Urhobo Historical Society
URHOBO YOUTH AND THE URHOBO FUTURE
By Omafume F. Onoge, Ph. D.
Professor
of Sociology and Anthropology
Introduction:
I want to express my
thanks to Urhobo Historical
Society for the invitation to deliver a keynote address to this
conference. I
consider it to be an honour. It is also with great pleasure and deep
sense of
solidarity that I accepted the invitation.
I must also immediately
congratulate the Historical
Society for its many achievements during the short period of its
existence thus
far. The potentials and prospects you have opened up for future Urhobo
scholarship by exploiting the facilities of the latest global
technologies and
other resources of your ukale
locations are truly inspiring. Some of us, over the years, regardless
of our
disciplinary and professional backgrounds, have dreamt dreams of how we
could
expand the spectrum of Urhobo leadership to include, not just actors in
political and business domains, but also intellectual labourers. Put in
another
way, the question was; must an intellectual step out of her or his
professional
role and seek admission, like a desperate Jambite, into the political
and
business classes, in order to make a contribution and receive due
recognition?
For sometime, the
predicament of the Urhobo intellectual
in this regard was difficult for two reasons. First the late entrance
of Urhobo
men and women as effective players in the national movement of
primitive
accumulation led to the extreme valorisation of money, which Marx had
described
since 1848 as the � chemical power� of capitalist society. Thus all
professions
that could not reliably pass the litmus test of financial solvency lost
prestige easily. This shift was not lost on the Urhobo masses. I recall
that
G.G Darah�s field studies of Udje
poetry in the late 1970�s already revealed such awareness among Urhobo
poets.
Many explained their shift from Udje
satire to praise songs of the juju music genre by saying that this is
the era
of �akpo r�igho� and �ighoshemusua�.
In the absence of
substantiating research on this point, I nonetheless hypothesise that
the mass
defection of Urhobo officers from top positions in the civil service
during the
70s was provoked largely by the embarrassing tauntings at public
gatherings
such as: �Doctor. Oshekure: onota r�igho ata na!�. It is my distinct
impression
that the defection was accompanied by a surge in the registration of
private
companies dealing with pest control and garbage disposal. It is also my
impression that this also produced a boom in the development of private
housing
estates in Warri and Effurun areas.
A second factor
responsible for status erosion was the
great decline that the teaching profession as a whole suffered for
several
decades, through deliberate materially impoverishing state policies and
neglect. The education sector is yet to fully recover from the
protracted
crisis of officially sponsored demoralisation.
It is therefore to the
credit of the young Urhobo
Historical Society to have produced the much needed leadership synergy
of
academics and leading lights in business and public affairs. In
post-civil war
About a month ago, at
another strategic academic
brainstorming session, Dr. Mrs. Aziza and I also recalled another
pioneering
effort in 1992 by Emudiaga Club, Jos, and its young branch in Sapele,
in
organising a �First International Conference on Urhobo Studies,� here
at this
same venue. I remember the infectious enthusiasm of Prof. Okpako of the
More recently we
witnessed the successful sponsorship of
an Urhobo Dictionary by the Atamu Social Club of Lagos. In this respect
we must
also acknowledge the persistent efforts of individual authors over the
years who
have self-financed their researches on critical challenges faced by
their
communities or some cultural matter of interest. Chief Daniel Obiomah
readily
comes to mind. The recollection � though not exhaustive- is important.
It
staves off despair. To my mind, however, in the unfolding history of
efforts by
groups and individuals to establish Urhobo Studies as an ongoing
academic
concern, the Urhobo Historical Society is today, its most significant
development. As it is said: �okiemute.�
Chairman,
Ladies and Gentlemen, I want now to begin my presentation by
acknowledging the
significance of the topic you have requested me to address. � The
phenomenon of
�youth restiveness�- as it is now labelled- and its implications for
our
collective future as a people are truly urgent. In the closing years of
the
last millenium, we, the Uvwie Urhobo became the target of embarrassing
jokes
from neighbours, government circles, traders, companies, transporters,
okada
associations, landlords, etc. because of the manifestation of this
phenomenon.
Uvwie Local Government Council was derided in such expressions as �I go
die
local government�; �I no go gree�, �garage council�, �motor park
council�.
Uvwie Youth, often without any discrimination, were alleged to be
nothing but
violent, riotous �gbeghe� and �deve� extortionists; who refused to go
to
school, learn a trade, or work for a living. Uvwie people also felt
rubbished
by the external perception that we were fixated on garage politics and
that the
traditional authorities and elders had abandoned their supervisory
responsibilities over the youth. This latter charge of abandonment of
responsibilities was also a favourite thesis in
The charge of
irresponsibility drew angry rebuttals from
concerned Uvwie in the form of letters to the editor published in the
Urhobo
Voice. The rebuttals contained the counter charge that the major
political
parties, and an indifferent police establishment, were in fact
escalating the
crisis and frustrating the efforts of the traditional authorities to
restore
normalcy.
