Urhobo Historical Society
|
<>
STRATEGIES
FOR SELF-RELIANT
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
OF
URHOBOLAND
By
Dr.
Emmanuel O. Ojameruaye
<>
A paper presented
at the 5th
Annual Conference of Urhobo Historical Society at PTI Conference
Centre,
Effurun, Delta State, Nigeria, October 30, 2004.
0. Introduction
Historically, the
Urhobo people are known to be one of the
most hard-working and enterprising peoples in Nigeria, relying on their
own
human and material resources for sustenance and growth. Collectively,
they had
built community schools, earth roads, and town halls and awarded
scholarships
to deserving children. There were many vibrant non-governmental
organizations
(such as the Urhobo Progress Union, UPU) and community-based
organizations and
groups that initiated and propelled self-help efforts in Urhoboland.
Because
government (federal and regional/state) was “far” from the area, the
people had
to learn to “do-it-themselves”. However, over the past 30 years there
has been
a steady erosion of the spirit of self-reliant economic development in
Urhoboland due to a combination of many factors, notably the growth in
government, the perverse attitude to politics and the exploration and
production of hydrocarbon (oil and gas) in the area.
Against this background, this paper examines
the concept of self-reliant development
within the context of Urhoboland and offers some suggestions on how to
promote
and sustain self-reliant development in the area. Section 1 of the
paper
describes the concept of self-reliant development. Section 2 takes a
look at
the state of the economy of Urhoboland and some of the factors
responsible for
the dampening of self-reliance in the area. In section 3 we present
some
actions necessary to revive, promote and sustain self-reliant economic
development of the area.
1. Self-reliant Development
It is the natural desire of every
economic
unit (be
it continental, regional, national, state, ethnic, local, individual,
etc) to
minimize its dependence on the resources of other economic units. In
other
words, a rational economic unit would strive to depend on its own
(internal
resources) for sustenance and growth and avoid excessive reliance on
external
resources. This however does not preclude the use or support of
external
resources. This natural tendency has found expression in economic
development
literature as “self-reliance” or
“self-reliant economic development”.
Thus, self-reliant economic development may be defined as that
type of
development that relies on the human and material resources of the
economic
unit whose development is the subject of discussion. In other words, it
is
development that relies on “internal” resources as opposed to
development that
relies heavily on “external” resources. Self-reliant development is not
autarky; it allows for “external” support, but it is propelled and
sustained by
“internal” resources. Thus one of the common objectives you find in
economic
plans or blueprints of continental, regional, national and state
organizations
or governments is “to promote self-reliant developmeent."
Even as these units pursue policies of self-reliance and strive to
ensure
“autonomy”, they allow for substantial external support. In fact, a
fundamental
conundrum of “self-reliance” is that in many cases external resources
do “make
a difference” thus challenging the “independence or autonomy” of the
economic
unit. In fact, self-reliance can be
viewed as a continuum that is bounded on the left-hand side by
parasitism and
on the right-hand side by autarky but which does not include both
boundaries. Thus we can talk of
different degrees or levels of self-reliance; the farther an economic
unit is
to the right-hand side of the continuum, the more self-reliant it is.
It is important to note that
neoconservatives
as
well as neoliberals subscribe to extreme view of self-reliance. They
consider
social welfare and social development to be the responsibility of local
communities and social organizations, and the philanthropic sector –
not of the
business sector and the state. This position was pushed to its extreme
in Chile
from 1973 to 1989 with disastrous results, and with millions of people
driven
into poverty. The Chilean experience clearly demonstrated that without
appropriate social policies and support from the state, communities and
social
organizations might not be able to help people rise above poverty and
address
quality of life issues.
At the micro level the concept of
self-reliant
development is expressed in the principles of self-help. The dictionary
defines
self-help as “the act or instance of helping or improving oneself
without
assistance from others”. In other words, it is “do-it-yourself” (DIY).
Today,
there are very many self-help or DIY books, tools and other resources
to assist
individuals in doing a wide variety of things. In practice, however,
there is
hardly anything like DIY because some form of “external” assistance is
usually
required for an individual to improve himself. For instance, you may
need to
read a DIY book (written by somebody else) to be able to fix a problem
(e.g.
electrical or plumbing) by yourself. This is why economists take a more
robust
view of self-help as “helping poor and disadvantaged people to help
themselves”. In other words, it is “assisted self-help” or
“autonomy-respecting
help."
