, 2006).