However, it is also true
that not everyone sought to
deride Uvwie by redefining Uvwie identity in terms of youth
restiveness.
Several Urhobo in different parts of the country were genuinely worried
about
its consequences for Uvwie economic development and the larger image of
the
Urhobo people. Such concerned persons urged that Uvwie leaders and the
UPU
should do something about it. As I reviewed for this address I
sometimes
wondered if the invitation to address the conference was based on the
initial
notoriety which Uvwie people endured as a prominent �inaugural� site of
the
youth irruption in Urhobo land.
I also admit that it was
not without some tu quoque satisfaction that some of
us
received the news reports of the later manifestations of youth violence
in
other Urhobo towns. Since then this restiveness, often sliding into
criminality
with tragic consequences, has spread to various Urhobo and Isoko
communities.
I consider it a sad
moral irony that its uglier
manifestations in communities like Evwreni,
Isoko land and riverine communities that have degenerated to
battlegrounds,
helped in some way to reduce the special targeting of Uvwie
reputations. What
the general public did not fully appreciate was that Uvwie people were
even
more disturbed and pained by the destructive character of the
restiveness. We
were the people on the spot- with no where else to call home. It was
our
properties that were being destroyed. It was our people who were the
casualties
of factional revenge violence among the youth. And it was the
livelihoods of
our masses that were being worst hit as economic activities in the area
continued to shrink. We the victims were the ones being blamed. I shall
return
to this point later.
At this juncture it
suffices to note that the wide
diffusion of restiveness shows that it is not a problem that is the
special
property of any single community or ethnic nationality, for that
matter. Its
multiple occurrence across Urhobo land, across the state, and across
the Niger
Delta compels a more searching investigation. It is in fact not just a
Niger
Delta problem as the central organs of state power in
Supplying a Context:
It can be safely assumed
that all socio-cultural
formations recognise the imperative linkage between a people�s
collective
future and the character of their youth. Evidence of this recognition
is
abundantly provided in ethnographic reports of the institutions and
customary
practices devoted to socialisation and enculturation of the young. The
reports
state, and the people confirm, that the goal of enculturation, is to
enable the
young acquire the appropriate behaviours, interiorise the beliefs,
value
orientations and identities of the group. Thus equipped, the young
generation
is in a position to reproduce the institutional format of the society
and its
cultural contents, long after the parental generation has moved on.
As is well known,
psychological anthropologists and
social psychologists have done considerable work in establishing how
socialisation practices ensure not just the reproduction of formal
institutional structures of economy, kinship and polity, but also the
emergence
of �basic/modal personality structures� (a shared inner reality) which
reproduce the deep psychic dispositions and anxieties, that sustain the
society�s collective projective defence systems in the domains of
religion,
rituals and art. In fact, as we may also recall, some investigators
hold that
it is alterations in the socialisation of the young that constitute the
best
predictors of societal change when the young become adults.
In any case the point I
seek to make here is that
parental generations in ongoing socio- cultural systems see their youth
as the
custodians or �leaders of tomorrow�. As such, every coherent culture
places
emphasis on the care and proper upbringing of the young.
It is to be further
noted that the leader- of � tomorrow
conception does not imply complete agreement between the elderly and
youth
generations all of the time. There may be differences, but they are
framed and
resolved within the model assumption that, in general, youth must serve
their
apprenticeship under the superior wisdom and experience of elders.
In small scale,
pre-industrial societies where there was
strong predisposition towards culture conservation, the idea of change
was also
part of lived experience. Elders were aware that youth experimentation
and
venturesomeness were often sources of some cultural changes.
Innovations of
better techniques of production, cultural borrowing in contact
situations
occurred. Environmental changes or some other exogenous developments
may pose
fresh challenges to the new generation who were now in control. Yet the
practice
of socialisation and enculturation was undertaken by the retiring
generation in
the confident hope that their successors would make the necessary
socio-cultural adaptations without �subverting� the core values and
identities
of the collectivity.
Thus the generational
differences are not antagonistic
contradictions that breed disloyalties and threaten the persistence of
the
social fabric. If a youth lives long enough, he too will become an
elder
someday. Hence the confidence of the Urhobo saying: �There is one
elder, but
several children�. In the mean time, the pervasiveness of the seniority
principle in social relationships ensures that the individual youth is
also
already enjoying the priviledges of respect and deference from his or
her own
age juniors.
In
The import of such
democratic political culture based on
age-group constituencies was not lost on colonial dictatorships. In
deed, as I
once stated the colonizer�s response: � �coming out� ceremonies of
age-groups-
important occasions for dramatic performances of democratic transfer of
political power from one generation to another- were banned in
societies such
as Banyakyusa and the Agikuyu, because of the fear that they could
escalate
into realistic dramas of anti- colonial politics�. �
A Further Context:
Imaging Dialectics
By all accounts the
imaging of Nigerian youth by state officials and the general public
today
is largely negative. Youth is now perceived as a social problem. No
week passes
without some media report of disparaging comments about youth and their
alleged
defilement of traditional �core values of yore�, such as respect for
elders and
authority, family honour, good manners, work ethic, self discipline and
the
like. At the community level, The Urhobo Voice
is also an unfailing
source of news headlines reporting problem youth activities in
Urhoboland and
other ethnic groups.