It is recognized that poor and disadvantaged people find it
extremely
difficult
to improve their condition of living without outside help. Sometimes
they even
become “complacent with poverty”. In such a situation, external help or
support
can serve as a catalyst or provide the push for action against poverty
or to
improve condition of living, and even to sustain improvement actions. In fact, self-reliance can be regarded as a
“helper-doer” relationship or game where the “principles of self-help”
are
adhered to. These principles involve the following actions:
1.
The outsider must make a
positive difference in the living conditions of the doer (the helped),
i.e. the
impact of the helper must be seen as felt.
2. The doer (the helped) must own and implement the program
or plan
of assistance.
3. The outsider must see the world through the eyes of the
doer and
respect the autonomy of the doer.
4. The help or support must not undercut the autonomy of
the doer
–too much help can make the helped lazy.
5. The help must be for a limited period of time –
long-term
charity corrupts self-help and undercuts the capacity for development.
6. The doer should be able to sustain or continue with the
development process if and when the help stops or even terminated
abruptly.
Many countries and groups
have adopted
the
principles of self-reliance in promoting rapid development. A classic
example
is the Harambee Secondary School Movement in Kenya from the mid 1960s
to the
late 1980s. It was a spontaneous grassroots initiative to develop
greater
access to secondary school education than what the government could
provide
after the country’s independence from
Britain in 1963. The Harambee (or self-help) schools provided 2 to 4
years of
formal secondary education. Although the Harambee schools differed
slightly
from one another, they shared some common features and were formed in
three
stages:
a)
Firstly (i.e.
initiation stage), community leaders (including district education
officers,
community development officers and local teachers) created awareness in
the
local community on the need for a secondary school within the community.
b) Secondly (i.e. organization stage), the community
leaders
defined participation criteria and funding procedures.
c)
L
astly (i.e. implementation
stage), leaders of local work groups take charge of work teams and
sustain commitment
throughout the construction phase. Churches or other established groups
are
selected to manage the schools and to contribute financial while the
day-to-day
functioning of the schools was left in the hands of registered
management
committees, represented by the Head Teacher and Community Leaders.
Some of the Harambee schools were assisted by
government and thus attracted government resources to local
communities. The
Harambee movement also helped to build indigenous community
institutions that
advanced local development. Thanks to the Haramabee movement, primary
school
enrollment in Kenya increased from 900,000 in 1963 to about 2,000,000
in 1973
while the number of government-assisted Harambee schools increased from
19 in
1964 to 1,142 in 1989. However, many of the schools had some problems
vis-à-vis
government schools in the cities. These problems included the use of
lesser
qualified teachers, higher student/teacher ratio, poorer facilities and
poor
performance. These problems notwithstanding, many communities and
groups and
the country as a whole recorded the significant progress in education
in the
period after independence that would not have been possible without the
movement. In the early 1990s, the Government of Kenya took
responsibility for all
the Harambee schools, putting an end to the movement and to the
dichotomy
between government and Harambee schools.
There is no doubt that the current
situation
in
Urhoboland calls for the (re)adoption of a self-reliant approach to
development
if we are to overcome some of the current maladies in the area.
2. The
Political Economy of Urhoboland
Generally, the Urhobo people and their
area
can be
regarded as poor and disadvantaged within the Nigerian polity.
Although, the
Urhobo people rank as one of Nigeria’s 10 largest ethnic nationalities,
they are still a minority and it is fair to say that they have not had
their
fair share in the allocation of federal resources including
appointments. They
have never had any significant impact or influence in the allocation of
resources at the federal level. Hence the area has suffered from
relative
neglect by the federal government. For example, although the area
accounts for
about 20% of electricity production by the National Electric Power
Authority
(NEPA) and about 8% of crude oil output, yet much of the area suffers
from
irregular power supply or have no access to electricity at all. There
is no
federal university and the few federal projects include the Petroleum
Training
Institute, the Warri Petrochemical Plant and the Delta Steel Company
(DSC)
Plant.