In
the past youth were perceived as heroes of the nationalist movement. As
students and as a nascent proletariat they were the militant wing of
the anti-
colonial struggle. As founder- members of the Nigerian Youth Movement,
the
Zikist Movement, the West African Students�
Nigerians came to
independence with the image of youth as
a precious, strategic, patriotic resource to be carefully groomed for
leadership and developmental roles. Investments in youth education were
considered paramount in the public consciousness, if the nation was to
make
rapid progress from colonial stagnation.
On the �morning� of
independence, Nigerian students from
the University of Ibadan and the Yaba Polytechnic had demonstrated
fidelity to
the legacy of militant anticolonialism, by physically disrupting
parliamentary
sessions in Lagos to block ratification of an Anglo- Nigerian Defence
Pact,
secretly imposed by the British government as a conditionality for
conceding
independence. The public read the behaviour as patriotic: and the Judge
who
tried their leaders reflected this public mood and dismissed the
demonstration
as an instance of harmless � youthful exuberance�.
Three decades after
independence, after so many twists
and turns, the famous Political Bureau Report of 1986 was still able to
affirm
linkages of youth and national destinies without recourse to
philistine,
pejorative slander. The Report devoted Chapter IX to �Special Groups in
Nigerian Politics and Society� such as traditional rulers, the
military, women,
labour, youth and students. I quote in
extenso from the subsection on youth and students:
In the context of
While
sticking to the official classification of youth as persons between 6-
30
years, the Report noted that this age constituted about 59% of the
nation�s
population: with those between 15-30 years representing a hefty 47% of
the
productive population of the nation. The Report further noted that the
students
segment of the youth has sustained its �militant wing� heritage of the
anti-
colonial movement by its current political activism:
They are the most
committed group in
the organisation of voluntary social work or community development
projects in
their various localities. As students, they are always in the forefront
in the
struggle against injustice, oppression and exploitation. They therefore
constitute a militant force in any political system. Many of these
activities
have been recognised and acknowledged in
A
detailed sociology of the changing relationships between the
ii. The perception that student protestant �radicalism� was short-lived; and was abandoned as they �joined the system� upon graduation. That is, an allegation of hypocrisy of �fire-spitting�. The establishment of NYSC as �remediation�.
iii. The post-civil war phase, as the students movement began to adopt more public causes of mass welfare, ignoring the sharp decline in student welfare (e.g. Canteen, dormitory, classroom etc. facilities); and acting as a de facto opposition, given the prohibition of politics by the military dictatorship. <>
iv. State response of violent suppression and repression and the allegation that students� role was to �face their studies� and not get involved with public polices and �politics�. Directives to university authorities to confine students to their campuses, etc; and harsh treatment of Union officials.<>
v. Phase of students� intensification of critique of state policies, and deeper identification with radical professional associations, and mass organisations such as Labour- e.g. the signing of an accord with Labour Union; and state response of prohibition of NANS and the prohibition of �undue radicalism� in academic pedagogy; restriction of usage of classroom facilities for public seminars. <>
vi. Phase of religiofication of campus culture and attempts by authorities to use this to fragment solidarity of unions.<>
vii. The impact of SAP ("Structural Adjustment Programme").
viii. Phase of emergence of violent cult phenomenon; its unresolved controversial genesis, and its negative impact on state and public images of students.
ix. Phase of Youth Earnestly Ask for Abacha (YEAA) and two million-man march. This was a period of active co-optation of youth by the State through the propagandistic manipulation of a theory of conflict of generations.
A
well-nuanced analysis will require that the changing images of student
youth
during these phases take account of the dynamics of the larger
political
economy, and the cultural sociology of Nigerian society as well.
Student youth
are not insulated from the existential impacts of changes in these
larger
societal contexts. The Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) has been
significant in the mis/fortunes of the country. Its continuation in the
job
retrenchments, curtailment of welfare, and obsessional fuel price
increases in
our �born- again� democracy, unhinge
real lives. A study of the changing images and behaviours of student
youth will
also take account of the quality of state-society relations, fresh
currents of
corrupt primitive accumulation; and the surge in new forms of piety as
well as
criminality. The study will also consider the sociological forces
shaping the
composition of tertiary institutions increasingly in the direction of
indigeneity. I move now to observations on the current youth crisis.
Current Youth Crisis: Some Observations
Perhaps
I have erred in my persistent usage of the term �youth crisis�. You
will have
observed that the thrust of my address is the ways in which various
phases of
our national crisis are manifested in youth attitudes, fears, hopes,
and
behavioural responses. Of course, there is a dialectical feedback
relationship
between society and its youth; but who in the relationship triggers the
feedback dynamics in the �last instance�?