When Urhoboland was
under the
Western Region (then controlled by the Action Group party) , it was
also
marginalized because the area was largely pro-National Council of
Nigerian
Citizen (NCNC) party. Before the creation of Delta State, the Urhobo people also had limited
influence in then
Midwestern Region/State and then Bendel State government. Therefore, with neglect by the
federal
government and relative marginalization by the regional government, the
Urhobo
people had to adopt self-reliant strategies of development. Thus in the
period
before and immediately after Nigeria’s independence, agriculture and industrial
activities
flourished in much of Urhoboland. The area was self-sufficient in food
production, notably garri, starch, yams, plantain, banana, vegetables,
fish and
“bush meat”. It was noted for the production and export of rubber, palm
produce
(oil and kernel) and timber. There were several industries in Sapele,
Oghara,
Ughelli, Effurun and the Urhobo area of Warri city. Open
unemployment was
hardly known. In the early 1960s, crude oil was discovered in parts of
Urhoboland (Kokori, Ughelli) and later in the 1970s and 1980s
in
Sapele, Udu, Oghara and elsewhere. Since then several oil
production
facilities have been established in Urhoboland. In the 1970s and 1980s,
some
important industries were established in the area including the DSC
Plant at
Aladja, Glass Factories near Ekakpamre, the NEPA Power Plants near
Ekakpamre
and Sapele, a number of breweries and beverage drink industries (e.g.
Skol,
Sparkling) and the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC)
Petrochemical
Plant at Ekpan.
However, since the
late
1980s, the area has witnessed a steady decline in agricultural,
commercial and
industrial activities and decline in entrepreneurship. With the
creation of Delta State in 1991, the Urhobo people became the
majority ethnic
group in the state and have produced the two democratically elected
Governors
for the period January 1992 –November 1993 and May 1999 to date (i.e.
about 6
out of 13 years of the State). Ironically, the creation of Delta state
and the
influence of Urhobos in the allocation of the states’ resources have
increased
dependency on the state government and dampened the drive for
self-reliance.
Since the past ten years, an increasing number of people now believe
that the
fastest, surest and easiest way of making money is through involvement
in
politics and securing of government contracts. The exploration and
production
of crude oil and gas in the area has also dampened the drive for
self-reliance
and increased dependency on oil companies, especially since the late
1980s.
Many oil-bearing communities in Urhoboland now look onto oil companies
to
provide scholarships, to build schools, hospitals or clinics, roads and
for
cash compensation for acquired land or environmental pollution or oil
spills. Almost gone are the days when communities will come
together,
contribute money to build a school or town hall or award scholarships
to
deserving kids. Now it is either government or oil companies. Thus,
since the
mid 1980s, the spirit of self-reliance in Urhoboland has gradually
given way to
the spirit of laziness, idleness and dependency on government and oil
companies. A significant number of enterprising and talented Urhobo men
and
women now troop to the offices of government or oil companies to
literally beg
for contracts. Many have moved out of Urhoboland to “greener pastures”
in Lagos, Port Harcourt, Kaduna, Jos and overseas. The business environment
has also
become increasingly less conducive with increasing insecurity
(e.g.
recent bank robberies in Sapele, Ughelli, and Abraka), disruption of
economic
activities by restive youths, growing extortionist activity of youths,
difficulty in obtaining land for economic activities, lack of adequate
infrastructure for businesses, difficulty in accessing business finance
(for
large, medium and micro enterprises) and movement (relocation) of
existing
industries and businesses from the area to safer haven outside. Some of
the
once flourishing industries are either dead or are dying or are in a
state of
suspended animation such the DSC and the African Timber &
Plywood
(AT&P) company. Many oil-servicing companies have pulled out of
Effurun. In a sense, government and oil companies seem to have
crowded
out the development efforts of local communities and social
organizations. In
short, one can conclude that Urhoboland has moved farther to the
left-hand side
of the continuum of self-reliance.
As a result of the
above
factors, the economy of Urhoboland is currently in a very bad shape.
There has
been a steady and significant decline in agriculture – decline in both
the
production of cash crops (rubber, palm produce) and food crops as well
as in
home gardening, livestock production and fishing. There has also
been a
sharp decline in timber production due to uncontrolled lumbering, use
of wood
for fuel and non-planting of replacement trees. The industrial base
remains
very weak. Many key industries are now moribund. Commerce is also and
limited
and weak with the steady decline in entrepreneurship. Traders from the
area
have to travel all the way to Onitsha and Lagos to buy their wares. Sapele
port has since been closed down (and replaced by a Naval Base) while
Warri port
is now but a shadow of what it used to be due to conflicts in the
riverine
areas, general insecurity and activities of pirates and illegal oil
“bunkerers”
along the water ways. Even crude oil production, currently put at about
64million barrels a year or about 8% of national output, is likely to
decline
due to aging oil wells, community unrest and better offshore oil
prospects.
Tourism is very weak and almost non-existent. The security is worsening
with
frequent armed robberies and youth gansterism and extortion of property
developers and businesses under the guise of “development levies”. At
the same
time there is growing reliance (dependency) on the state government
(AGDS) and
on oil companies (AGDO) while investment and interest by federal
government
remains very low. Finally, there has been a decline in the number and
vibrancy
of civil society organizations (CSOs) in Urhoboland.
3.
Strategies for Promoting Self-reliant Development in Urhoboland.
<>In view of the gloomy
situation of the
economy of
Urhoboland painted in the above section, there is an urgent need to
take
concrete actions to revive, promote and sustain self-reliant economic
development in Urhoboland, i.e. development that depends on the
natural,
material and human resources of the area. In doing this, the support of
both
the federal and state governments as well as the business sector must
be
properly harnessed without creating over-dependency and reducing the
capacity
or drive for self-reliance in the area. Accordingly, we propose the
following
actions for self-reliant development of Urhoboland.
3.1 Promoting
Vibrant Civil Society Organizations
<>Civil society organizations (CSOs) are
defined as
“an array of people’s organizations, voluntary associations, clubs,
self-help
or interest groups, religious bodies, representative organs,
non-governmental
organizations (NGOs), foundations and social movements which may be
formal or
informal in nature and which are not part of government or political
parties,
and are not established to make profits for their owners. In today’s world, CSOs play very
important
roles, including the following:
a)
providing
space for the mobilization,
articulation and
pursuit of interests by groups;
b) providing
institutional means for mediating
between
conflicting interest and social values;
c)
giving
expression and direction to social,
religious
and cultural needs;
d)
limiting
the inherent tendency of
governments to expand
their control;
e)
urturing
the values of citizenship;
f)
mplementing
development programs and
projects aimed at
improving the quality of life of local people;
g)
acilitating
communication between
beneficiaries and
donors, voicing community needs and building local capacity.
Of particular interest are
community-based
organizations (CBOs) and NGOs (advocacy and developmental types). In
fact, NGOs
have become key players in international development assistance. Over
20% of
total overseas development assistance (ODA) to developing countries is
now
channeled through NGOs compared to about 5% in 1970-1988.
<>Urhobo
leaders, elite and communities must
mobilize to reactivate existing CBOs and NGOs and create new ones.
Every
village or community and “quarters” or “wards” in towns must have a
Community
Development Committee (CDC) to play some of roles outlined above. In
addition,
urhobo professionals, businessmen and those with “means” and
“connections”
should work together to form NGOs that can compete with NGOs from other
parts
of Nigeria in attracting development resources and projects to
urhoboland. A
cursory look at the spatial distribution of development assistance in Nigeria shows that
they are concentrated in regions with
vibrant NGOs (e.g. the West) and urhoboland belongs to one of the
neglected area<>. It is also important for rich urhobo sons
and
daughters to imbibe the ethos of volunteerism and philanthropy and
invest more
in their local communities as was the case in the past. They can
establish
Foundations that can support community development efforts in their
communities
and throughout urhoboland.
3.2 Promoting
Private Sector Investment in the Social Sector (Education and Health)
<>Today there are no centers of
excellence in
education and health in urhoboland. In years past, Eku
Baptist Hospital,
Urhobo College,
Government College Ughelli and the Government Trade Center Sapele used
to be
centers of excellence that attracted “clients” from all over the
country.
Today, they are no more. The only university in urhoboland, the
state-owned Delta State
University,
Abraka, lack the resources that will make it a centre of excellence in
university education. In fact, it is usually the second or third choice
by many
urhobo students who sit for the JAMB while urhobo parents who can
afford it
prefer sending their children to the new private universities in other
states
including the Igbinedion University,
Okada. Similarly, many parents now send their kids to private high
schools in Edo State
and elsewhere. The same is
true of health facilities. Urhoboland is dotted with some government
hospitals
and several small private hospitals and clinics that can hardly provide
state-of-the-art medical treatment. Thus those who can afford it go
outside the
area to receive specialist medical treatment. All these have resulted
in
significant capital flight and brain drain from the area. Urhobo
leaders,
professionals and businessmen are therefore challenged to pull their
resources
together to establish centers of excellence in education (at least one
private
university and some high schools) and health in urhoboland. I strongly
believe
that such centres are economically viable. Given the amount of capital
investment required, they can be established through partnerships (e.g.
like
the EKO Hospital
in Ikeja) or through Joint Venture arrangements with government.
3.3 Promoting
Private Sector Investment in Economic Activities
<>Similarly there is an urgent need to
promote
private sector investment in economic activities by urhobo
entrepreneurs.