Consider
this touching comment by Obi Nwakanma, which I have excerpted from his
column,
published in the Sunday Vanguard of
�A contemporary generation of Nigerians have
psychologically rejected, and spiritually abandoned
And
here is the first segment of his concluding paragraph:
We entered life to a meaningless existence- a
nullity.
And we might even be called lucky, because those coming after us will
live as
slaves.
To
our columnist it is this government and previous military regimes �who
have
authored this tragedy-who have ruled
We
can of course hold that some of his statements do not fully capture the
many-sidedness and ambivalences in the public mood in the social
responses to
certain events and policies over the decades. To take just the example
of
military rule: it used to be the case that some military coups received
initial
considerable support both from the public and ranks of the
intelligentsia. Such
support was founded on the theoretical and speculative expectation that
military regimes would be free from corruption, ethnic partisanship,
inefficiencies, and indiscipline; and would more readily attend to the
technological and economic development of the country, as well as,
promote a
deep sense of common nationhood. It is our lived experience under a
series of
military regimes that has established the mythological character of the
initial
heraldic expectations.
The
foregoing notwithstanding, the despair of the �post-colony� generation
is
evident in Obi Nwakanma�s intervention just quoted. It is not an
isolated
observation. Harsh appraisals of the current state of our nation are
now
frequent in our print media and broadcast media under private
proprietorship.
Such appraisals increasingly characterise newspaper and magazine
editorials.
The old supportive restraint displayed by commentators, NGOs,
(including labour)
and others during the first term of the new democracy is evaporating.
There
have been shifts too in the consideration of youth question. Here is an
itemisation of some of the switches.
2. There are a number of other smaller youth associations in the states, local governments and towns across the country today. They must be in the hundreds, at least. This smaller type of youth smaller youth associations are without any explicit political agenda, but focus more on their welfare concerns. This is the predominant type whose activities troubles Urhobo land today.
3. There is also a rise in organised youth delinquencies in
4. Whereas in previous years, discussions of youth concentrated on the student stratum based on the assumption of a vanguardist role, the situation has changed. Discussions no longer privilege students, over other youth. The emergence of cult gangs on campuses has facilitated the assimilation and subsumption of students in the inclusive category of Nigerian youth. It is the violent restiveness of youth, which now announces their presence in the public mind; and campus cults share in this attribute. I suggest also that the rampant graduate unemployment, which now exists, has also contributed to the erosion of the status of undergraduates.
We recall that in some states of the Eastern zone, the unemployment crisis resulted in sharp decline in enrolment of boys in secondary schools. Parental preference was for early insertion into vocational training as apprentices in commerce and artisanship. It has required mass campaigns to reverse the trend.
5. There is an increase in the number of youth who flee the country through illegitimate means in order to make a living in other lands. Global networks have emerged to facilitate this physical flight of both male and female youth, as well as child labour smuggling.
In any case the long queues of Nigerian youth at foreign embassies seeking entry visas is, in part, an indication of the �mental flight� which Nwankama mentioned.
6. The youth who are now so characterised as restive were born during the era of military rule. - The era in which the actual use of force, or the demonstration of readiness to use force to gain advantage was institutionalised by soldiers at public service points, such as petrol filling stations with long queues. Traffic regulations were routinely violated by uniformed men. There was a resultant militarisation of youth consciousness, which the society is now reaping.
The
foregoing national characteristics of the youth condition today enable
us
better appraise the youth question in Urhoboland. It should however be
noted
that just as it is the case with the rest of
Urhobo Youth Restiveness:
Two
years ago, I initiated a pilot field study of youth restiveness in
selected
communities in the Niger Delta, as a basis for a more comprehensive
investigation of the phenomena across the zone. The goal was to
generate data
that could guide the formulation of informed development policies and
programmes for youth. Some Urhobo communities were included in the
pilot study.
Here
are some of the tentative findings:
2. Urhobo youth restive groups came into existence in the 1980s as pressure groups to get paid employment for their members in companies operating in the area. This is emphatically the initial purpose of their genesis.
In some other Urhobo communities where there were oil wells, there was the additional question of the quest for fair sharing of compensations from oil companies. The presence of oil companies and the consequent promiscuous debasement of the environment has spurned the emergence of compensation agents and a veritable compensation crisis. There are accusations in a number of Niger Delta communities concerning the hijacking of such compensation by agents, and traditional authorities. Youth groups have emerged to ensure that they are not shortchanged.
3. In the Uvwie case, the groups supplement their revenue by demanding �deve� that is development levies, from non-indigene property developers; or companies. A respondent justified the actions thus: ��government has collected most of our lands in the community with the aim of building low cost housing estate without paying compensation, but suprisingly these lands have been sold by government to various individuals who are not indigenes of the community. I see nothing wrong therefore in collecting �deve� from these people. It is our land they are building these houses, making us landowners tenants. They must pay. This is the only we get compensated.