Although there are no data to confirm it, one may not be wrong to say
that the
level of urhobo investment in the diaspora is more than the level in
the
homeland. To be sure, many factors have discouraged investment in the
homeland
by urhobo businessmen. These include the poor security situation, the
high cost
of doing business, lack of or inadequate social infrastructure
(electricity,
water, public utilities), high cost and problems with land acquisition,
youth
disturbances, weak purchasing power, poor transportation network, etc.
These
constraints must be addressed by government and civil society
organizations.
Some of the specific actions that should be taken include the following:
a)
Setting
up an urhobo Chambers of Agriculture,
Commerce and industry (UCACI).
b)
Reactivating
agricultural development by
restoring soil
fertility; reactivating the production of rubber, palm produce,
cassava,
plantain and banana; establishing agro-based export industries such as
cassava-processing and starch manufacturing factories, palm-oil and
cake
industry and fruit drinks/beverages industry.
c)
Reactivating
the timber industry through
re-planting of
trees and halting indiscriminate lumbering and promoting alternatives
to the
use of wood as fuel.
d)
Reactivating
the moribund industries in
Urhoboland or
transforming/re-tooling them into other types of viable industries
(e.g. ATP
Sapele, the breweries, the glass factory, rubber processing plants,
salt
factory at Ogharefe, the Delta Steel Company at Ovwian-Aladja).
e)
Setting up
export processing zones in Sapele and Warri.
f)
Setting
up of industrial estates,
self-sustaining
business development centers, business incubators and skills
acquisition
centers in major towns.
g)
Promoting
small and medium-scale industries
as well as
micro-finance institutions.
h)
Transforming
Sapele, Warri, Ughelli and
Abraka/Eku to
major commercial centres.
i)
Ensuring
security and peace, e.g. through
community
policing to weed out armed robbers, and establishment of peace and
conflict
resolution committees.
j)
Ensuring
easy and cheap access to land for
property
development, agriculture and industry, e.g. by halting
disruptive/extortionist
youth activities under the guise of “development levies."
k)
Improving
transportation by developing an
integrated
transportation plan that will include the following.
Expanding/upgrading the Osubi
airport (built by
Shell Nigeria) from the status of an “airstrip” to a full-fledged
domestic
airport and ultimately to an international airport like that of Port
Harcourt. This will make it possible for larger
aircrafts (including cargo planes) to use the airport and thus reduce
the high
cost of flying to Osubi. It will also enhance tourism, commerce and
industry.
Upgrading and continuously
maintaining the road
network in urhoboland. The Benin-Warri dual-carriage road
(expressway) should be completed as soon as
possible The Warri-Port Harcourt Road
as well as Ughelli-Asaba Road
and Effurun-Agbor and Sapele-Eku Roads should also be expanded and
dualized.
There is also an urgent need to ensure security and safety along these
roads.
Restoring urhobo inland water-ways. Dredging
the network of inland waterways in Urhoboland to
enhance water
transportation and natural drainage and deal with the menace of water
hyacinth.
Restoring Sapele
Port and relocating the
Naval Base,
NNS Umolokun. Also establishing smaller ports or large jetties at
Oghara, Eku,
Abraka and along the major rivers.
E<>
xtending the Ajaokuta-Aladja
railway line (at
least the part of it in urhoboland land or Delta
State) to several towns
(e.g.
Sapele, Oghara, Warri Port,
Ughelli) for passenger and commercial traffic. Alternatively, new railway lines can be
constructed. This will be very expensive, but we can start the planning
now and
it can be done over a long period of time. According to the Chinese
adage, “a
journey of a thousand miles begins with one step."
<>
<>
3.4 Formation
of a joint Urhobo Investment
Corporation
All the urhobo local government
councils should
work together to form a joint Urhobo Investment Corporation to manage
pan-urhobo investments, similar to the Odua and Arewa/Northern
investment entities.
3.5
Formation of
a Pan-Urhobo Representative Assembly (PURA)
<>
<>The establishment of an Urhobo state
with committed and accountable leadership is a critical success
factor
in
addressing the some of the problems of
self-reliant development in urhoboland. Since this may not
happen soon,
there is need for an arrangement that will galvanize some elected
urhobo
representatives and the organized private sector to form a body that
will act
as an all-urhobo “quasi government” to direct and guide actions that
will
ensure rapid and sustainable development of urhoboland. Members of this
body
should include the Senator representing urhoboland, elected urhobo
members of
the House of Representatives, State House of Assembly, the Chairmen of
all
urhobo LGAs, urhobo Ministers and Commissioners, the President-General
of UPU
and about ten other very important persons from the private sector and
academia. The body should meet quarterly to review developments and
take
necessary decisions and actions that will ensure sustainable
development in
urhoboland. The body should be apolitical and could
set up committees to handle specific projects
and tasks. Any urhobo person with requisite competencies
can be
appointed to
serve in such committees.
4. Conclusion
In this
paper, I
have discussed the concept of self-reliant development and outlined how
it can
be promoted and sustained in urhoboland.
I have noted that while self-reliant development (or self-help
at the
micro level) means development that depends on internal human and
material
resources, it nonetheless allows for external support by government,
businesses
and external donors. However, the process must be initiated and
propelled by
the “insiders”. I also described some of the features of the economy of
urhoboland and have noted the steady decline in the spirit of
self-reliance
over past 30 years. Finally, I made some far-reaching recommendations
to remedy
the current situation. The required actions outline in section 3 above
involve
civil society organizations in urhoboland, the elite and leader,
government and
the business community. In particular, the CSOs can lobby or put
pressure on
the appropriate arms of government to address some of those actions
that are
within the purview government, e.g. (g) and (k) above. In short, the
required
actions involve all stakeholders in urhoboland. It is only by working
together
that we can ensure self-reliant development of the area. We have no
other land
we can call our own even if we decide to remain in the Diaspora. Now
therefore is
the time to act to ensure self-reliant development of our homeland for
the
present and future generations.
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Sustainable Development of Urhoboland in Nigeria. Paper Presented at
the 11th Annual Convention of UNANA, New Jersey, USA. September 4.
8. Ojameruaye, E. (2002): Self-Help Principles
in
Community Development Practice. Unpublished Presentation Material.
9. Sullivan, L (1998): Moving Mountains –
The
Princples and Purpose of Leon Sullivan. Judson Press.
Dr.Emmanuel Ojameruaye is on loan from Shell International to the
International
Foundation for Education and Self-help (IFESH), based in
Phoenix,
Arizona, USA.
He was Head, Community Development, Shell
Nigeria, Warri Office from 1998 to January 2001;
Head,
Government and Community Affairs, Shell
Lagos Office (1992 –1995); National Consultant Economist/Statistician,
National
Data Bank Project, UNDP Lagos Office/Federal Ministry of Budget &
Planning
(1989-March 1992) and Lecturer in Economics & Statistics,
University of
Benin, Nigeria (1982-1989). He was also Secretary of the Nigerian
Economic
Society from 1987-1990.
For
instance, one of the objectives of the Sullivan Plan for the
Development of
sub-Saharan
Africa is “to encourage
self-reliance
through self-help efforts”, see Sullivan, L (1998). pp. 225-283.
See
Campfens, H ed. 1999: Community Development Around the World, p. 457.
See
Ellerman, D (not dated) Autonomy-Respecting Help: Rethinking
Development
Assistance Agencies. The World Bank.
The
population of Urhoboland is put at between 1.5m and 2.5m (i.e. between
1.2 %
and 2 % of
Nigeria’s
population) while the area is about 5,000 square km
(i.e. about 0.54% of
Nigeria’s
landmass). The Urhobo people however
constitute about 55% of the population of
Delta
State, making them the
majority
ethnic group in the state.
The are
ongoing attempts to reactivate the DSC Plant which
has been moribund for many years.
Its
Lime Plant is reported to have started
production again.
See
Fowler, A (1997). p. 8.
For
instance, the Guardian of October 15, 2004 reported that the N68.4
billion (or
42 million Euros) grant from the European Development Fund (EDF) for
the development of the Niger Delta in the
next four years will go Abia, Akwa Ibom, Cross River, Edo, Imo and Ondo
states.
The project, tagged: Micro
Project Programme 6, has the National Planning Commission as its
supervising
agency and will focus mainly on human and infrastructure development in
the
rural communities of its coverage area. It is ironical that
Delta
State (hence urhoboland) and
Bayelsa State
(the “core” Niger Delta
states) are excluded from the program at this stage.
The
construction of the Ajaokuta-Aladja railway has shown that it is
possible for
the Nigerian government to expand the railway network in the country
for both
commercial and passenger traffic. Already the Odua Group is considering
building an Ibadan-Lagos railway line.
In a
recent article in the Guardian of
August 11, 2004, Dr. G.G. Darah noted that the “
ultimate trajectory of urhobo nationalism is to attain the
status of an
all-urhobo state in Nigeria…”