In a sense, some of us foresaw this land crisis in Uvwie kingdom more than two decades ago. In 1978, I wrote an article titled �Rural Poverty in Nigerian Bourgeois Sociology�� in which I devoted a section to the rape of the Urhobo peasantry that had commenced with the oil rush economy. While I leaned on Darah�s collection of Udje poetry to illustrate growing mass consciousness of capitalist penetration among Urhobo generally, I used the happenings in Uvwie land to sketch the process of land alienation that had commenced. Here is a fragment of how I expressed it 26 years ago:
From my personal observations, the singular
feature of
the current state of capitalist penetration of Urhobo villages,
following the
oil rush, is the process of rapid land alienation. Uvwie villages,
which are
immediately adjacent to the city, have faced the pressure more
intensely and
without any advance warning. Within the short time that the city of
This material haemorrhage, this massive
dispossession
of Uvwie peasants of the means of production, land, has been effected
through
the mechanisms of forcible expropriation, deceit, corruption, state
acquisition
and commercial transaction whose morality is unproblematic only in the
fetid
ethical system of bourgeois legal
culture.
The leaders of this coerced
proletarianization
movement are big landlords who have converted the farmlands into giant
housing
estates, �layouts� and hotels for high-class corporate tenants. Today,
Uvwie
villages are imprisoned in a forbidden ring of estates and layouts
boldly
flaunting the obscene egoism of the new lords of the land on gilded
sign
boards: �Chief Oguobi�s Estate�,
�Mr. Ozighe�s layout; Ogbare�s Mansion�.
A variegated
assortment of hotels, motels, �guest houses� and �inns� dot the area
like
smallpox. My natal village Ugborikoko, is today without farmland,
imprisoned,
in this capitalist transformation of the ecology.
In
this land racket Uvwie villagers were truly ambushed. The land pirates
had the
money. The villagers had no money. The land pirates could afford the
best
lawyers and the services of professional surveyors. The villagers could
not.
All that villagers had were oral chronicles of geneologies of their
forebears
who tamed the land. The land pirate with his money could summon
emergency fake
griots (who had also begun to emerge) to fabricate geneological claims
on
behalf of the pirate for a fee.
Meanwhile,
the litigation battle is an unequal one. Desperate and pressed to the
wall, the
peasant villagers fall back on their only ultimate cultural resource:
they
sacrifice to the ancestors and summon them to come and defend their
children.
They perform magic before they go to court only to discover that money,
the god
of the capitalist age is thicker than the blood knot between peasant
and
ancestor. Thus defeated, some villagers capitulate and accept the
�magnanimous�
offer of �compensation� by the pirate. But the financial �compensation�
is for
this year�s crops, and not for the infinite generations of crops that
future
generations of the village will require for their sustenance.
5. Definition of youth is elastic. Some have membership spanning 19-50 years of age. The driving force is really the search for employment. Some refer to the older members as �big youth."
A non-indigene member, an artisan in his 30s from outside the Niger Delta zone said: "For years I have nothing doing. The only way to survive is to join the youth, and since I joined I have been getting some money."
6. Membership spans the educational spectrum. There are graduates, HND, NCE holders, artisans, SSCE and primary school certificate holders. It is not true that members are a bunch of dropouts
7. On how long one can remain a member? A respondent said:
8. Membership is all-male. But they are ready to gbeghe companies for the employment of women.
9. Groups get additional funds through membership levies and monthly contribution of a percentage of salaries earned by those who secured employment through the groups lobby; and the fines they impose on cases they settle among litigants in youth �courts�. They also make money from fees paid by persons who seek their services in recovering debts via their display of �gbeghe� (the show of force). Funds are shared by members immediately.
10. On the critical question of personal future goals. All responses stress to �get a job�; other expressions are �take care of my children�, �get married�, �settle down�, �to become a businessman�, �to become a politician� and, in one case, to �gain admission to University�. On Future community goals: they say they �wish to see my community developed."
11. The two sources of violence that has often spilt over from the groups to fracture the community itself have come from the chronic problem of Executive Committee successions; and the infiltration of the groups by rival politicians seeking to use the groups for electoral campaigns support.
The
flight of business organisations because of frequent youth �gbeghe� and
the
Exco succession crisis, which is the occasion for much factional
violence, and
has sometimes led to loss of lives, property destruction and
instability in the
community has provoked community initiatives. Some communities have now
set up
committees to ensure peaceful succession and prohibited the
associations from
involvement in extra legal activities.
Implications for Urhobo Future:
Notwithstanding
the tentative nature of the findings from the study-in-progress, they
indicate
that all is not lost even in sites of galloping urbanisation such as
Uvwie land
and Warri. This is because the members, as well as, opponents of the
youth
associations state emphatically, that the main goal of the groups is
lobbying
for paid employment from the business corporations operating in the
area. When
pressed for remedial suggestions, both members and their opponents urge
the
creation of more jobs in the area by government and other relevant
development
agencies.
Members
state personal future goals and ambitions of �settling down� and
raising
families as soon as � I have a good job�. They claim they would cease
to be members
as soon as they have employment, to enable them focus on their careers.
In
deed, the study confirms several cases of such former members who quit
after
they secured jobs. This means that members see the association as a
temporary
instrument for unlocking closed employment doors. They are of course
aware that
the extortion of �development levies� and �compensation� fees from
companies
and individuals is illegal. These are illegal desperate acts for
survival in an
economic environment where legitimate alternatives are presently bare.
However,
the fact that they dream of personal futures of settled life outside
this kind
of youth association, indicates that they have not deteriorated to a
mindset
which celebrates idleness and survival predicated on illegal use of
force. In
some parts of the Niger Delta, community leaders are already expressing
great
anxiety about the future behavioural consequences of the huge �stand
by� wages
paid to some unemployed youth by oil corporations, just to buy peace.
Unemployment
is a nation-wide problem, which is now further exacerbated by ongoing
SAP-type
�reforms�. It is a veritable social time-bomb: and it is already
manifesting as
the flash point for riots across the country, expressed in a variety of
ideological colourations. Although a full resolution of the crisis
requires a growing of the national economy, the
local situation can still be relieved somewhat.
For
example, the state government can insist that the giant companies
comply
strictly with the regulation restricting job positions of certain grade
levels
to host communities. The local governments and the Community Based
Organisations (CBOs) can, through patient dialogue, persuade smaller
business
outfits to reserve some of their job positions to their host
communities as
well. This will enhance the climate of peace necessary for the orderly
conduct
of business and the growth of the economy. The leaders of the CBOs and
the
Local Government Councils ought to ensure that they bring to the
attention of
NDDC the concrete needs of the grassroots of their communities. That
way, the
NDDC can match development projects to real community needs. The
current NDDC
practice of explaining their master �plan to contractors and
politicians at
local government headquarters, does not reach down to populations in
greatest
need of development.
Meanwhile,
the flight of companies and other commercial outfits from Urhobo land
because
of the violence and insecurity contributed by �gbeghe�
- �deve� violence of the youth associations-
has become clear to the communities and the youth alike. The very
employment,
which they seek, is vanishing because of their mode of approach. A
number of
communities are already taking initiatives to rein in the youth
associations
and gradually return them to the traditional role of serving the
community
under the directives of ekpako. The
recent move of the UPU to inaugurate a central youth body to monitor
and
coordinate youth associational activities, through representatives from
the
clans, is an appropriate initiative.
Youth
in rural Urhoboland still have the advantage of early insertion into
the
productive family economy through availability of farmland, unlike
their urban
counterparts. The project of road construction and rehabilitation,
which the
current state government has undertaken, has already produced an
impressive
network of motorable roads. This has opened up market access for rural
farm
economies. This has also created the possibilities for youth to have
their
primary and secondary education within their villages and towns, with
eventual
access to University education less than two hours from home. The
upshot of
this is that rural youth can complete primary and secondary education,
without
being alienated from a work ethic. This is an opportunity now largely
lost in
the enculturation curricula of youth growing up in the urban Urhobo.
However,
despite this rural advantage, educated youth will be attracted to
agricultural
pursuits as a long-term option only if the agrarian economy is
revolutionised. Here
then is a vast opportunity for Urhobo entrepreneurs� industrial
mechanisation
of agriculture. Fortunately the state government is currently promoting
programmes for a refocusing on agriculture: and has in fact set up a
successful
training facility �
The
state, the UPU, Urhobo Associations, CBOs and communities have a role
to play
in rescuing the youth groups from the violent lumpen
regressions which now contaminate their original employment
seeking goal. The aforementioned bodies need to seek ways of
terminating the
sources of small arms supply to the region. Where do the guns come
from? The
commercial networks, which drive substance abuse among youth, must also
be
dismantled. No nation progresses with a population addicted to
substance abuse.
Where the habit had taken roots, its eradication has been one of the
first
priority objectives of third world revolutions, as was the case of
As
I had indicated earlier, provided that some rehabilitative action is
taken,
youth that presently constitute the associational type that has been
discussed,
do not seem to me to constitute a major hurdle to Urhobo future.
Fortunately,
female youth are thus far, largely insulated from this associational
type.
Urhobo have also escaped the teenage female delinquency which first hit
Urhobo
youth- in the form of hotel and night club prostitution with expatriate
oil
workers, in the late sixties to mid seventies, when the oil rush
commenced.
Many teenage girls abandoned their school for the �easy life� at the
time. It
appears also that Urhobo female youth are happily under-represented in
the
current international network of migrant prostitution. We must salute
our
mothers for so protecting our female youth in these truly trying times.
To
my mind therefore there are more serious challenges facing the Urhobo
future in
the poly-ethnic/poly-national constituencies of the
Urhobo Future: Other Challenges:
We
are faced with four crucial challenges. They are the questions of
cultural
identity, leadership, politics and nation-class tensions. I discuss
them in
capsule form.
1. Cultural Identity:
Language is the key aspect of Urhobo cultural
identity. And it is proper that its significance has recurred in
various
sessions of this conference. In deed, it has always been an agitational
issue
in all-important gatherings of Urhobo. I suspect that Urhobo
Associations and
�Meetings� in ukale locations in
The case of the Australian Aborigines is a
tragic
empirical lesson. One of the indices of inequities in the Nigerian
polity is
its neglect of the promotion of the languages of the minority ethnic
groups.
The system works on the assumption that national integration
requirement is
achieved when the languages and cultural symbols of the big three
ethnic groups
have been provided for. Other minority groups in the Niger Delta and
the Middle
Belt are also now much concerned with this problem. But it must be said
also
that the big three are not relying solely on federal support. They have
been
doing a lot for themselves in the promotion of their languages,
literatures,
dress modes etc. In seeking to reverse this trend with respect to
Urhobo
language, we can learn much from the initiatives of the Yoruba, Hausa
and Igbo.
In promoting the language and culture of
Urhobo the
Local Governments, Urhobo CBOs, and other Associations can do a lot for
us
without waiting for initiatives from higher organs of state power in
the
Federation. Among a host of things they can jointly do is the
establishment of
community Radio and Television stations devoted to cultural promotion.
For
example national and world news, discussion, enlightenment, religious
and entertainment
programmes can be broadcast in Urhobo in such media.
Research and publications can be funded on a
regular
basis if the local councils expand the notion of development beyond
motor park
and market stalls construction, to include culture development.
There is yet another issue: masquerade
festivals used
to be a fecund source for cultural renewal and community solidarity.
Occupational changes among the population, the dispersal of youth from
home for
education and career pursuits are some of the factors that have led to
their
decline. But there is a new force in the land- Christian Pentecostal
evangelism
that now paganises cultural
practices, including these masquerade festivals which, in essence, were
classical indigenous Urhobo theatre. FESTAC is now denounced by these
evangelists as having spiritually polluted
Are we not faced here with a major cultural
cost? Is
there not a middle ground? Is the ongoing uncritical demonisation of
the
indigenous environment not itself a source of Urhobo identity
disorientation
for the coming generation? The Urhobo Historical Society may wish to
organise a
thoughtful panel on the question.
2. Leadership question:
After the golden age of the UPU under Mukoro
Mowoe and
his associates who succeeded him, this apex organisation of the Urhobo
has been
plagued by successive leadership crisis. The problem is now almost
endemic.
This problem has also been remarked upon at Urhobo assemblies. Whereas,
the
discussion of the language problem unites, that of the leadership
question
fractures the community. Whereas successful initiatives are already
being
contributed to the resolution of the culture problem; resolution
efforts on the
leadership concern continue to totter.
It is an issue still requiring deep thought.
For my
part I think that a serious aspect of the problem which is often
neglected is
followership. I hold the view that leadership is not all just charisma.
The followership
also matters. A leader is as strong as his followership. A weak
followership
can wreck leadership. In my judgement, the modern generation of Urhobo
are poor
followers. Ethnography of modern Urhobo public occasions will reveal a
constant
alteration of seating arrangements at the high table and on the front
row.
Everyone wants to be at the high table or front row whether or not such
�notable� is directly relevant to the occasion. Each is a �leader� at
all
times.
I have usually argued that the poverty of
followership
stems from the deep tradition of republicanism and egalitarianism,
which
informed Urhobo social structures and cultures for very many
generations. We do
not, in my view, have long-standing traditions of living under rigid
neo-feudal
hierarchical structures. Such hierarchies institutionalised deep
traditions of
deference performance and subservience. In fact, there are several
instances
where mass migrations of whole communities were driven by the desire to
be free
of tyrannical polities. In such instances, the present kingdomite
revivalisms
represent a return to a past, which had been superceded. These returns
are
adaptations to a colonially crafted polity with structured privileges
according
to the degree of feudality of the constituent societies. Our colonial
master-nation, we should remember, did not complete its own democratic
revolution from feudal monarchism.
By my hypothesis, the stabilisation of Urhobo
modern
leadership in its apex organisation will therefore require deep thought
about
far-reaching democratisation of its constitutions.
3. Politics
This is another area of concern in thinking
about the
Urhobo future. In particular I have in mind the question of political
party
affiliation. Despite official and popular public thinking that Nigerian
political constituencies, and voting behaviour, are ethnic, it is also
the case
that politics fractures ethnic communities. People also consider their
self-interests and moral principles in the choice of party affiliation
and the
candidates to support at elections.
As a people the significant political injury
suffered
by the Urhobo in Warri under the Action Group government in the Western
region,
created a long-standing anxiety about being in the opposition. The fear
and
distaste of opposition is indeed a pervasive Nigerian phenomenon. It
derives
from the deformed values of the current political culture where control
of the
state apparatus is crucially for accumulation, and the settling of
scores.
Ethnic minorities are particularly disadvantaged if they find that
their votes
went to the losing political party. The consideration, come election
time, is
to hop on to the �winning� party wagon regardless of the relevance of
its
manifesto, if there ever was one. Even if the voting was a hoax, it
does not
seem to matter as long as one�s own ethnic minority constituency was
rigged to
the wining party. If the rigging is 100%, that is better: one can
deploy the
one hundred percent support in bargaining for appointments and other
spoils.
Yet for all that political strategising about
being on
the winning side, no matter what, there is today general complaints
that the
Urhobo have not found any special favours. More fundamentally,
Urhoboland
suffers the disabilities of neglect, environmental damage and
underdevelopment
of the Niger Delta zone. It is this stagnation that is at the root of
the
emergence of the youth disturbances we have discussed. Fortunately due
to
combination of youth social movements with clear political economy and
environmental protection agendas in Rivers and Bayelsa states, and the
political activism of the current crop of State Governors of the Niger
Delta,
the problem of marginalisation can no longer be quarantined from
national
consciousness. Yet the same one-party winners regime, routinely
threatens the
fruits of this struggle-NDDC, onshore-offshore agreement- through state
governments controlled by the winning party where our states are
members.
It is my position that the developmental
transformation of the Niger Delta zone will hugely facilitate the
development
of all the states and ethnic nations- including Urhobo- of the zone. On
this
ground, I suggest that it is time for Urhobo politicians to encourage
the
establishment of a Niger Delta political personality. They in
association with
their colleagues in the zone can form their own political party with
manifesto
articulating the special problems of the area. The party can then
invite
alliances across the country on the basis of terms that will include
the core
concerns of the zone. As it is, despite the revived awakening, Niger
Delta
zonal concerns receive grudging treatment, because our political elite
now lost
in the world of the big party, are reduced to the status of appendage
politicians.
4. Nation - Class Tensions
This is the fourth challenge, which faces the
Urhobo
future. However, I do not think it has usually been posed in this way,
although
the empirical consequences are much discussed. I consider the caption
unsatisfactory; but it is for want of a better expression. In any case,
by it I
am referring to the sentiment of common solidarity and unity �of-
interests�
assumption which informs our public discussions on occasions like this.
Are
there no risks in taking this common solidarity for granted? Will it
hold for
all instances requiring collective effort? Has it in fact held on all
fronts
today? Is this assumption not an exceptionalist view, which places the
Urhobo
outside of Nigerian history?
Yet it is the case that like other ethnic
groups in
Conclusion:
By
way of conclusion, let me remind the conference that the Urhobo
heritage has a
time honoured technique for seeing
the future, it is evwa, divination.
I had no time to consult any diviner before preparing my address. One
of the
secular techniques for an approximate apprehension of the future of a
culture
or society is to do a SWOT analysis- that is the strengths and
weaknesses of
the internal environment, as well as, the opportunities and threats
from the
external environment. Although I did not follow the SWOT framework in
this
address, I am convinced that the Urhobo Historical Society has through
the
quality of participants and resources it has attracted from within
Urhobo, is
evidence of the peoples� strength.
If
we keep up the momentum, much poverty can be banished from this part of
It
is therefore my hope that this programme of protecting the environment,
safeguarding the livelihoods, heritage and dignity will strengthen the
voices
of Urhobo sons and daughters in the ongoing struggle to reformat the
Nigerian
state in a truly democratic direction. In this regard, other
progressive
constituencies, ethnic and transethnic, eagerly await our participation
in the
sovereign national conference.
It
remains for me to thank you for your audience.
NOTES
I wish to acknowledge the following persons with whom I had extensive consultations on different aspects of the youth restiveness in Urhobo land today. They are my brother T.A Onoge and our friend Rotarian Luman Gbemre, JP. Both of them are current presidents of the apex Community Based Organisations (CBOs) in the neighbouring kingdoms of Uvwie and Ughievwen, respectively.
In their capacities as presidents of the CBOs they willy-nilly engage this restiveness and its consequences for the community, business corporations, security officers and the youth themselves. They and their executive committees have frequently had to deploy a great deal of tact and patience in mediating among this quartet of forces to produce a win-win environment for all.
I also consulted with my friend Chief Raphael Okene, the Otota of Otovwodo, Agbarah Ame (Agbassa) Kingdom, Warri. He also grapples practically with the problem in his capacity as a community leader.
In conformity with the comradeship tradition of deep consultation of our movement way back at the
Finally, I must here appreciate the patience of my daughter, Otome Ighofose Onoge, an undergraduate of the Faculty of Law,
References
1. Omafume F. Onoge: �Towards a Marxist Sociology of African Literature�, in George M. Gugelberger ed.; Marxism and African Literature, James Currey Ltd.;
2. Omafume F. Onoge: �Rural Poverty in Nigerian Bourgeois Sociology: A materialist Critique� in Onigu Otite and Christine Okali, eds., Nigerian Rural Society and Economy: A Book of Readings. Heinemann Educational Books (